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Propositions 
1. It is not possible to comprehend post-conflict land governance without understanding the 
role of the state.  
(this thesis) 
2. Without power, people or institutions cannot participate in land governance.  
(this thesis)  
3. There is no need to toy with democracy by a regime that was imposed by violence. 
4. You can only govern people that are willing to be governed.  
5. Being extremely vocal is a cover-up of inner personal battles or insecurities.  
6.  Projecting a trajectory of a PhD is like climbing and sloping incessant hills.  
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1. General Introduction 
Community meeting of 4th May 2013 at Kololo, Amuru District 
On the 4th of May 2013 all roads in Amuru district led to Kololo village. Lawyers were to deliver 
an update on the land dispute between the community of Amuru District and the Amuru 
District Land Board. The community contests allocation of 10,000 hectares of land by Amuru 
District Land Board to Amuru Sugar Company Limited, which is one of the most vehement land 
conflicts in Acholi region. Days before the community meeting local people were mobilized by 
their local leaders and announcements were run on local FM radios urging people to attend 
in big numbers. The state Minister for Water, who doubles as the Amuru District woman 
Member of Parliament, other members of parliament and other politicians were to attend the 
community meeting.   
At 1pm my research assistant and I arrived at Kololo primary school, which had structures 
constructed from mud and thatched with dry grasses. It was the venue for the meeting. At a 
stone’s throw away a makeshift police station/barracks of approximately 100 policemen was 
in place and ready to keep law and order. Local people were clustered in small groups, some 
were seated on school desks and others sat on the grass under trees to get shelter from the 
scorching sun. A pickup truck kept on ferrying people from neighboring villages to the meeting 
grounds. The majority of people arriving were youths. One could tell the level of poverty by 
looking at their torn clothes. Some were bare footed while others wore dirty clothes which 
suggested they had been directly picked from their gardens. Both the elders and youth 
seemed enthusiastic and were looking forward to receive updates about the land dispute from 
the lawyers, minister and politicians.   
At around 3pm the meeting started after an announcement that the state Minister for Water 
would be late. A local mobilizer who had failed to win in previous local council elections but 
commanded a lot of respect from the local people opened the discussions. He started by 
saying that “we finished the LRA war but now we are in conflict over land which is very 
difficult”. The people gathered were reminded of the agenda of the meeting: the lawyers 
representing the community in court would report on the progress made in negotiations 
about the conflict with the attorney general representing government.  
The lawyers then informed the people gathered that after their many meetings with the 
attorney general at state house, some resolutions had been reached between them and the 
attorney general in response to local people’s demands and concerns expressed in earlier 
meetings.  
The first of those was that the community wanted to know the exact boundaries of the land 
that was allocated to the sugar company by the district land board. The lawyers and the 
attorney general had agreed that the sugar company should show these boundaries to the 
community. The lawyers also informed the people that they would be compensated before 
they would be displaced from the land by the sugar project. The second request was to be 
better informed about the extent local people would benefit from the sugar project. In 
response, the attorney general had advised people to form and register associations that 
would communicate directly with the government on how the community would benefit. The 
third issue was people’s concern about the fact that the district land board had allocated land 
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to powerful people without proper assessments. The attorney general had promised that the 
Ministry of Lands would work on that issue, so that people’s rights to land would be protected. 
Lastly, the lawyers informed the gathered community that a team from government, including 
one minister from northern Uganda, the minister of lands and the attorney general, would 
visit the disputed land and consult the people staying on the land. The lawyers concluded by 
saying that “according to us, we see that the government is responding positively, it has 
accepted many -if not all- of our demands”. The lawyers reminded the people gathered that 
the land dispute was still in court, and if negotiation with government would fail, they could 
still hope for a court ruling in their favor. 
The reaction of local people to the report from the lawyers  
The announcement of these resolutions resulted in sporadic questions and people talking at 
the same time. Tempers were rising; people were dissatisfied with the solutions that had been 
reached between the lawyers and the attorney general. The community wondered how 
government could simply show up and allocate land to an outsider, the sugar company, 
without involving let alone informing them. People also asked “if we are relocated, and not 
compensated, what will the government do?” The people said that it was clear government 
wants to put an end to the Acholi people. People then argued that they want the government 
first to accept that the land belongs to the people, and if the government is not willing to do 
so, they are not willing to receive any team from the president.  
A young man raised his hand and was given a chance to speak. He said: a group of 100 people 
from other parts of Acholi had been invited to state house, had visited the Kakira sugar factory 
in Jinja district, and had gone to Kalangala District to visit the palm plantations and oil factory. 
However, the people from Lakang, the proposed locality for the sugar factory in Amuru 
District, had not been included in these visits. The purpose of these visits had been to have 
youths see for themselves the potential benefits of large-scale investments. The young man 
argued that these promotion visits had taken place before this community meeting in order 
to create political support for the sugar cane plantation and nurture opposing opinions among 
the Acholi.  
After the youth had spoken, other people commented that when you are not affected by 
something, how are you able to talk on behalf of the affected? All the people that had 
participated in these visits to other parts of the country had received an allowance of 
400,000shs (153 US Dollars), slept in lodges of 200,000shs (76 US Dollars) and had been 
“feasting on expensive food”. It was rumored that in total over a billion Uganda shillings had 
been spent on these visits which might have been used to build schools and open up roads in 
order to rebuild the communities after war. Some people then started to shout that some of 
the beneficiaries were present and should be stoned to death. Many of those present then 
said that people of Lakang should not go to meet the president.  
An elder remarked that some politicians disorganize and misrepresent the ways in which 
people of Acholi own land. This comment was directed to a particular prominent politician 
who is known for his support to the government’s plan to use the contested land for growing 
sugar cane. People commented that this politician wants a reward from government for 
supporting the sugar project because he lost his parliamentary seat in 2011. Other people 
then started to mention names of politicians that supported the government to give land to 
the sugar company and said that if these politicians had come to the meeting they would have 
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beaten them to death. Then the local mobilizer calmed people down and asked them to make 
a way forward. When tempers had been cooled down and some order restored, the local 
people present agreed on the following recommendations; the government should first 
accept that the disputed land was their customary land; only then government and the sugar 
company representatives could come and negotiate directly with the local people; and finally, 
that no delegates from Lakang would meet the president.  
After the community had tabled their complaints to the lawyers, the discussions drifted to 
other issues like corruption and the importance of land to the Acholi people. A middle aged 
man commented: “to us, a land conflict is the most difficult war. No one can accept to be 
pushed into fire. But why are they pushing the people of Lakang into the fire? We have 
prepared our weapons to fight. The sons of Lamogi [a clan among the Acholi people] are 
fearless, and asked the cowards to leave Lakang and go to hide in Guru-Guru hills [where the 
Lamogi rebellion against the British was fought]. The government is made of people, yet the 
people are marginalized as if they are not the government”. This remark illustrates the 
strained relationship between the Acholi people and the government, as well as the negative 
perceptions of the government prevailing among local people. 
As it was getting darker, the lawyers told the people present that an attendance list would 
circulate and that people should sign for attendance. This list of attendance could then be 
attached to the minutes of the community meeting. However, many people present refused 
to sign the attendance list, demanding their Area Member of Parliament (MP) to first tell them 
it was okay to sign. Only after this had happened, the people present started to fill out the 
attendance list. The MP told people that “our land should not be played with. If it is to be given 
out, this should be done in the right way. Many people have been arrested in connection to 
this land conflict for no good reason. People of Lakang, you should not be fearful, even if the 
government has [its police forces] on standby to execute government orders like evicting you 
from this land. To authenticate the issue of money exchanging hands to support the sugar 
project, the Area MP said: Today should be the last day to receive money from the state house; 
people should get it on their own and not on the behalf of people of Lakang”. The Area MP 
then got 500,000shs (192 US Dollars) out of his pocket and publically gave the money to the 
community leaders. He declared this money had been a bribe given to him by government to 
fuel his car to come to Kololo for the meeting yet he always comes to check on people in his 
constituency without government facilitation.  
Thereafter, another MP, representing people with disabilities from northern Uganda, and 
belonging to the NRM ruling party, was given the floor to speak. He admitted that he had given 
that money to the Area MP, and that he had evidence that this same Area MP had received 
more money from the government. This statement resulted in a fight between the two MPs. 
Then a woman from the crowd walked up to where the MPs were seated, pulled a walking 
stick from the MP representing the disabled, and tried to beat him, However, she was pulled 
away. Then the Woman MP of Amuru district -who is also the state minister for water, and 
who had arrived 30 minutes earlier- intervened and stopped the two MPs from further 
confrontation. 
At 7pm the woman MP of Amuru district was given the floor to address the people gathered 
for the meeting. She said “I am very happy to be with you even though I was late. I want to 
tell you that if the government had wanted to take the land by force, it would have done so 
already a long time ago. The fact that people are being paid to support the project is not 
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correct, because we would not be coming here to discuss this land issue.” Yet, as the minister 
continued to speak, the majority did not pay attention. I later discovered that the local people 
considered her to be supporting the interests of the government rather than those of local 
people.  
An unexpected turn of events 
At around 7:30pm, when the meeting was still ongoing, we left because our car had a flat tire, 
and we wanted to get a pump for motor cycles at Lakang centre to get some pressure. 
However, at 7:45pm we encountered a road block at Lakang centre organized by drunken 
youths armed with logs to be used for flogging people, stones, pangas, bows and arrows. The 
atmosphere got tense. My research assistant, driver and I were ordered out of the vehicle. 
From the crowd surrounding us, a young woman ordered the youth to beat me first. My driver 
and research assistant pleaded with them saying that I was only a student. Then, we were 
ordered to sit on some benches, as these youth, wanted to again discuss the land issue. The 
youths started shouting on top of their voices to make us know about their feelings towards 
the government, and how the land conflict had been handled by government and the district 
land institutions. The youth shouted that “we will continue beating up people, being violent 
until this land dispute is solved, Museveni (the president) will have to come back to Lakang, 
we will die on our land, how can a car take people from other villages to the meeting in Kololo 
and no one from Lakang is taken yet it is the headquarters of the land conflict”.  
After around 20 minutes of our “arrest” by these irate and drunk youths, the car of the Area 
MP arrived. It was stopped and he came out, he shook hands with the youth casually and 
called some of them by their names. The youth realized that he was their beloved Area MP 
and then wanted to let him continue with his journey. Yet, before the Area MP could leave 3 
other cars arrived, one carrying the state minister, another one the lawyers, and a double 
cabin pick up that was ferrying people for the meeting. The cars were blocked. The body guard 
for the minister jumped out of the car to assess the situation, he started disbanding the road 
block by removing the stones and logs from the road. Then the youth started hurling stones 
at him and at the cars, smashing some windows. The situation got out of hand and the body 
guard started shooting in the air, while the youth continued approaching towards him, he 
even slapped and kicked some of them. Because of gun shots the youth scattered a bit. The 
body guard then ordered us (people from the Kololo meeting) back into our cars and we drove 
off in a convoy; everybody memorizing of how we had escaped the wrath of the violent youths 
of Lakang. We finally reach Gulu town at midnight.  
The community meeting of 4th May 2013 at Kololo in Amuru district pointedly illustrates the 
complexities of post-conflict land governance in northern Uganda, which is the topic of this 
thesis.  In the first place, the meeting and its aftermath shows the impact of the LRA war on 
tenure security, and the way land is governed, and how claims on land in such a context may 
turn very conflictive. 
This all happens in a context where in principle district-level institutions are responsible for 
land governance. While proponents of decentralization argue that it may contribute to 
enhancing the power of local decision takers, the events rather demonstrate that it is more 
complex. The case of Amuru Sugar suggests that to better understand the outcomes of 
decentralization requires to explore not only the institutional arrangements that come about 
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as a result of the reform, but also to what extent they are indeed capable to perform the roles 
imagined for them, and how power plays of local and national elites play a role in this.  
The case also illustrates the prevalence of institutional multiplicity in land governance. Even 
though the land dispute case is before the court of appeal waiting for a ruling, lawyers are 
busy negotiating with the attorney general about the same land dispute. Important to note is 
that both the court of appeal and the attorney general are at the national level. At the same 
time people claim the land as theirs on the basis of customary norms. The case suggests, that 
to understand how decentralization works out one needs to explore how it impacts a situation 
of ongoing institutional multiplicity and competition.  
In addition it shows the problematic relationship between the state and the people of the 
northern region, and the sometimes violent nature of this relationship. The diverse remarks 
show a negative perception of the government. People from the north believe that the state 
does not protect their interests in land matters. The roles of state actors in this particular land 
dispute only reinforce people’s perceptions of the state. The youth would not have had to 
block the roads 20 years before because there was no District Land Board to give away the 
land to a large investor. The state would not have got access to Acholi land, if it were not for 
the state institutions like army, and decentralized land structures such as the district land 
board that have been put in place over the past years. There is a strong perception that the 
state is trying to gain access to the resources of the community. A developmental state is using 
land policies to dispose of certain people (local people) to create space for the elites and 
government supporters especially investors. Later on in the thesis I will explain this 
relationship and show how the state is using land governance to incorporate northern Uganda 
into the “mainstream” Ugandan society. 
In a nutshell, the community meeting provides a snapshot of the impacts of decentralizing 
land governance on tenure security, institutions and other actors in land governance, the 
sensitivity of such reforms in post-conflict settings, the use of violence in land matters and the 
problematic presence of the state at the local levels. These issues will be elaborated in this 
thesis in order to show how they shape post-conflict land governance and impact state 
formation in post-conflict settings. 
Problem statement 
Land disputes continue to play an important role in violent conflicts on the African continent. 
Consider for example how fierce competition for land contributed to the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda (Pons-Vignon and Solignac Lecomte, 2004). Likewise, the civil war that started in 2002 
in Cote d’Ivoire was linked to land and identity issues (Anseeuw and Alden, 2010). In 2006 in 
Ethiopia over 150 people were killed in a land clash between the Borenas and Guhis 
(Wehrmann, 2008). In Ituri in north-eastern Democratic Republic of Congo there has been an 
ongoing violent land conflict since 1999 between the Lendus and the Hemas (Vircoulon, 2010). 
Recent post-electoral violence in Kenya was directly connected to the threat of land evictions 
(Anseeuw and Alden, 2010). Land is a resource that is deeply embedded in conflict. And 
particularly in post-conflict settings people might react violently to land issues because they 
see it as the only source of livelihood.  
Scholars have pointed out various reasons for land disputes. Some of them emphasize high 
population growth, availability and scarcity of land, political crises and land markets (Berry, 
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1993; Le Billon, 2001; Whitehead and Tsikate, 2003; Lund et al, 2006). However scarcity, 
distribution, and depletion are not just the characteristic of resources themselves; but often 
the ways in which land is governed make land such a contentious issue (Peters, 2004). Land 
conflict is foremost a matter of distribution, unequal access and exclusion that may be 
embedded in the system of land governance.  
Land governance emerges out of a number of interactions among various actors at different 
levels of government and society. FAO (2007) defines land governance as a process by which 
decisions are made regarding the access to and use of land, the manner in which those 
decisions are implemented and the way conflicting interests in land are reconciled. The way 
in which land is governed may be conflictive and this can result into land regulations that are 
considered unfair, and irregular practices of land governance. It can have significant 
consequences for levels of tenure security, for example, overlapping and conflicting land rights 
and unequal access to and ownership of land can give rise to land disputes (Rugadya, 2009). 
Nowadays land governance reform is seen as a necessary measure to alleviate land disputes, 
while it might also deal with other tensions in societies (See Cotula et al, 2004; Wiley, 2006; 
Anseeuw and Alden, 2010). Reforming land governance, e.g. through decentralization, is often 
considered an important way to improve governance after conflict (FAO, 2007). At the same 
time, though, land governance and its reform are very sensitive affairs in post-conflict setting, 
as they touch on the issues that the peace process is all about.  
This research project sought to find out how post-conflict land governance takes shape in 
post-conflict areas like Amuru district, amidst unique characteristics of post-conflict situations 
such as displacement and return; confusion over which institutions have authority over land 
governance; opportunities that can be exploited by the powerful; and use of violence in land 
matters. It starts from the realization that, in order to understand the relationship between 
land disputes and other conflicts, it is necessary to have a clear and deep understanding of the 
special characteristics of the particular land conflict, the causes of the conflict, its 
transformation, the actors involved and their power relations with each other (Wehrmann, 
2008). Throughout, the study highlights the connection between the rampant land disputes in 
northern Uganda and the recently ended civil war. 
Objectives of the study 
This study aims to comprehend the dynamics of land governance reforms in post-conflict 
settings, particularly to understand how decentralization, the aftermath of the LRA war and 
the mobilization of youth have influenced land governance in post-conflict Northern Uganda. 
An indirect aim is to contribute to the policy debate about land governance by providing 
scientific findings on post-conflict land governance; especially at a moment that policies are 
being formulated in order to rebuild peace and reconstruct Northern Uganda. Land reform is 
problematic in post-conflict settings due to political sensitivities; whereas effectiveness of 
land reforms is a critical issue, considering the need for economic recovery and restoration of 
livelihoods. The study was particularly interested in the link between decentralization and land 
governance, as this is a key strategy in many post-conflict reform agendas. This study also 
intends to clarify the relationship between conflict and land and thereby contribute to the on-
going debate on resource-based conflicts. 
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Research Questions  
This study started from the question of how post-conflict land governance and its reform –
notably decentralization– takes shape: how reform impacts the legitimacy and authority of 
local institutions, and contributes to tenure security and the resolution of land disputes in 
post-conflict Northern Uganda. The study is sensitive to the fact that land disputes might be 
connected to other contestations in society, and thus that land governance reform might have 
impacts beyond land disputes and tenure security.  
Over the course of the trajectory I particularly got concerned with how land reforms are 
critically connected to the larger process of contested state formation in Northern Uganda 
where the state tries to get more control over its territory1.  
Hence, the main research question is: 
How does war and subsequent decentralization impact on land governance in post-conflict 
Northern Uganda, and how does this contribute to the process of state formation? 
This question led to the following sub-questions: 
1. How is land governance in Uganda organized and how did the conflict in the North 
affect land access and land governance practices over time? In particular, how did  the 
20 years’ civil war affect land access, land governance practices, and local land disputes 
in Northern Uganda?  
2. How does decentralization influence land governance? How does it restructure power 
relations among land governing institutions and what is its impact on tenure security 
in Acholi region? 
3. How does decentralization contribute to institutional proliferation and what is its 
impact on land dispute resolution in northern Uganda? 
4. How has the war impacted and transformed the role of marginal groups such as youths 
and women in land governance in Acholi region? 
Relevance of the study 
A lot of studies have been carried out on decentralization in general but little has been done 
on decentralized land governance in a post-conflict situation in particular. As Clover (2010) 
noted, the issue of land policy in post-conflict environments has received little attention from 
researchers. The findings from the study are vital in understanding how post-conflict land 
governance takes shape which information is useful since a post-conflict situation in many 
                                                          
1 The study equally paid attention to gender issues in post-conflict land governance. Women are often affected 
differently in war-time situations, basing on this reality data was collected to understand how the war impacts 
on women’s ownership and access to land in northern Uganda. But also on how women become vulnerable in 
land matters in post-conflict settings. Gender issues in land governance were catered for in this study and much 
of these findings explaining land and gender relations were disseminated through a film documentary entitled 
‘Governance off the Ground’ which was a product of grounding land governance program. However I chose not 
to devote a chapter to land and gender issues in this thesis because in literature a lot of attention is given to 
women and land matters. Instead in this thesis I choose to focus on the youth because little attention has been 
put into understanding the role of youth in land governance in post-conflict settings.  
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cases provides a window for governments to introduce administrative, territorial and land 
tenure reform.  
Cotula et al (2004) advised that further research should be carried out in order to understand 
the link between land and conflict. This study shows that violent conflict and war prominently 
impacts on land governance and extensively contributes to land conflicts in post-conflict 
settings. In addition, the study underscores that the relationship between land and conflict 
cannot only be explained by the environmental security notions or by only the political ecology 
but rather a combination of both. Scarcity, availability, political, historical and social dynamics 
interconnect and contribute to the potential for conflict related to land or natural resources. 
 Lund (2010) points out that information does not serve only governments and technocrats 
but also social and political movements (like cultural institutions, civil society and pressure 
groups). This information might be useful to central and local government, NGOs and all 
stakeholders while formulating their policies in the reconstruction and peace building of 
Northern Uganda. For example the issue of devolving enough power from central government 
to local government so that local government structures like district land boards can make 
independent decisions about land governance. Bringing all actors in land governance on board 
and giving land issues a central place in order to maintain stability in post-conflict settings. 
Post-conflict land governance reform in northern Uganda 
Like in many areas coming out of war land is a contentious issue in northern Uganda2. Land 
disputes have become part and parcel of daily life. One cannot fail to hear or read about a 
land related issue or dispute on radio, in the newspapers and in community meetings. The 
Ministry of Justice (2008) equally reported that land disputes ranked the highest among all 
conflicts in the country. Since 2006, after more than two decades of civil war between the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government 
which resulted into the displacement of over 2,000,000 people, life in Northern Uganda is 
returning to normalcy. Following the ‘inconclusive’ 2006 Juba peace talks between the LRA 
rebels and the NRM government, former refugees and internally displaced people started 
returning home and re-accessing their land in northern Uganda. However, many people in the 
Acholi region are confronted with contestations and competition over ownership and access 
to land: within extended families (relatives), between those who returned first and those that 
returned later, between clans, between the Acholi and other tribes like the Madi, and 
between local communities and institutions like the Uganda Wildlife Authority, and foreign 
companies. In the difficult transition from war to peace, land disputes are considered a serious 
threat to stability of Northern Uganda (Cf. ARLPI, 2010; Carfield, 2011). To make matters 
worse formal and informal institutions that govern land are still weak as a result of break-
down during the civil war. Important to point out is that post-conflict does not necessarily 
mean a situation of total peace or no conflict at all but it can be a situation immersed in hidden 
conflict or characterized by forms of everyday violence.  
Post-conflict settings are prone to land conflicts because of the disturbance of land 
governance during the conflict but also because land governance institutions may not be able 
                                                          
2In this thesis northern Uganda is taken to refer to the 7 districts of Acholi region including; Gulu, Amuru, Pader, 
Kitgum, Lamwo, Nwoya and Agago. Important to note is that politically northern Uganda encompasses the 
greater regions of Acholi, Lango, West Nile, Teso and Karamoja. 
 9 
 
to guarantee people’s tenure security. Violent conflicts might undermine the functioning of 
formal property rights institutions and when war ends people might question the capability of 
such institutions to enforce rights to property or natural resources (See Daudelin, 2003; 
Unruh, 2003). Post-conflict circumstances such as many people re-accessing land within a 
short period of time, a large number of contested land claims by for example returning 
refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs) who find their land occupied by other displaced 
people and consequently settle on land belonging to others (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2008; Van 
Leeuwen, 2008), make post-conflict land governance significantly challenging. Without doubt 
the way land issues are dealt with is crucial for post-conflict stability. Land disputes at local 
level can articulate with or give birth to new conflicts (like ethnic conflicts) and if they are not 
managed properly they can broaden (draw in new issues), widen (suck in new actors) and 
intensify (suck in new victims) (Miall, 2004). The relationship between land and conflict cannot 
be underestimated or taken for granted. It is sometimes suggested that low intensity conflict 
can eventually result in an outbreak of extreme violence and limited land conflicts can erupt 
into large scale political conflict and violence (Andre and Platteau, 1998; Pons-Vignon and 
Solignac Lecomte, 2004). This makes land a critical element in peace building and economic 
reconstruction in post-conflict situations (See Unruh, 2003; Rugadya, 2008; Borras and Franco 
2010; Cammett and Malesky, 2012). Therefore, land reform in post-conflict areas ought to be 
well thought out because the risk of conflict is high in post-conflict societies (Bigombe et al. 
2000).    
Decentralization is often promoted as an important strategy of reforming land governance 
based on various assumptions about its positive effects (for example popular representation, 
local accountability and participation of local actors). Similarly Bigombe et al. (2000) argue 
that decentralization might facilitate war-to-peace transition because it empowers all 
stakeholders and allows them to settle issues such as land control, land reform and local 
representation. The government of Uganda is modeling post-conflict northern Uganda 
through promoting decentralization reforms to reconstruct the northern region. Regarding 
land issues, decentralization provides for statutory decentralized land governance structures 
like District Land Boards, District Land Offices, Land Tribunals, Area Land Committees and Sub-
county court committees at the sub-county levels (Land Act, 1998). These structures are 
charged with dealing with land related issues or disputes. However, despite these efforts, land 
disputes are still rampant in post-conflict northern Uganda. The frequent occurrences of land 
disputes in Acholi region for example Gulu district (GDLG, 2010) might be an indicator of the 
ineffectiveness of decentralized land governance structures in dealing with land issues or 
disputes particularly in post-conflict situations. This study seeks to find out why decentralized 
land governance has not specifically translated into improved tenure security and less land 
disputes in northern Uganda. 
Historical divides between the north and south/state shaping perceptions 
Land governance reform takes place within the context of how the people in the north 
perceive the state and their relations with the state and this may have diverse consequences. 
The civil war in northern Uganda and the problematic north/south relations play an important 
role in shaping land governance in post-conflict northern Uganda. The relationship between 
the people of the north and the south or state in Uganda has been shaped by colonialism, 
tense relations after Independence and the war between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) led 
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by Joseph Kony and National Resistance Army/Movement (NRM) government headed by 
Yoweri Museveni, president of Uganda since 1986. 
When the British colonialists ruled Uganda, they favored the Buganda region in the south 
because it was more organized and had political institutions that could help the British achieve 
their colonial objectives (See Atkinson 2010). This put Buganda at an elevated position vis-à-
vis the other regions of Uganda. Note that Buganda is found in the southern region of the 
country, and thus all infrastructural investments were done in the south by the British. The 
northern region was of little importance to the colonial government because it had nothing to 
offer economically given that it was a dry land, sparsely populated and remote. As a result, 
since colonialism the Acholi region (north) has served as a labour reserve for the army, police 
and plantations in the south because the south has always been more developed compared 
to the north. At independence, the Acholi dominated the Ugandan army, a situation created 
by the British. The north was neglected by the British and also in the post-independence era 
the north was relatively underdeveloped and neglected. In short the colonial regime fueled 
the north-south division in Uganda (Omara Otunu 1995; Atkinson 2010; Branch 2010).  
People from northern Uganda dominated state power from when Uganda attained 
independence to 1986. The northerners, among them the Acholi held most of the positions in 
the army and government at large during the regimes of Obote I and II, Amin and Okello. The 
divide between the north and south was further widened by the 1981-1986 NRM guerilla war 
and furthered by NRM government after capturing power in 1986 (Cf. Branch 2010). In 1981 
Museveni welded a lot of support from people of Southwest and central regions because he 
was seen as fighting northern military domination or relieving the country from domination 
by the people of the north (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010). Therefore the takeover of power by 
the NRM in 1986 was seen as a threat among the Acholi because their political link to state 
power had been severed (Cf. Branch 2010). The Acholi were excluded in the NRM government 
(with no political positions) but also they were pursued by the same government and during 
the LRA war state violence was meted upon the Acholi (See Branch 2010).  
In 1996 at the height of the civil war in northern Uganda, the NRM government ordered all 
people in Acholi to go to “protected” camps or Internally Displaced Peoples’ camps (IDP). The 
Acholi believe that encampment was not the only solution to the violence that was carried 
out by both NRM and LRA. Though the camps were to protect the people, they were not 
secure, violence was continually meted upon civilians and people were massacred, and 
mutilated, youth and children were abducted (Branch 2007; Atkinson 2010). The LRA war 
helped to show this north-south division and the position of Acholi or people of the north in 
the Ugandan state. When the LRA headed by Joseph Kony attacked civilians, it showed that 
the government was reluctant, unable or uninterested to protect the Acholi or people of the 
north. Instead encampment and state violence was viewed as government having secondary 
motives of getting hold of the land in Acholi. Land issues have also become closely connected 
to this marginalization in various ways. However on the other hand the NRM government may 
have believed that by forcing people into the camps it would effectively control the northern 
region and make it a part of the Ugandan state. 
The media, both local and international, framed the LRA guerillas as satanic, barbaric and 
terrorists. This framing has for long worked in the interest of NRM government without a 
proper understanding of the actual reasons behind the rebellion in northern Uganda. Because 
of such labeling immediately the world condemned the LRA and wanted to bring it to an end 
 11 
 
(Schomerus 2010). This helped government to secure funds internationally in order to buy 
weaponry to counteract the insurgency in the north. However army officers amassed personal 
wealth with money that was meant to help bring the insurgency to an end (Mwenda 2010). 
The economic benefits of the LRA war  to the NRM government and army contributed to 
resounding the perceptions of the north-south relations.  
In a nut shell, the NRM inherited a failed state in 1986 and its responsibility was to build a 
stronger state. Although this had been attained in the south over time, the NRM government 
had not achieved this in the north. Therefore the NRM wants the organs of the state like army, 
police and other state institutions to work in the north in order for it to legitimize its rule and 
incorporate northern Uganda into the Ugandan state (Cf. Mwenda 2010; Atkinson 2010). 
While the south has flourished economically, the north has been crippled economically due 
to the civil war thereby furthering the imbalance between north and south that has existed 
since colonial times. This contributed to the Acholi regarding themselves as different from the 
rest of Uganda. The Acholi and the people of northern Uganda at large believe that the current 
NRM government treats them as ignorant and backward (Also see Atkinson 2010). But also 
the Acholi are skeptical about the land governance reforms that are being carried out by the 
state in northern Uganda. In many ways land issues touch on larger issue of conflict in the 
north, marginalization and relations between the north and south. While violence is over, this 
North/South conflict is not. This ongoing divide seems also to play an important role in how 
land issues and government responses are locally understood. Thus land governance reforms 
in the north need to be analysed from this lens of North and South/State relations in Uganda. 
Theoretical framework 
A number of concepts have been employed to understand but also to contribute to debates 
around post-conflict land governance. Key concepts used include; decentralization, land 
governance, legal pluralism, institutional proliferation, access, conflict, violence, governance 
and state formation. All the concepts are interconnected to the topic of study. The analytical 
concepts are used as tools to understand issues under study and processes which were 
studied. The themes to be discussed include the nexus between land and conflict, 
decentralized land governance and an argument will be made that the state through 
decentralization acquired more control over local land governance. This is promoted by a 
situation of legal pluralism and institutional competition especially between customary versus 
statutory land institutions. This leads to a situation that the state increasingly determines 
where and how customary institutions operate through its decentralized institutions. This 
leads to numerous conflicts and even the use of violence in land matters by both the state and 
people. 
Power Relations and Access to Land 
Land governance is ultimately about access to land, it is thus vital to understand the concept 
of access. In the literature on land tenure a shift is taking place from analyzing formal property 
rights and how they are enforced or denied towards thinking in terms of access (Hann, 2007). 
Ribot and Peluso (2003:153) define access as the ‘ability to derive benefits from things’. To 
them, access is not just a bundle of rights but is embedded in bundles of powers. These powers 
constitute the material, cultural and political-economic strands within the bundles and webs 
of powers that configure resource access (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Access to land is vital for 
the rural populations of Africa, and often continues to be based on social identity or group 
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membership along lines of ethnicity, age, gender and religion (Berry, 1993; Ribot and Peluso, 
2003; Peters, 2004; Bernstein, 2005;). 
In societies some people and institutions control resource access while others must maintain 
their access through those who have control therefore access to land is distinct from control 
of land (Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Cousins, 2010). Law, customs and in some cases non-legal 
means such as violence determine who has control and who gets access to land. Thus a focus 
on access broadens the scope of analysis from rights to powers and identities. 
Identity plays a big role in determining peoples’ access and rights to land. Land conflicts bring 
identity and ethnic sentiments to the forefront. Lund (1998) argues that when people struggle 
over land it is not merely to secure a livelihood, but elements of belonging and political 
identity also play a role. People attach a lot of meaning to land and people can make claims 
to land based on historical claims to that land (Unruh, 2003). In Africa artificial boundaries 
were created by colonialism and this put together different ethnic groups within a state 
(Anseeuw and Alden, 2010). Likewise in Uganda the British colonial administration made 
ethnicity the basis for the creation of territorial and administrative boundaries and divided the 
country into ethnically defined regions (Cf. Espeland, 2007). In situations where regions were 
created based on ethnicity or religious reasons then secure access and control over specific 
lands can be important to those particular groups (Cf. Unruh, 2003). When access to land is 
mainly determined by factors such as ethnicity, it might give rise to conflicts that run along 
ethnic lines and spread to areas completely unrelated to land (Deininger and Castagnin, 2006). 
Recently, land conflicts along ethnic lines have increased considerably in number and the 
severity of the violence (Anseeuw and Alden, 2010). Minor land conflicts can be kept alive for 
generations and reawakened by ethnically motivated violence (Deininger and Castagnin, 
2006). It is therefore crucial to understand how groups interact with each other, assert and 
defend their identity in situations of conflict (See Ibrahim, 1998; Barron et al. 2004) because 
these might be the underlying forces behind land conflicts. In a post-conflict situation, 
therefore, issues of identity may affect and impact on decentralized land governance. 
Access relations are contingent upon a person’s position and power within social relationships 
(Ribot and Peluso, 2003). This means that in post-conflict settings people’s access to land may 
have changed because their position and power might have shifted during the conflict. Power 
relations are dynamic: they can change and shift between social groups and institutions over 
time. People may grab land if their positions allow, for example army generals may use their 
powerful position during war and the vulnerable can lose their land because they are in a weak 
position and cannot protect their rights, such as in Northern Uganda where people were put 
together in IDP camps. 
People can use illegal means to enjoy access to resources like land. Ribot and Peluso (2003) 
term this as illegal access which operates through coercion and use of power of official 
positions to protect personal resource access. In this regard the access framework can be used 
to understand how land conflicts become the means through which terms of access and 
control are reformulated. As we will see land conflicts in Northern Uganda are largely a 
reflection of power relations between conflicting parties and the institutions that govern land. 
In particular this is the case when we explore the power relations between customary and 
statutory land institutions and its implications for tenure security.  
 13 
 
Decentralization and Decentralized land structures  
Bartley et al (2008) define decentralization as the devolution of governance from higher to 
lower level organizations most commonly from central government to local governments. 
There are various forms of decentralization these include; administrative decentralization 
which transfers responsibility for administrative procedures; political decentralization which 
delegates electoral and legislative authority to the periphery; financial decentralization which 
transfers both resources and responsibility for financing government services to local entities 
(Meinzen-Dick et al. 2008). Most African governments have embraced decentralization as a 
governance reform especially in the 1980s and 1990s when it featured as one of World Bank’s 
structural adjustment criteria (World Bank, 2003). This acted as an incentive for African 
governments to give decentralization a central place in their administrative policies. 
Decentralization was promoted as the ‘official’ response to widespread failure in the provision 
of services by the post-independence African states. The logic behind was to bring on board 
other actors in governance (Prud’homme, 1995).  
Proponents of decentralization suggest that it improves the quality of governance, this is 
because decisions are made at the local level (See Golola, 2001; Shah and Thompson, 2004; 
Siegle and O’Mahony, 2006; Benjamin, 2008). The rationale for decentralization was to take 
services closer to the people (Ribot et al. 2008) where local views and ideas would be included 
in governance. It was assumed that people would be empowered to make decisions about 
local issues that affect them. Others argue that decentralization provides space for 
interactions among all actors in governance (Golola, 2001; Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; 
Meinzen-Dick et al. 2008; Van der Haar et al. 2009). This in turn should lead to increased 
participation, representation and accountability in the process of governance. And particularly 
decentralization was supposed to create channels for dealing with differences or conflicts 
because of representing views of all stakeholders (Siegle and Mahony, 2006). According to 
Meinzen-Dick et al. (2008) decentralization taps into local knowledge to develop rules that 
work for particular local conditions, rather than imposing exterior rules that in most cases are 
not appropriate to local circumstances. 
However, the sketch above is a somewhat idealized version as in practice decentralization 
might not bring about things like popular participation and representation of all stakeholders 
in governance. First of all most African countries have undertaken administrative and political 
decentralization with the central government retaining most powers over finances and 
decision making (Cf. Ribot et al. 2006). In such cases decentralization may not be as efficient 
and all representative as decentralization is supposed to be (cf. Pons-Vignon and Solignac 
Lecomte, 2004). On the other hand, under decentralization there are many stakeholders 
involved in decision making, which might be a cause of conflict itself. In addition local 
governments face horrendous pressure from various actors in governance such as the central 
government, local people, donors and NGOs (Bartley et al. 2008). These actors significantly 
influence the process of decision making and implementation of policies. Devolving power to 
local government by the central government brings in different power relations in case 
policies are determined from the center and implemented by the local governments. This 
study therefore seeks to find out to what extent does decentralization indeed bring power to 
local actors, or instead is strategically used to enhance power of central government? Whose 
interests are executed and what does this imply for tenure security? 
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Decentralization in the 1990s contributed to the transfer of responsibilities in the governance 
of natural resources from central to local government. Powers to control natural resources 
were transferred from the central governments to user groups or local authorities (Vedeld, 
1996). Indeed many African states established local governments and decentralized land 
governance within the broader context of political decentralization (cf. Cotula et al. 2004). In 
the scanty literature available on decentralized land governance a few reasons are identified 
to explain why decentralization may fail to result into tenure security. For example land 
disputes may increase in situations where land boards are not decentralized enough to create 
downward accountability (Sjaastad and Cousins, 2008). Lund et al (2006) further point out that 
land boards tend to be dominated by local elites who may implement central government 
interests. Authority under decentralization is entrenched in complicated and often conflicting 
institutional structures (Bartley et al. 2008). Decentralization might be used by the elite class 
and politicians to promote their interests (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003; Meinzen-Dick et 
al. 2008).  
However little research has been done to understand how decentralization restructures 
power relations between land governance institutions and its relation to tenure security. 
Decentralization might lead to institutional proliferation and the impact of institutional 
multiplicity on land governance especially in relation to the authority of land governance 
institutions and land dispute resolution has rarely been studied. Thus to understand to what 
extent decentralized land governance in northern Uganda is effective in curbing land disputes, 
we have to explore better how participation, representation and decision making are catered 
for under decentralized land governance. It is also important to find out how power is 
distributed among the various decentralized institutions that deal with land issues in northern 
Uganda. Therefore, decentralization is taken as a system of governance that is employed by 
the state but may work out in unexpected ways in practice like creating competing 
institutions, unclear power divisions between central government and local governments and 
as a tool used by government for building a strong state 
Legal pluralism, institutional proliferation and tenure security 
Escalating land conflicts directly point to the issue of authority of land institutions that are 
supposed to resolve land disputes and sanction claims to land. Looking through the lenses of 
legal pluralism might be a useful way to understand how the coexistence and competition of 
different legal systems in land governance in northern Uganda comes into being and how 
institutional competition intensifies land disputes. Legal pluralism is the presence of multiple 
systems of legal order within a society or confines of the state (Hooker, 1975; Griffiths 1986; 
Unruh, 2003). Legal pluralism challenges the idea that law is a single, unified and exclusive 
hierarchical normative ordering depending from the power of the state (Griffiths, 1986:3). 
Instead Unruh (2003) notes that legal pluralism with regard to land tenure signifies the 
existence of different sets of rights and obligations concerning land and property. 
In most African states, legal pluralism was a consequence of colonialism. Colonial regimes 
introduced state institutions that started operating alongside customary institutions. However 
because the two systems were never mutually combined, many at a time they end up 
conflicting and competing with each other for authority. Legal pluralism does not necessarily 
create equal systems but systems that interfere with and oppose each other (Cf. Peters, 2004). 
State institutions significantly determine how customary institutions act. Customary systems 
have to function within the conditions set by state law and is often confined to specific 
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domains (for example family law, land) and particular territorial spheres such as tribal areas. 
The state can choose to recognize customary institutions or circumscribe their activities 
(Fitzpatrick, 2005). Therefore, customary institutions cannot be regarded as autonomous but 
as institutions that compete for authority with statutory institutions (Benjaminsen and Lund, 
2003). Important to note is that a customary system is not static it keeps on evolving and this 
process is also shaped by interactions with state institutions. So in many instances it is even 
questionable whether they can still be regarded as customary. 
In policy making and in the analysis of African land tenure, a sharp distinction is often being 
made between customary and state tenure. Land tenure is the relationship, whether defined 
legally or customarily, among people with respect to land (FAO, 2007). Land tenure involves 
the allocation and security of rights in land (Enemark, 2010). Land tenure is not only a system 
of rights but also a requirement for peaceful human interactions (Migot-Adholla and Bruce, 
1994 quoted in Unruh, 2003). Customary land tenure is characterized by its largely unwritten 
rules and is based on local practices, norms and customary institutions. State systems of land 
tenure are usually based on written laws and regulations, in combination with state 
institutions like centralized and decentralized agencies (See Feeny et al. 1990, Cotula et al. 
2004; Juma, 2006; Kunda Komey, 2010). However, in practice this distinction often does not 
hold, and the two systems blend with each other and it becomes complex to differentiate 
between customary and statutory tenure systems. 
Tenure security is a fundamental requirement for African economies because the majority of 
their populations derive their livelihoods from agriculture. Land tenure systems should 
provide security to people with regard to accessing, owning and utilizing land. Unclear tenure 
systems can contribute to land disputes well as clear tenure and unambiguous systems may 
alleviate land disputes. Similarly, Hilhorst (2009) notes that a resource tenure system only 
enhances perceptions of security when trusted. People can trust the tenure system when they 
feel that their rights to land are secure and protected and the reverse is also true. Thus 
evidence to prove and support rights of access and claim to land is a fundamental feature of 
land tenure systems; this can be done through documents for state tenure systems or informal 
evidence related to social and cultural features for customary systems (Unruh, 2004).  
There is a new interest in customary tenure arrangements which is related to the resurgence 
of interest in grass-roots democracy, public participation and local level planning (Feeny et al. 
1990). Agencies like the World Bank now recognize that customary systems of land tenure are 
more flexible and adapted to local circumstances than centralized statutory systems 
(Deininger, 2003). This recognition has led to international attention for how non-state tenure 
systems might help to make land tenure more adapted to local circumstances. However, the 
merging of customary and state systems requires a cautious approach because vague tenure 
systems can be a source of conflict (Anseeuw and Alden, 2010). But also codification and 
registration do not necessarily increase tenure security, because all the flexibility and 
ambiguity in customary systems needs to be suppressed and rights have to be fixed, and this 
may lead to conflict. 
In Africa over 90 percent of the land is accessed through customary tenure arrangements and 
formal tenure covers less than 10 percent of the land area (Wiley, 2006; Deininger and 
Castagnin, 2006). This implies that in Africa in many settings different tenure systems 
(statutory and customary) apply simultaneously. The fact that little land is registered does not 
imply that the land is not governed. Instead most land is still held under customary tenure 
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arrangements and there are customary institutions that govern customary land. In some cases 
states create a statutory institution to oversee and govern land in customary tenure. However 
statutory tenure does not necessarily lead to increased tenure security (Peters, 2004) but 
rather this gives opportunity to conflicting parties to manipulate the overlapping jurisdiction 
which is put in place when statutory institutions replace customary institutions (Fitzpatrick, 
2005). In other cases it might not be clear which system has the authority to define rights and 
deal with land disputes (Carfield, 2011). It may also provide individuals and institutions with 
opportunities to use either of the systems (Fitzpatrick, 2005). However, in the end the 
statutory system prevails over the customary system because in most cases it has the backing 
of the state and the possibility of use of state violence. Similarly Carfield (2011) clarifies that 
pluralism offers opportunities of refuting one system and seeking out the other for a better 
deal. This availability of choices may contribute to escalation of land disputes, indecision in 
land dispute resolution and people not knowing which institutions to go to have their land 
disputes resolved. 
Due to lack of clarity about the role of statutory and customary institutions in land governance 
in post conflict areas (Deininger and Castagnin, 2006) room is created for forum shopping in 
land governance institutions according to what suites people’s interests (See Lund 1996, 
Unruh, 2003). Forum shopping is the ability of some actors to select the arena of law or custom 
that will favor their objectives (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). In addition Firmin-Sellers also noted 
that, when customary and statutory systems compete they give conflicting parties an 
opportunity to resort to institutional shopping (Firmin-Sellers, 2000 cited in Deininger and 
Castagnin, 2006). The relationship between state law and various normative orders provides 
a menu for forum shopping (Von Benda-Beckmann, 1981 cited in Unruh, 2003). In sum legal 
pluralism fuels into institutional competition among land governance institutions, creates 
choices for both people and land institutions and all these impact differently on land dispute 
resolution in post-conflict settings. But important to note is that legitimacy and stability in 
tenure institutions is necessary if people are to believe that existing institutions protect their 
rights in land (Juma, 2006).  
The issue of legal pluralism becomes very challenging and pronounced in post-conflict areas 
where there are numerous claims on land as a result of an influx of returnees. Yet the majority 
of the population may not have proof of ownership of their land. Both statutory and 
customary land institutions may still be weak to provide tenure security and ascertain land 
claims that are made by large numbers of people within a short period of time. Post-conflict 
areas always have diverse and competing institutions, and under such circumstances people 
might seek out institutions to sanction their claims and also people embodying land 
institutions can equally look for claims to authorize in order to solidify their legitimacy in 
relation to competitors (See Boege, 2006; Sikor and Lund, 2009; Huber, 2010). Institutions are 
not neutral, but often reflect power relations in a given society. Conflicting parties especially 
the powerful may take advantage of competing institutions to achieve their interests in land 
(cf. Juma, 2006; Lund et al. 2006; Bartley et al. 2008). Therefore power struggles and 
competition that occur among institutions create opportunities for mostly the powerful 
parties which is commonly referred to as elite capture in the literature on decentralization 
(Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003; Meinzen-Dick et al. 2008). The important question to ask is 
how competing land institutions are able to assert their authority and influence the resolution 
of land disputes and tenure security. 
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Land governance and state formation  
Scholars have speculated about how improved governance can promote post-conflict stability 
(FAO, 2007; Cammett and Malesky, 2012). They emphasize that when governments operate 
effectively people may not be motivated to resort to conflict (Cammett and Malesky, 2012). 
Governance can be defined as the structure that emerges in a socio-political system as the 
common outcome of the interacting intervention efforts of all the actors involved (Kooiman, 
1993). Governance is not something fixed but a process that is altogether more fluid, process 
of interactive decision-making that is constantly evolving and responding to changing 
circumstances (Commission for global Governance, 1995). In the past governance was seen as 
synonymous with the state but attention shifted from the state to various other actors who 
interact, participate in decision making, and exercise authority in governing society (Nuijten, 
2004; Stoker, 1998; Strange, 2000; Waters, 2004). What we see emerging is a system of 
polycentric governance in which a range of central and local institutions, public and private, 
each play a role (Ostrom, 1999; Wunsch, 1999). However important to note is that the central 
state continues to play a critical role in governance and in most of the spheres the economy 
to the extent that its presence may be felt even in the lowest local structures (Cf. Nuijten, 
2004; Meinzen-Dick et al. 2008). Therefore states have strong influence on how the 
interactions among different governance actors turn out.  
Issues of participation and representation are important elements in governance discussions, 
because they determine how other actors may contribute and influence relations of 
governance (Nuijten, 2004). People may start to view themselves as actors in land governance 
because of the opportunities provided by representation and participation under 
decentralized governance. However most governments in Africa do not willingly create 
institutions to enhance participation of different actors (Sjaastad & Cousins, 2008). Therefore 
this study sought to understand the interactions and power relations between the state and 
other actors in decentralized land governance. How stakeholder participation is provided for, 
who participates, whose interests are represented in decentralized land governance and how 
the state may use land governance as a tool of building a strong state. 
Land governance and state formation are closely linked. When government institutions make 
decisions on land governance, they are explicitly or implicitly feeding into state formation. 
Their aim is not only to solve problems but also impose their authority as part of a strong state. 
State formation can be taken to mean activities that contribute to the ‘formation and 
systematization of social action and in so doing consolidate or complicate the division 
between state and societies’ (Agrawal, 2001: 12). Most of the states in Africa were a creation 
of colonialism, however the process of state formation did not stop at the end of colonialism 
or the attainment of independence. Post-independence governments are still engrossed in 
the continuous process of state formation. State formation is currently done through 
governments building state institutions, armies and developing economies (See Robinson and 
Parsons, 2006). 
The power to govern land lies with the state (Borras and Franco 2010: 24). Some African states 
interfere with democratic decentralization of resource management in order to retain central 
control (Ribot et al. 2006). Central governments may instead use decentralization as a form of 
governance to frustrate local governments in governing themselves, for example through 
limiting the powers that are devolved to local governments (Ribot et al. 2006). States often 
interfere with natural resource management, for example land, in order to stay in control. The 
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rules of land governance may be redefined by the state so that they fit into the process of 
state formation. State land laws affect social relations or directly impacts on the way people 
relate with land especially through statutory land institutions (Borras and Franco 2010). State 
formation then serves the extension of state power to ensure the hegemonic status of state 
institutions. The process of state formation or building a strong state inevitably leads to a 
deconstruction of customary institutions (Boege et al. 2008; Trotha, 2000) because they are 
regarded as competitors to statutory institutions and a challenge to central state authority. In 
most cases state and the local communities may have divergent interests and then the issue 
of power and coercion comes in (Agrawal 2001). Using coercion works in the interest of the 
state because the state has monopoly of violence and can enforce cooperation of customary 
institutions. 
The Ugandan state started up a process of decentralization in 1986, as a way of changing the 
authoritarian ways of governing introduced by earlier regimes (Obote and Amin’s regimes), 
and arrive at better relationships between citizens and authorities. In fact, the development 
of state-citizen relationships can be seen as an important element of state formation 
processes. This raises the question to what extent decentralization of land governance, so 
important for local livelihoods alter relationships between citizens and authorities in northern 
Uganda? I will show that a critical element in this was that people mistrusted the good 
intentions of the government to truly transform governance practices, and rather perceived 
the reforms as an effort by the state to impose itself and get a stronger grip on land 
governance and local resources.  
Civil conflict reflects a state’s failure to monopolize the use of violence or force (Fjelde and De 
Soysa 2009: 6). This has been the case in northern Uganda for over 2 decades. During the civil 
war in northern Uganda, many scholars, researchers and politicians depicted Uganda as a 
country collapsing into state failure. Do the current policies (state violence, develop policies, 
land governance) of the government help the NRM government to build a strong state? After 
the war ended in 2006 the government of Uganda may have wanted to show that it has 
monopoly on the use of force by reinforcing the state’s presence at local level. Land 
governance is a crucial element in this endeavor to reinstate government control.  
It is also vital to further explore the notion of violence and its role in governance. One of the 
defining features of a state is its ability to have a monopoly over the means of violence. States 
can use this violence to their advantage especially to enforce policies, rules and norms in order 
to maintain social order (See Boege, 2006). Bakonyi and Stuvǿy (2005) define the use of 
violence as social process where violent actions shape new structures and new forms of 
behaviour, thereby redefining the forms of societal organization. According to Finnstrom 
(2005) violence is not limited to the battleground or to perpetrators and their victims but may 
progressively infest the wider surrounding and may even last for generations. However in a 
post-conflict situation where most of the people may be accustomed to the use of violence, 
how does the state use this monopoly over violence to order society? The state may use 
violence as a tool of regaining control over post-conflict areas. However, violence may be just 
another form of gaining access to land in post-conflict areas. But also the use of violence by 
people in land matters may explain the failure of both statutory and customary land 
governance institutions to provide tenure security to local people in post-conflict settings. It 
is therefore critical to comprehend the role of violence in shaping land governance in post-
conflict situations.  
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Outline of the thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows; Chapter two discusses the research design; 
ethnography was the main methodology employed. Qualitative methods like participant 
observation, focus group discussion, interviews, case studies and document collection were 
utilized to collect data about the role of war, decentralization and the youth in land 
governance in post-conflict Northern Uganda. This chapter also comprises of the justification 
for selecting the study areas and case studies, area of study – Acholi sub-region, Northern 
Uganda, methods of data collection, and my experience with ethnographic research.  
Chapter three describes the case of the Apaa evictions in Amuru district and discusses the 
connection between the colonial past, the 20 year civil war in the north and the current land 
disputes in Acholi region. The chapter adds knowledge onto the ongoing debate on resource 
based conflict by illustrating that the multifaceted relationship between land and conflict 
cannot only be explained by the environmental security notions or by only the political ecology 
but rather a combination of both. Scarcity, availability, political, historical and social dynamics 
interconnect and contribute to conflict about land or natural resources. Violent conflict fuels 
into tensions between local groups about social issues such as ethnicity, grievances against 
those in power and the institutions that govern natural resources. This chapter concludes by 
highlighting that how those new issues are dealt with by policy makers is critical for future 
reconstruction and stability.  
Chapter four which is based on the case of Amuru Sugar Project reflects on decentralized land 
governance and its role in large-scale land allocation. It zooms in on how decentralization 
reshuffles vertical power relations between land governing institutions. It shows that 
administrative decentralization without real devolution of power from central governments 
to local governments is insufficient to influence decision making at local level. In this chapter 
it is demonstrated that decisions made about land attribution at lower levels of government 
reflect interests of those at higher levels of governance. The chapter asserts that the real 
impediment to local governance lies in the distribution of power between levels of authority. 
And it concludes that without transfer of real power to decentralized structures, 
decentralization will continue to be ineffective as a channel of incorporating popular 
participation in decision making. The chapter helps to comprehend how decentralization 
restructures power relations between land governing institutions and its impact on tenure 
security in Acholi region. 
Chapter five that is based on the Kigwe land dispute case in Pader district, focuses on the 
notion of institutional pluralism and its impact on land dispute resolution. In this chapter it is 
demonstrated that institutional proliferation in land governance results into confusion in land 
dispute resolution in post-conflict settings. Decentralization contributes to institutional 
multiplicity by creating new institutions that add on to the already existing authorities and 
regulations about land rather than devolving power to existing local institutions. This fuels 
into institutional competition at local level, thereby contributing to indecision in land dispute 
resolution. This intensifies land disputes and thus deviates from the essence of improved 
service delivery propelled by decentralization.  
Chapter six focuses on the youth case and elucidates the pivotal role of the youth in post-
conflict land governance. It demonstrates that although intergenerational conflicts are part 
and parcel of society, war significantly accelerates social and political change which in turn 
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restructures society and place land governance partly in the hands of male youths in post-
conflict settings. The shift in power relations fuels into struggles for authority over land 
governance between the youth and the elders. Social change as a result of war makes some 
youth powerful and prominent while other youths especially the female and orphaned youth 
become powerless in land governance. The chapter shows how the dynamics of staying in IDP 
camps, participation in the war, assuming positions in decentralized structures and inability 
to find jobs outside agriculture significantly influence the role of youth in land governance in 
post-conflict settings. It concludes by asserting that the new role attained by the youth in land 
governance may have irreversible effects on customary tenure where authority to govern land 
is embedded in elders but may also provide new avenues of dealing with intergenerational 
conflicts over land. It contributes to answering the question of how war transforms land 
governance. 
Chapter seven discusses what the different chapters tell us regarding the main question of the 
study. In this chapter the link between post-conflict land governance and state formation will 
be discussed. The Involvement of the central state in the decision making process at the local 
government levels reinforces state formation and the creation of a strong state. It shows how 
the state uses land to reward elites, investors and government supporters (especially in the 
case of Amuru Sugar Works limited). The state wants to have monopoly over violence in order 
to establish itself as the highest command or force in northern Uganda, a region that was 
under the control of the LRA rebels for more than 20 years. In short in this chapter it is shown 
that states use post-conflict land governance as tool of regaining control over and asserting 
authority in post-conflict areas that were previously under some other form of control. The 
state not fully devolving power to decentralized land governing institutions but also 
constricting the operations of customary institutions are indicators that central states want to 
continue pulling the strings of power. In a nutshell these are some of the characteristics of 
strong states.
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2. Methodology 
Organization of the research 
In November 2011 my fieldwork was started and the data collection journey began. In early 
November 2011 introductory visits were made to NGOs working on land in Kampala including 
Uganda Land Alliance, Land and Equity Movement in Uganda and Environmental Alert and 
interviews were conducted with key informants in Kampala. The visits and interviews in 
Kampala gave me an overview of land issues in Uganda and what to expect from the field. Mid 
November 2011 I made my first visit to northern Uganda, Gulu district in particular. I visited 
NGOs like the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), Legal Aid, the Norwegian 
Refugee Council (NRC) and Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA) and interviewed representatives from 
those organizations. The purpose of the visits was to establish contacts and introduce myself 
to local authorities and institutions working on land. I applied for an internship and requested 
to do research with some of those organizations. KKA accepted my internship request; I was 
given office space at the office of KKA and was allowed do field visits with KKA staff and teams. 
This arrangement did not involve any form of payments.   
I worked with Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA) for a period of two years from 2011 to 2013. KKA is the 
Cultural Institution for Acholiland, the institution was involved in peace talks with LRA and 
contributed to the peace process in northern Uganda. KKA has undertaken many programs 
including helping to resettle formerly displaced people in the Acholi region, programs to 
improve people’s livelihoods and documenting the principles and practices of customary 
tenure in Acholiland. The institution helped me to gain access to the Acholi community. My 
attachment to KKA enabled me to do field trips with the staff and conduct research in all the 
7 districts that make up the Acholi sub region, the districts include Gulu, Amuru, Pader, 
Kitgum, Lamwo, Nwoya and Agago. I attended land dispute mediations, meetings, workshops 
on land governance and community dialogues that were organized by KKA. I was also able to 
interview conflicting parties that brought their land disputes to KKA offices. Later I made 
independent visits to my research sites. The data I collected is my independent data and in no 
way does it reflect the interests or influence of KKA.  
Selection of study areas and case studies 
As part of the grounding land governance program, the project was designed to study post-
conflict land governance. The southern part of Uganda has been fairly peaceful since the 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) government came to power in 1986. Thus northern 
Uganda was selected as the area of study because the region had just come out of the 20 year 
civil war (from 1986 to 2006), and region provided the best conditions to study how 
decentralized land governance takes shape in post-conflict settings. At the beginning of 2012 
the high court in Gulu, made a ruling on the prominent Amuru Sugar project land dispute. The 
ruling stirred violence among the youth in Amuru, the politicians clashed with government, 
and the media extensively started reporting on this land dispute. This is what drove my 
attention to this particular land dispute and I started following it as case study. I also chose 
this case because it showed vertical struggles for authority between central and local 
government. Amuru sugar project land represents a conventional land grabbing case. 
Another case is the Apaa evictions that occurred in February 2012 in Amuru district, KKA 
arranged to meet with the people that had been evicted and that is how I chose to study the 
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case. This particular case showed how the colonial history contributes to the present 
confusion in land governance in northern Uganda. It is not only a classic case of green grabbing 
but it also manifests the impact of war on land governance and progressive state formation 
through land governance. Then for the Kigwe land dispute in Pader, I went with KKA for this 
land dispute mediation but what made me pick interest in the case is that this particular land 
dispute had been taken to almost all formal and informal land institutions but it had not been 
resolved. The Kigwe case represented the horizontal competition for authority between state 
and customary institutions. Interviews were conducted across Acholi region to understand 
other aspects like the role of war and youth in land governance. However majority of the 
interviews were conducted in Gulu, Amuru and Pader districts. This is because Gulu district is 
the hub or heart of Acholi region where most of NGOs are found and with a burst of activities 
like workshops on land matters. Amuru district was the hot spot where all the prominent land 
disputes in Acholi took place and then Pader district because of specifically the Kigwe case 
study that I chose to follow.  
Methodology 
Ethnography 
This study was conducted in a post-conflict setting as already illustrated by the Community 
meeting of 4th May 2013 at Kololo. The study employed a qualitative methodology in order 
to attain an in-depth description of processes and events during fieldwork (Eby et al. 2005). 
Understanding how decentralized land governance takes shape in post-conflict northern 
Uganda and the connection between land and conflict required studying these processes over 
a long period of time. Participant observation combined with interviews were the main 
fieldwork methods of ethnography and had the advantage of being explorative and open-
ended in character and better able to deal with the complexity of the issues (internal and 
external validity). Qualitative methodology is also not so structured because it involves less 
prior classification on data which therefore means that emergent themes from the field can 
be catered for (Eby et al. 2005). From all the land conflicts that I followed during fieldwork I 
realized that violence was used either by the state or by the citizens. This is a concept that I 
had not given a central place in my proposal but it became significant during data collection. 
Participant observation was the main methodology used because it was most suitable for 
collecting data about the role of war, decentralization and the youth in land governance in 
post-conflict Northern Uganda.  
The methods of ethnography help to uniquely explore lived experiences in all its richness and 
complexity (Herbert, 2000). Ethnography involves watching what happens; listening to what 
is said, asking questions and collecting whatever data that is related to the focus of the 
research (O’Reilly, 2005). Ethnography enables the researcher to examine processes of 
change, negotiated lived experiences (O’Reilly, 2005) making it suitable to collect data about 
the process of post-conflict land governance. Ethnography enables a research design that 
leaves space for fluidity and flexibility (O’Reilly, 2005) which gives it an edge over other 
methodologies such as quantitative methods for example questionnaires that are rigid and 
which do not cater for emergent or unexpected issues that arise from the field. Careful 
analysis of what people do and how people do it (Richards, 2005) in relation to land enabled 
the researcher to discover the relations between conflict and land, people’s attachment to 
land, why people use violence in land matters and the struggle for authority over land 
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between land institutions. By studying events in their natural setting (Eby et al. 2005), for 
example by witnessing processes as they evolve, gives this research also external validity. 
Both primary and secondary data was used. Primary data was collected in the field for example 
data about the experiences of formerly displaced people and how the war changed their 
access and ownership of land. Secondary data, especially from written documents on 
decentralization, land tenure systems was used to get information for example about laws, 
provisions and roles of decentralized land governance structures and customary institutions 
and how they interact and contribute to shaping land governance in northern Uganda. 
Methods of data collection 
A range of qualitative methods was utilized. Qualitative methods including participant 
observation, focus group discussions, interviews and case studies were used to collect data on 
post-conflict decentralized land governance in northern Uganda. Similarly Kvale (2007) noted 
that such qualitative methods of data collection have become key methods of social research 
since the 1980s. This research employed a mixture of qualitative methods so that data 
obtained could be cross-checked and triangulated. In the same way Eby et al. (2005) pointed 
out is that convergence across data methods increases confidence in research findings. 
Participant observation, the researcher spends considerable time observing and interacting 
with a social group (Herbert, 2000). By carrying out participant observation, the researcher 
becomes part of the natural settings so that people being researched cease to be affected by 
his/her presence (O’Reilly, 2005). I took part in and observed daily practices of the people of 
Acholi region for example land dispute mediations, community or village meetings, periodic 
markets, youth meetings and practices like group digging. Through participating in such daily 
practices I was able to observe how land disputes unfold, how they transform from nonviolent 
to violent, people’s perceptions about the state and the governance of land in Acholi. 
Photographs were part of the data, for example photos of markings on trees which signified 
people’s land boundaries, photos of people evicted from their land and their emotions shown 
through facial expressions. And photos of crop gardens and animals that show that people are 
trying to rebuild their livelihoods after war. The meaning of objects and events are often 
revealed through practices, reactions, cursory comments and facial expressions (Herbert, 
2000). I documented and recorded events related to the topics under study through making 
field notes and this enabled me to later give a thick description of the events like evictions in 
Apaa, Amuru district, northern Uganda. In total I participated in 5 land dispute mediations, 
and 8 community dialogues; land, culture, investments, saving and LRA war issues were 
discussed. I took part in 7 workshops that discussed land matters in Acholi region for example 
to discuss the relevance of certificates of customary ownership in Acholi and the applicability 
of principles and practices of customary tenure in Acholiland that were documented by KKA. 
Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were conducted in order to see how opinions are formed while 
people discuss about issues of land governance. Information on topics like how the war 
changed the social structure of Acholi and how the youth view themselves with regard to land 
were obtained through FGD that were composed of youth, elders and women. Focus group 
discussions were categorized into homogeneous and heterogeneous. FGDs with youths, 
elders, women, local leaders, returnees were conducted so that different information and a 
variety of opinions could be obtained on concepts like identity, decentralization, land conflict, 
the impact of LRA war. Through FGDs people were able to share their different experiences, 
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for example how they participate in decision making and how land disputes bring out ethnic 
sentiments among social groups. In total 25 focus group discussions were conducted. Certain 
sensitive issues, like what it means for a widow to be denied access to land by relatives and 
officials in land institutions taking bribes which influences land allocation and land dispute 
resolution could not be discussed through FGD. So other methods of data collection such as 
interviews were used to get such information.  
In an interview the researcher asks about and listens to what people themselves tell about 
their lived world (Kvale, 2007). One to one in-depth interviews and group interviews about 
decentralized land governance were conducted but also questions that arise on the spur of 
the moment were catered for (Cf. O’Reilly, 2005). Interviews were conducted with people 
from central government, local government (for example officials from the ministry of lands 
and land boards at the district level), traditional leaders, local council leaders, police, women 
and youth, returnees, formerly displaced people, non-government organizations and the local 
people. Interviews were also done with key informants who are experts or very 
knowledgeable on topics related to the research in order to get a complete picture. Interviews 
were done with the district land officers, members of district land boards, members of area 
land committees and local council members, because they were knowledgeable about the 
functioning of decentralized land governance structures. Through interviewing the above 
categories, data was obtained on how land governance decisions are made under 
decentralization, who is represented, who participates and whose interests are implemented 
in decentralized land governance. Employees of local and international NGOs were 
interviewed to understand their role in land dispute resolution because conflicting parties 
approach NGOs for services such as land dispute mediation and legal representation. In a 
nutshell qualitative interviews provide for in-depth understanding through rich narratives 
(O’Reilly, 2005). A sum of 133 interviews was conducted throughout the data collection 
period. 
By viewing a case study through the lens of an interpretive framework, the researcher 
provides a broader understanding of what happened (Druckman, 2005). I followed particular 
case studies in depth: these included the Apaa evictions in Amuru, the Kigwe land dispute in 
Pader district and the Amuru Sugar project in Amuru district. From following these case 
studies I was able to find out the actors involved in land governance which included 
institutions, politicians and local people, the interests of those actors, the causes and types of 
land conflicts. They shed more light on associated issues like identity, why people use violence 
in land matter, the impact of war on land governance because there was ample time for 
descriptive questioning. Case studies often show major patterns, trends, comparisons and 
contrasts with other cases (Druckman, 2005). This is important because the case studies that 
were followed were totally different yet they all told a story about land governance in post-
conflict settings. Out of the 4 papers that were developed from this study, 3 are based on case 
studies. 
Document collection, land governance involves policy reforms therefore documents were 
analyzed in order to understand the concept of land governance. The documents that were 
collected include legal statutes like the Constitution, Land Act, Local Council Act, Gazettement 
and De-gazettement statutes, Newspapers, Scientific papers and Policy papers. Analysis of the 
above documents contributed to the understanding of the discourses and debates on 
decentralization, legal pluralism, tenure systems, governance, land conflicts and power. For 
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example from analyzing the gazettement and de-gazettement statutes, I was able to find out 
that the current land conflicts in northern Uganda are also deeply rooted in historical policies 
on land governance.  
How choices made in methodology contributed to the research  
By using methods of ethnography I was able to study land governance as a process which 
would not be possible if I had employed questionnaires or through a short term research (less 
than 6 months). For example the case of Apaa evictions is ongoing and new developments 
keep unfolding like the women who undressed before government ministers who had gone 
to visit Apaa village in early 2015 after my fieldwork. Undertaking ethnographic research 
permitted me to continue recording such events as they happened. Staying long with the 
communities made me get accepted by the community and got data that can only be got when 
the community stops identifying you as a stranger, for example to explain the current 
perceptions of the people of Acholi or north towards the state/government. The specific cases 
that I followed were very sensitive: most people at the start thought I was a government spy. 
If this research was to be carried out through short interviews and short stays in the field I 
would have missed observing how land disputes escalate into violence, and I would have failed 
to understand how various power plays influence decisions made on land on the long run. In 
all the cases land governing institutions were reluctant to make decisions over land disputes 
because they were afraid of stepping the powerful actors’ toes these include the state. The 
Apaa case (chapter three), Amuru sugar case (chapter four) and the Kigwe case (chapter five) 
are land disputes that kept on evolving and transforming, they required sufficient time to 
follow all the actors and also to understand the interests of the different actors. Important to 
note is that by the end of fieldwork in May 2013 these land disputes were still open and 
ongoing.  
Fieldwork experiences 
My background of coming from the southern part of the country contributed to people 
viewing me as an outsider. I received this treatment from both the local people that I lived 
with and the institutions that I worked with. The little children openly called me muno 
(foreigner) referring to my skin complexion which was a bit lighter than most people in the 
areas where I conducted fieldwork. Where I worked I was regarded just as another person 
from Southern Uganda. Of course being identified as an outsider makes a person feel isolated. 
However this was more intense during the initial stages of conducting fieldwork. But as time 
passed and the longer I stayed with the communities in northern Uganda people started 
treating me like their own. People opened more about land disputes and told me their 
histories especially with regard to their experiences during the LRA war. And at KKA I made 
friends and my colleagues realized that my research was purely for academic purposes, my 
relations with them improved. 
Language barrier  
The people in Acholi region, northern Uganda speak Luo and I come from a Bantu speaking 
group in southern part of the country. The two languages are completely different and 
communication was difficult. I was able to learn a few basics in Luo but I had to work with a 
translator on a full-time basis. The other good thing that helped is English is the official 
language in Uganda so many people tried to communicate with me in English. 
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Living with the communities  
Some of the case studies that I followed were in very inaccessible places with no other types 
of accommodation apart from individual residential homes. It was difficult to get 
accommodation but it was almost impossible to commute to these areas on a daily basis. I 
managed to get host families that took me on with my research assistant. Staying with 
communities for a long time helped to gain trust from the people that I lived with and people 
shared with me virtually everything. However I got into situations where people who helped 
me gain access to the field turned out to be the perpetrators of land conflicts and the 
community had negative perceptions about them. I also did not want the community to see 
me as party to such actions so some relations that I had developed with such people were 
severed by building new networks. There were also instances where I had been following two 
families with a land disputes for a long time that these families expected me to be loyal to 
them and share what the different families were sharing with or telling me. This was tough 
but I tried to make the ground straight by telling them that my stay with them is not about 
telling the other what they are doing about the land conflict but studying what each family is 
doing about the conflict. 
Violence or the threat of violence was also very much part of the fieldwork as was apparent 
in the account of the community meeting in Amuru. I saw live bullets for the first time in my 
life. I dodged stones that were hurled in different directions by irate youth and took cover 
under a parked car to protect my dear life. This happened when the minister’s convoy met the 
road block, the minister’s body guards swung into action by firing live bullets in order to 
disperse the youth who had turned violent. This taught me that while doing research in post-
conflict settings the researcher has to be prepared for anything. This experience increased my 
interest in this particular land dispute, it also seemed like a movie to me. I eagerly waited for 
new developments; my ears were always on the ground so that I do not miss any 
developments. This is because I would later use such occurrences to make my analysis about 
the use of violence in post-conflict land governance.  
The research area: Northern Uganda 
Uganda has a land resource base of 20 million hectares of which 6.77 million is cultivated 
(Bruce, 1998). Uganda is politically divided into four regions Northern, Eastern, Western and 
Central region. The Northern region comprises of Acholi, Lango, Teso, West Nile and Karamoja 
sub regions. Northern Uganda covers 35% of the total land surface in Uganda.  
Uganda has a total population of 34,856,813 people and 73 percent of the country’s 
population is employed in the agricultural sector and only 13 and 3.3 percent are employed in 
the service and industry sector respectively (see UBOS, 2014; World Bank, 2013). This paints 
a clear picture of the pressure exerted on land because the majority of the population derives 
its livelihood from agriculture. Uganda is engrossed in a cocktail of land related conflicts 
throughout the country, for example land conflicts on Mailo land in Buganda between the 
tenants and the land lords which was a creation of the British colonialists, land conflicts in 
Acholi land because of distortion of land governance during the LRA war, land conflicts among 
customary land owners in Teso, Ankole and Busoga regions because of population growth and 
currently land conflicts in Bunyoro region because of the discovery of oil. These wide spread 
episodes of land conflicts or clashes occur between the pastoralists and farmers, men and 
women, investors and local people  over ownership and access to land. In Uganda there have 
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been several policy responses to such issues, among which decentralization takes a prominent 
place. Decentralized land governance has been looked as a land governance reform that would 
contribute to tenure security and alleviate land disputes in the country. 
Map 1:  Showing Northern Uganda 
 
The Acholi sub-region 
Well as the southern part of the country has enjoyed relative peace for the last 30 years since 
NRM came to power, the northern region of Uganda, more specifically the Acholi sub-region 
has been devastated by a two decades civil war. The study was conducted in Acholi sub-region 
which forms part of the greater northern Uganda, it is made up of seven districts; Agago, 
Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum, Lamwo, Nwoya, and Pader district, with a total land surface of 28,400 
square kilometers. Acholi sub-region has a population of 1,511,614 people of which the 
majority belongs to the Acholi tribe (UBOS, 2014). Customarily Acholi are governed by 
traditional chiefs, and Acholi sub region has 54 chiefdoms which are led by the paramount 
chief who is based at Ker Kwaro Acholi in Gulu district. Economic activities in Acholi are 
dominated by agriculture especially subsistence agriculture, cattle keeping and fishing from 
numerous streams. The main crops grown in Acholi include; sesame, sorghum, millet, rice, 
groundnuts etc. Acholi is surrounded by rivers which also act as political boundaries between 
Acholi and neighboring regions or districts. 
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Map 2: Showing Acholi Sub-Region 
The Acholi region that was affected the most by the activities of a series of rebel movements 
that occurred between 1986 and 2006 in Northern Uganda. These violent events have been 
framed by researchers and scholars as the LRA war, a war that started without clear motives 
apart from the rebels claiming to restore the 10 commandments in Uganda (Allen 2007; 
Finnstrom 2010). However, this civil war that started in 1986 was a rebellion against National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) government led by Yoweri Museveni, because it had toppled the 
Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) government that was led by Acholi officers. In the 
course of time, the civil war transformed and took on new motives and new actors. The 
resistance movement went through a series of leadership changes. It started as the Uganda 
People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) and the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) led by Alice Lakwena 
which led the rebellion between 1986 and 1988. Then Lukoya Severino the father of Alice 
Lakwena took over from 1988 to 1989 under the flag of the Holy Spirit Movement ii. Over the 
same period of time (1987) armed Karamajong cattle rustlers also terrorized the region, 
raiding almost 98% of the cattle in Acholi region (HURIFO, 2002). From 1989 onwards, the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) under the leadership of Joseph Kony became the face of the 
guerrilla movement. The LRA abducted children and youths, mutilated people by cutting off 
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their limbs, lips and ears and massacred civilians. However atrocities were committed by both 
the LRA and the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF). 
In 1996 due to intensified brutalities, the government of Uganda forcefully ordered all people 
of Northern Uganda specifically in the Acholi region to relocate to protected camps so that 
the UPDF could drive the LRA rebels out of the villages where they had access to food and 
could disguise as civilians. The civil war in Northern Uganda led to the death of more than 
30,000 people and displacement of over 2,000,000 people (ARLPI, 2010; Mabikke, 2011). 
Literally all families in Acholiland were displaced to Internally Displaced People’s camps (IDP). 
According to many of my Acholi interlocutors this is one of the factors responsible for rampant 
land disputes in the present. 
The civil conflict in northern Uganda later transformed into an international conflict when the 
Khartoum government started supporting the LRA rebels which was a retaliation since the 
NRM was equally helping the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels in South Sudan. It 
then became an issue of state building where governments were now defending their 
territories and international borders. Northern Uganda suffered the brunt of violence as the 
two states tussled it out. Up to now LRA rebels continue to destabilize Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan but also the Uganda People’s 
Defense Forces has not given up the pursuit of the rebels in those countries in order to finish 
them off. This war elevated the importance of northern Uganda in regional politics and the 
subsequent desire of the NRM government to have full control over this territory in order to 
portray Uganda as a strong state.  
In 2006, after peace talks were held in Juba between the NRM government and the LRA rebels, 
there was cessation of hostilities bringing an end to the civil war that had lasted for over 20 
years in Northern Uganda. Gradually people started returning to their villages. However, upon 
their return, they are now faced with land disputes some of which turn out to be violent (See 
Allen et al. 2010). Important to point out is after the war in the north, on one side the 
government of Uganda in bent on opening up Acholi land for development and on the other 
there is a search for opportunities by power holders. These are taking place in a period before 
people are fully resettled. These developments mean changing the way land is owned which 
is receiving opposition from the local people. Not forgetting that majority (90%) of the land in 
Acholi is held under customary tenure, thus when the state makes land governance reforms 
for example district land boards allocating land to investors for large-scale land investments 
then it touches the core of the Acholi existence. 
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3. The Multifaceted Relationship between Land and Violent 
Conflict: The case of Apaa Evictions in Amuru district, 
Northern Uganda 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that violent conflict prominently impacts on land governance and so 
contributes to land conflicts in post-conflict settings. In the natural resources literature, the 
relationship between land and conflict is often explained in terms of environmental security 
or political ecology, and many have pointed out that the way land is governed in itself may be 
a source of conflict. However, less attention has been given to the effects of violent conflict 
on land and its governance in post-conflict situations. This paper argues that violent conflict 
affects land governance in many ways and that this in turn might contribute to further violent 
conflict. The argument builds around an extended case study of the Apaa evictions in Amuru 
District in Northern Uganda. The case illustrates how conflict around land is not just the result 
of resource scarcity and competition, but is the outcome of a combination of political, 
historical and social dynamics. Past policies on land and practices of land governance play a 
critical role in this. However at the same time, violent conflict has a critical impact on land 
access, transforms land governance authority and the rules applied. The land conflicts 
resulting from this, in their turn, fuel ethnic tensions between local population groups, and 
grievances about those in power and the institutions that govern natural resources. The ways 
in which such problematic conflict-induced changes in land access and governance are dealt 
with by policy makers is critical for post-conflict stability.   
Keywords: Apaa, Violent conflict, Land governance, Land conflicts, post-conflict 
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Introduction 
In post-conflict situations land is a necessary asset for people to rebuild their livelihoods 
(Huggins 2010; Rugadya 2008). At the same time, many post-conflict situations are 
characterized by a high number of land disputes because of displacement, disrupted 
structures of authority over land, and illegal occupation by powerful actors (Unruh 2003). 
Therefore, to achieve peace, economic and social recovery, and to prevent land disputes from 
culminating into new violence, strengthening land governance is considered a key component 
of post-conflict reconstruction programmes (See Pons-Vignon and Solignac Lecomte 2004). 
Likewise, post-conflict states often consider improving and reforming land governance as an 
important way of restoring sovereignty and legitimacy (see Peluso and Vandergeest 2011). 
However, the relationship between violent conflict, land governance and continuing instability 
deserves further investigation. This is because most of the literature explaining the nexus 
between land and conflict concentrates on re-emphasizing the role land plays in violent 
conflicts. Land issues intersect with other factors like political mobilization that work together 
to contribute to violent conflict (Daudelin 2003; Pons-Vignon and Solignac Lecomte 2004). 
However, there exists a knowledge gap about the impact of violent conflict on land 
governance itself. Land governance issues resulting from violent conflict are not given 
appropriate attention in the peace process yet they form part of the reasons for violent 
conflict to continue or reoccur (Unruh 2004).  
Natural resource literature often focuses on the ‘root causes’ of land conflict. A dominant 
perspective remains that of environmental security which understands conflicts about natural 
resources as a result of scarcity and competition (see Hardin 1968; Homer-Dixon 1999). 
Increasingly, proponents of a political ecology perspective gain more prominence, 
understanding resource conflicts as power struggles embedded in wider historical processes, 
contestation and institutional failure (see Peluso & Watts 2001; Turner 2004; Benjaminsen et 
al. 2009; Peluso and Vandergeest 2011). Such perspectives also highlight that the ways in 
which land is governed may be a potential cause of conflict (Anseeuw and Alden 2010). They 
illustrate how many resource conflicts in Africa can be traced to historical policies that assure 
that particular groups in society reap the benefits of resources and exclude others (See Peters 
2004; Turner 2004; Cotula et al. 2004 about the Great Lakes Region, Sudan; Clover 2010 about 
Angola). 
Moreover, it is only recently that researchers have come to highlight the diverse ways in which 
violent conflict interacts with land issues. First, violent conflict reshuffles access to land, land 
ownership and it also creates room for all kinds of ‘injustices’ in the ways in which land is 
appropriated (Daudelin 2003; Unruh 2003; Vircoulon 2004). When land governance is in 
disarray, various outsiders to the community, including government institutions may come in 
to appropriate land and this is what may cause land conflicts after violent conflicts. In addition, 
post-conflict return or resettlement of displaced people often results in competing claims on 
land and new tenure insecurities. For example in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide refugees 
returned and resettled themselves on land without supervision by the state. This resulted into 
violent occupation of land that did not belong to them and this contributes to the current land 
disputes in Rwanda (Unruh 2004).  
Second, violent conflict may also significantly alter the ways in which land is governed: conflict 
redefines the rules of access, utilization and ownership of land. Ambiguity about who is in 
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charge and the rules that apply may result into a situation in which diverse land governing 
institutions compete for authority over land in post-conflict settings. This in turn may produce 
tenure insecurity and land conflicts (Clover 2010), a continuation of instability and even new 
violence. Distortion of land governance during the war is a significant long-term cost of violent 
conflict that may take generations to restore (Cf. Bannon and Collier 2003). How these 
violence-related transformations of land governance precisely work and what they imply for 
intervention is a topic that needs further analysis (Cf. Daudeline 2003; Ross 2004).  
In this paper we argue for the need to better understand the long-term impacts of violent 
conflict on land access and land governance. Though political ecology perspectives on the 
land-conflict nexus may provide valuable insights into post-conflict land disputes, it is critical 
to bring in the conflict situation as an explanatory element to better understand conflicts 
around land and its governance in post-conflict settings. These land conflicts in turn create a 
space in which territorial struggles and contestations over identity and ethnicity are played 
out in new ways. Unfortunately, practitioners and policy makers often fail to take account of 
what violent conflict does to land access and land governance (Cf. Huggins 2010; Clover 2010). 
If the linkages between violent conflict and contestations over land access and ownership in 
post-conflict settings are not well understood post-conflict stability may continue to be an 
elusive dream.  
We will make this argument by reflecting on the case of the 2012 eviction of land occupants 
in Apaa village, in northern Uganda, which was the culmination of a long history of 
contestations about who are the rightful owners of land in question and which laws apply. The 
case-study is based on ethnographic research in Apaa, which formed part of two years of 
fieldwork in the period 2011-2013 in Northern Uganda, in the context of a larger research 
project on decentralized land governance in post-conflict settings. 3  The study employed 
qualitative methods of data collection. Fieldwork was conducted in Amuru and Gulu Districts 
in the Acholi sub-region and Adjumani District in West Nile sub-region all part of northern 
Uganda. This ensued getting data from both sides and thereby representing the case/conflict 
from both Acholi and Madi perspectives. This paper builds on 43 interviews, 8 focused group 
discussions, 1 dialogue meeting on investments in Acholi region, 2 songs composed about 
Apaa evictions by a local musician, 2 community meetings, 1 workshop, newspaper accounts, 
news broadcasts by Nation Television Uganda (NTV) and Nile Broadcast Services (NBS) 
Television and field observations by the main researcher who lived within the Acholi villages. 
People interviewed included politicians, local people, members of the area land committees, 
local council members, civil servants at districts, traditional leaders, the youth, game rangers 
in Apaa, representatives from NGOs. Secondary data is based on review of documents 
especially court documents, the land laws for example the 1975 Land Reform decree, the 1998 
Land Act, the 1995 constitution, instruments of gazettement and de-gazettement4 and other 
related literature. 
                                                          
3This programme, ‘Grounding Land Governance - Land Conflicts, Local Governance and Decentralization in Post-
Conflict Uganda, Burundi and South Sudan’ was funded by NWO-WOTRO Science for Global Development, grant 
number W 01.65.332.00 
4 Gazzettement means to give a legal status to something which is published in an official government journal. 
In Uganda gazzettement is done by parliament for example putting land a side for a particular purpose like 
preservation and control of game reserves. On the other hand degazzettement means to remove or revoke 
legal/official status from something. In Uganda, this may be done by a cabinet minister, president. For example 
president Amin degazzetted most of the game reserves in 1972. 
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The argument is presented as follows; the following section reflects on the contribution of 
environment security and political ecology perspectives to understand the relationship 
between land and conflict, and the need in post-conflict settings to complement those with a 
focus on how violent conflict plays into land access and land governance. We then turn to the 
case of the Apaa evictions. Applying a political ecology perspective, we demonstrate the 
historical and political background of the claims made by the different parties involved –the 
local people, the district authorities of Amuru and Adjumani Districts, the Uganda Wildlife 
Authority; the impact of the redrawing of district boundaries and struggles over jurisdiction of 
various authorities; the role of ethnic identity in local perceptions about those boundaries; as 
well as the power politics involved. We then argue how the resulting dispute can only be 
properly understood if one takes account of the diverse ways in which the violent conflict 
between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
government interfered with land distribution and land governance. We show how the 
LRA/NRM war resulted in the opening up of Apaa to outsiders and a redistribution of land 
governing power. Post-conflict efforts at decentralization that aimed to enhance land 
governance and transform authoritarian governance practices complicated the dispute even 
further. This brings us to the major argument that –to better understand post-conflict land 
disputes– political ecology perspectives need to be complemented with a particular focus on 
the impact of violent conflict on land access and land governance. 
Analyzing land, governance and conflict in post-conflict settings 
Theorizing about the relationship between conflict and land tends to explain land disputes 
either in terms of scarcity and competition, or sees land disputes as embedded in wider 
historical and political developments (Le Billon 2001; Korf and Funfgeld 2006; Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers 2004; Cf. Cramer 2006). The proponents of the first explanation underscore the 
inevitability of competition and conflict in case of a high demand for and limited supply of 
natural resources. In such a conception the scarcity of land is presented as a ‘root cause’ of 
violent conflict, which is inevitable, and at best can be averted by putting in place the right 
institutions (See Van Leeuwen and Van der Haar 2016). Such a perspective – which has also 
become known as ‘environmental security’– reduces the relationship between natural 
resources and conflict to an issue of a desperate search for survival or human greed (Hardin 
1968; Homer-Dixon 1999; Cf. Peluso & Watts 2001). 
However, such a perspective fails to explain why in certain situations of scarcity and competing 
interests over natural resources conflicts do not arise. It is precisely this type of question that 
theorists from a political ecology school of thought seek to clarify. These scholars do not 
dispute the relevance of scarcity and abundance, but point out that actual scarcity or 
availability of resources on its own cannot predict the prevalence of conflict. Instead, they 
consider that resource dependency and conflict-proneness of resources are always socially 
constructed; and that there is need to understand how certain resources become perceived 
as scarce or valuable (see van Leeuwen and van der Haar 2016). This requires understanding 
the historical, political, social context in which those resources are exploited, the distribution 
of resources and relations of production that come about and how those turn conflictive (Le 
Billon 2001; Peluso & Watts 2001). In this connection, Cramer and Richards (2011:281) 
emphasize to look beyond the period immediately preceding the outburst of violence, as many 
resource-related conflicts have a long history in the making.  
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This paper starts from such a political ecological perspective. It underscores that the 
availability of land in itself does not spark off conflicts, but explores how the contested nature 
of land access is politically and historically formed. It also highlights the importance of the 
state, its policies and power politics. The management of land is a key area in which the state 
manifests itself and tries to impose its power over society, not only through the use of 
violence, but also through legal instruments, and statutory land institutions. Land reform may 
mean changing the rules of access and ownership of land of the local people or among the 
local groups. In due course land governance becomes a tool for state expansion and 
formation. Literature has argued that modern African states in diverse ways continue a 
colonial project of state expansion and expropriation of local resource users (see Peters 2004; 
Peluso and Vandergeest 2011; Cramer 2006). States may design rights to resources in such a 
way that they benefit the state itself (Peluso 1993), thus maintaining control over territory, 
natural resources and people. As a result, local people might be excluded from accruing 
benefits from natural resources, and the interaction between state institutions and local 
people might turn conflictive. Peluso (1993:204) illustrates how wildlife-conservation and the 
promotion of nature reserves may in effect enhance a state’s control over natural resources 
and populations, especially those that do not support the government.  
Such a perspective also brings out that conflict about land is not so much about the resource 
itself, but primarily about its governance, regulation and the maintenance of political 
hierarchies. In short, the governance of land access is embedded in wider power relations. 
How decisions are made about access, utilization, and ownership may be a source of 
contestation and resistance, while ambiguity about who is in charge and what rules apply 
might also lead to land conflict. Further, such a perspective clarifies how land-related conflicts 
represent or get deeply intertwined with other contestations in society, and how issues such 
as identity, ethnicity and grievances about those in power may play out in land issues (van 
Leeuwen & van der Haar 2016).. In this connection, to understand the conflictive nature of 
land access, it is important to consider the different meanings of land to local people. In 
agrarian African economies, land means more than an economic asset to rural populations; it 
is simultaneously the basis of their livelihood, and the source of their identity. As a 
consequence, disputes about land are more than resource conflicts, they may in fact come 
down to tensions over power, identity and social relations between different social groups, or 
as efforts to protect livelihoods and certain ways of living (Turner 2004).  
Nonetheless, such a perspective still considers violent conflict essentially as the outcome of 
contestation over land. It is only recently that researchers have come to highlight the diverse 
ways in which violent conflict interacts with land issues. While the ways in which land is 
governed may create resentment and resistance, violent conflict in itself may have an 
enormous impact on how land is governed. Violent conflict may reshuffle the rules of access, 
utilization and ownership of land. This in turn may produce tenure insecurity and new 
contestation over land, and even new violence. The gist of this paper is to clarify the impact 
of violent conflict on land governance which in turn, acts as a catalyst to conflicts about land.  
The case of Apaa evictions brings out the necessity of such a perspective. It illustrates the 
multi-dimensional relationship between land and conflict, illustrating how land conflict in 
northern Uganda and the competition over land ownership should be understood in the 
context of a longer history of contested politics of access to land, as well as contestation about 
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who is in charge and what rules apply, and how violent conflict instigates new contestation 
about land and its governance.  
Governance, war and land disputes: the Apaa evictions, Amuru district 
On the 13th of February 2012, amidst gunshots and tear gas, over 10 police trucks ferried 
people from Apaa village to Pabbo sub-county offices, in Amuru District. During the forceful 
evictions carried out by the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) and the police, 2 people were 
killed, 25 youths were imprisoned, 2,730 huts were demolished, 1,365 households were 
displaced and over 6,000 people were evicted from their land (Cf. Lawino 2012; Makumbi 
2012; RLP 2012; Lenhart 2013). This was the second eviction of the people of Apaa in less than 
a year. The first eviction in Apaa took place in May 2011, when armed UWA rangers moved 
around Apaa village demolishing people’s huts without explanation or notice of eviction. After 
the first eviction, people were told to go back to Apaa by their leaders and the land dispute 
went silent until the second eviction in February 2012. 
The evictions were the outcome of a long-standing dispute over land ownership and land 
governing authority. Apaa village5 is the main locality in the disputed area, which comprises 
about 825 square kilometers, and is found in Pabbo sub-county, Kilak County, Amuru District 
in Northern Uganda. The land in question is at the border between the Districts of Amuru and 
Adjumani. The dispute has come to encompass various actors with conflicting interests: while 
initially a dispute between the community of Apaa and the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), 
over time, the police, army and the district authorities of Amuru and Adjumani Districts got 
involved (Cf. RLP 2012; Lenhart, 2013). Due to the intermingling of various members of 
parliament, the dispute eventually became an issue between two communities, the Acholi and 
Madi people, and was even understood as an issue between the Acholi and the state.  
UWA claims that Apaa is located in East Madi Game Reserve that is found in Adjumani District, 
and that the current inhabitants of Apaa are illegally ‘encroaching’ on the game reserve. UWA 
has announced that further evictions will be carried out once marking of the district borders 
between Adjumani and Amuru Districts is complete. On the other hand, the residents of Apaa 
believe that the land in question is their ancestral land, from which they were displaced over 
the course of two decades of civil war between the LRA and the NRM government. The local 
people claim that UWA leased out the area to a South African investor interested in developing 
tourism and exporting game meat. Both the District authorities of Amuru and Adjumani 
maintain that Apaa village falls within their jurisdiction, and that each district is the rightful 
authority to determine what happens to the land in Apaa. Like UWA, Adjumani District also 
claims that the people of Apaa are illegal encroachers that have to vacate the village and the 
land as those are located in a reserve gazetted for wild animals. Amuru District acknowledges 
the claims of the local residents to the land on the basis that Apaa is part of the former Kilak 
Controlled Hunting Area, which was de-gazetted by President Idi Amin in 1972. 
How to understand those different claims? One might argue that the problem is basically one 
of irreconcilable claims on the same, scarce resource, that lead to competition and conflict; or 
the failure of institutions to properly deal with those unavoidable conflicts (see Turner 
                                                          
5 Apaa village has a total population of 17,541 people or 5,000 households. The major economic activities in Apaa 
are farming, basically subsistence agriculture of crops like rice, cassava, sesame, ground nuts, and sorghum and 
they rear a few goats and cattle, bee keeping, charcoal burning and hunting. 
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2004:864-5). Such an explanation, building around the notion of ‘scarcity’ certainly plays a role 
in local people’s explanations of the conflict. For instance, people interviewed pointed out 
that land is so central to people’s lives that they are willing to die for land: land is both their 
life and their identity. They would argue that land is a source of livelihood, from land people 
get food, and an income to pay school fees for their children and medical bills. At the same 
time, they point out how land defines them, and embodies their ancestry. The Acholi, who 
inhabit the village claim that their forefathers were born on that land, occupied and started 
cultivating it. They cannot relocate because past generations were buried on the land. This 
affiliation between land and ancestry concerns not only the direct family, but also the clans 
and even the tribe to which people feel they belong. To those interviewees, land disputes 
were inevitable in Northern Uganda, considering that the amount of land was incompatible to 
the number of claimants. 
On the other hand, one could explain the claims of local people in terms of opportunistic 
competition for scarce resources. In this connection, UWA representatives sometimes pointed 
out that those residing in Apaa village had prospectively come from other localities after the 
LRA/NRM war ended because the land was lying idle. Likewise, local people underscore the 
financial benefits that UWA and other parties may accrue from the land. For instance, a 
prominent politician from Adjumani District, who held ministerial posts in the past regimes, 
was said to have played a key role in driving the evictions in Apaa. In the past, this politician 
had never made claims that the land in Apaa belonged to Adjumani District. His recent interest 
in the case is locally attributed to personal benefit he may gain from the 4 billion Uganda 
shillings deal between the district, UWA and a South African investor, who will turn Apaa into 
a tourist destination with safari lodges. Under his chairmanship, discussions in cabinet 
resulted in a resolution that it was illegal for people to encroach on East Madi Game Reserve, 
and that the encroachment by the people from Apaa had to be stopped immediately. This 
resolution was reached prior to a visit to Apaa by the parliamentary commission to establish 
the facts on the ground. UWA and other security agencies were then called in to stop the 
encroachment and protect the game reserve. 
However, such stories of scarcity, competition and self-interest are only part of the 
explanation, and need to be complemented by a more historical and political analysis of the 
dispute. 
Contestation of local people’s claims to the ownership of the land in question has a long 
history. A key historical event occurred in 1922, when for administrative reasons the British 
forcefully relocated part of the residents of the contested area to Pabbo and Gulu town. The 
formal justification for the relocation was an epidemic of small-pox and sleeping sickness 
transmitted by tsetse flies, which had their breeding grounds in Zoka forest6. Between 1945 
and 1955 people slowly returned to Apaa, yet did not cross river Ceri, because of the sleeping 
sickness quarantine. In 1963 the area was gazetted and it became part of the Kilak Controlled 
Hunting Area, which occupied an area of approximately 1,800 square kilometres7. In 1972, 
Kilak Controlled Hunting Area was de-gazetted by President Amin8. After the revocation, in 
                                                          
6 See Fishbourne, 1909; Good 1972; Selby et al. 2013 for more information about small pox, sleeping sickness 
and other epidemics and how they were used by colonialists to influence local people’s settlements.  
7 Statutory instrument No. 226-25 
8 Statutory instrument No. 55 
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1973, descendants of the original residents returned to the land they claimed to be occupied 
by their ancestors. 
However, their return was short-lived, because in 1986 the LRA/NRM war broke out and the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) used the forests of Apaa as their training grounds. The 
government of Uganda then asked the people of Apaa to relocate to Gulu railway-station 
camp. Though initially not all people relocated, intensification of the civil war in 1996 forced 
all residents to move to the main IDP camp in Pabbo. In May 2002, the area was still insecure, 
nonetheless, people started to re-occupy and cultivate the land. Instead of residing in Apaa 
itself, they moved to a satellite camp called Acu, near Apaa, so that they could access their 
land from a distance. It was not until 2006 and after the Juba peace talks between the LRA 
and the NRM government that relative peace prevailed, and people finally settled again in  
 
Map 3: Showing Apaa conflict area and other localities mentioned in the case study. 
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Apaa. They were led by the chief of Pabbo clan, the Local Council 3 chairman of Pabbo, and an 
army general currently serving in the Uganda Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) who is locally 
described as ‘a son of Pabbo’.  
From history, we see that people have always been moving out and into the area, either 
because of colonial policies, sleeping sickness, government policies for wildlife conservation, 
or war-related insecurity. Unfortunately, these movements have contributed to ambiguity 
about who are the rightful owners of the land and the authorities in charge. 
 
Table 1: A history of population movements and evolution of Apaa conflict 
Time  Event 
1922 People displaced from Apaa by the colonial authorities 
1945-1955 People returned to Apaa 
1962 Uganda gets independence, end of colonial period 
1963 Area gazetted as part of Kilak Controlled Hunting Area  
1971 Idi Amin becomes president of Uganda through a coup 
1972 Area de-gazetted by President Idi Amin 
1973 People return to Apaa 
1986 NRM government takes power after 5 years of a guerrilla war. The same 
year there was an outbreak of war between LRA and NRM, people left 
Apaa yet again 
1996 At the height of the civil war, everybody is displaced from Apaa to IDP 
camps 
1997 Adjumani District was split from Moyo District 
2002 Though the war was going on, people started re-accessing their land in 
Apaa. At the same time Adjumani District offered Apaa land for 
gazettement to become part of East-Madi game reserve  
2006 End of the LRA/NRM civil war, and official return of people to Apaa 
satellite camp. Amuru District was carved out of Gulu district. 
May 2011 First eviction 
February 2012 Second eviction 
September 
2015 
Third eviction. The conflict is yet to be resolved 
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The creation of new districts: putting into question the jurisdiction over Apaa land 
Confusion about the status of the land and its ownership resulting from the consecutive 
gazettement and de-gazettement of the game reserve is further compounded by the creation 
of new districts with unclear boundaries. Apaa finds itself at the boundary between Amuru 
and Adjumani Districts, which again were split-offs of the districts of Gulu in 2006 and Moyo 
in 1997 respectively (Cf. RLP 2012). However, the boundaries of those new districts were never 
clearly demarcated, turning the dispute about the gazetted or de-gazetted nature of the land 
into a conflict over powers of jurisdiction. 
To local residents, the division is clear: local people from both Apaa and across the river Zoka 
(Adjumani) point out that the boundary between Adjumani and Amuru Districts is the river 
Zoka. In previous elections, residents of Apaa voted for political candidates from Amuru 
District. During fieldwork, the main researcher observed Amuru District cars traversing the 
area, Amuru health workers providing services like immunization of children. Likewise, people 
in Apaa possessed identity cards from Gulu District, from which Amuru District was carved out 
in 2006.  
However, both districts claim authority over the area. To support their claims, they make 
reference to its status of a gazetted or de-gazetted game reserve. Amuru District claims that 
Apaa is part of the former Kilak Controlled Hunting Area, which was located within the 
boundaries of the former Gulu district. Kilak Controlled Hunting Area  was de-gazetted on 30th 
March 1972 under statutory instrument of 1972 no. 55. This converted the area into a place 
for human settlement. Some residents of Apaa even attained lease-hold titles, issued by the 
Gulu district Land Board. The authorities  of Adjumani District, on the other hand, claim that 
Apaa belongs to Adjumani District. At the beginning of the new Millennium, Adjumani District 
offered the land for gazettement and it became part of East-Madi game reserve, and this 
gazettement was approved by Parliament on 27 March 2002. 
As a result of those actions by the two districts, the area now appears to have a dual legal 
status, being legally recognized as a de-gazetted area, and at the same time as a gazetted 
game reserve. Either legal status has significant consequences for the extent to which the 
residents of Apaa are allowed to use of the land.  
An important role in the ambiguity about which district is in charge, and thus about the status 
of the land, is played by the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA). UWA was created in 1996 and 
is charged with a mandate to conserve resources within national parks and other wildlife 
areas, so that people may accrue benefits from wildlife. In 1998 during the LRA/NRM war, 
Uganda Wildlife Authority requested the district council of Gulu District to gazette Apaa and 
Lakang9 to become a game reserve. According to UWA, Apaa provides a strategic wild life 
corridor between the East Madi game reserve and Murchison falls National Park, and UWA 
wanted to stop ‘encroachers’ (poachers) from killing the animals travelling between these 
areas. UWA suggested also that the area had good potential for tourism, if the insecurity 
resulting from the LRA/NRM-conflict could be resolved. At that time, UWA recognized that 
the area was vacant, because most of the land holdings had been abandoned as a result of 
                                                          
9 Lakang is another contested area where Amuru district land board allocated 10,000 hectares of land to Amuru 
Sugar Works Limited to start up a sugar complex. Lakang is also part of Kilak Controlled Hunting Area which was 
degazetted on 30th March 1972 under statutory instrument of 1972 no. 55. For more information about Lakang 
land dispute see Kobusingye forth coming 
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the LRA/NRM-insurgency (see below). However, Gulu District council did not accept the 
proposal. The episode suggests that, at that time, UWA acknowledged that the Apaa area was 
part of Greater Gulu District –and of what later became Amuru District; and not of Moyo 
District –and of what later became Adjumani District.  
Currently, however, UWA considers the area to be located in Adjumani District. There appears 
to be a good understanding between the UWA and Adjumani District, and the latter promotes 
the establishment of the reserve. Repeatedly, UWA has underscored how the land was 
proposed for gazettement by Adjumani District at the beginning of the Millennium. Adjumani 
District may well be interested in supporting UWA’s perspective on the district boundaries and 
the establishment of the game reserve for financial reasons as well. 20 percent of the total 
revenue generated from the reserve will go to the district in which Apaa is located, in the form 
of infrastructure development, such as schools, health centres and roads. The sub-county 
under which Apaa falls will also get a certain percentage of the revenues. This may entice 
Adjumani District to claim that Apaa is under their jurisdiction. Moreover, decentralization 
seems to further articulate ethnic boundaries and identities between the Acholi and the Madi. 
Decentralization means that both communities now each have their own administrators to 
provide them with development services and resolve their disputes and their own Land Boards 
to govern land. It is important to note that because of limited funds it has taken a long time 
for these new districts to establish these District Land Boards that should govern land. 
After the violent evictions in February 2012, a resolution was reached by central government 
to establish and demarcate boundaries between the two districts. On the 20th of August 2012, 
surveyors from the Ministry of Lands came to Apaa to demarcate the border between Amuru 
and Adjumani Districts. On that very same day, people of Apaa had come together to receive 
the surveyors, Resident District Commissioner (RDC) and district officials to discuss solutions 
to the Apaa land conflict. When the people in the meeting heard that the surveyors were 
already putting marker stones demarcating the boundary in such a way that Apaa was 
included in Adjumani District, they went to the scene, got rowdy and confiscated the tools of 
the surveyors. The police started firing bullets and tear gas to disperse the crowd and the 
surveyors returned to Kampala.  
Over the same period, community members and some politicians from Amuru district filed 
the case before the High Court, asking the Court to decide whether Apaa belongs to Amuru or 
Adjumani District. A court injunction was secured, which halted further evictions, destruction 
and interfering with land rights in Apaa. At the time of writing, the case was still awaiting an 
outcome. If the Court grants the authority over Apaa to Amuru District there will be no further 
evictions of people of Apaa. However, if Adjumani District is granted authority over Apaa then 
evictions will continue, considering that Adjumani District has already destined the land to 
become a game reserve. 
Later efforts at surveying the land in May 2015 drew widespread media attention in Uganda 
and even abroad,10 when a group of elderly women stripped naked in front of two government 
ministers that accompanied the surveyors. The ministers called off the exercise and the land 
was not surveyed. Four months later, on the 7th of September 2015, the Member of Parliament 
representing people of Apaa was arrested and detained for 4 days on allegations of inciting 
                                                          
10 See BBC News, ‘The Ugandan women who strip to defend their land’, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
32938779 
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violence and organizing the people of Apaa to reject planting of mark stones which effectively 
located Apaa in Adjumani District. At that time, police and the army were deployed in large 
numbers in Apaa and on the 9th of September a third eviction was carried out. This left 2 more 
people dead, 5 badly injured with limbs amputated and 30 people from Apaa were arrested. 
Finally a few mark stones were planted in the area where Adjumani District wanted the 
boundary to be located. Soon after, on the 14th of September, a United Nations team and 
members of parliament from other regions of Uganda came to the area for a fact finding 
mission about the conflict but were denied access to Apaa by police and army, under orders 
of the Adjumani RDC. The team then returned to Kampala after exchanging heated 
conversation with the police and soldiers.  
Land, ethnicity and identity 
To complicate matters even further, underneath this controversy about territorial 
demarcations simmer disputes about ethnic identities. Amuru District is mainly inhabited by 
the Acholi people, while Adjumani District is mainly inhabited by the Madi. Before the colonial 
period there was rivalry between the two tribes of Acholi and Madi. The Acholi and Madi used 
to fight in order to expand their territories into the lands of the other group, and Apaa was 
one of the areas that were contested. On several occasions, the Acholi defeated the Madi and 
chased them up to a river called Lalopi.11 However, the story goes that, tired of these constant 
wars, and after the death of some Madi chiefs, elders from both sides decided ‘to bend a 
spear’: to show reconciliation and put an end to tribal wars. They came to the agreement that 
river Zoka would become the boundary between the two groups. Zoka means ‘stop me’: the 
river had to stop the Acholi from crossing to the Madi side and vice-versa. Both communities 
could still cross the river on good terms, for instance for hunting, and the improved 
relationships resulted in intermarriages in Apaa between the Madi and Acholi.  
The Apaa land conflict and the contestation over the precise location of the district boundaries 
reawakened tensions between the two ethnic groups. In Uganda, political constituencies are 
often mobilized on the basis of ethnic identity. Politicians strategically play on ethnic 
sentiments or antagonisms to acquire political relevancy and votes during elections. In the 
case of Apaa, to politicians, representing the dispute in ethnic terms, turned out an easy way 
to garner support from one’s own ethnic group. Political representatives from both sides 
strategically played on the memory of past competition and hostility. After the evictions, 
political leaders from both the Madi and Acholi incited their fellow community members to 
take up bows and arrows to fight for their land. Acholi leaders pointed out that the game 
rangers who evicted people from Apaa came from the direction of Adjumani District, and to 
the local people of Apaa, the ‘people’ responsible for their eviction were Madi. Authorities 
from Adjumani have complained that the Acholi deny the Madi access to the land in Apaa, 
stay illegally in Apaa, and should go back to their ‘original homes’. Some claim that, even if the 
Acholi occupy land in Apaa, it still belongs to Adjumani District.12 This introduction of an ethnic 
dimension in the Apaa conflict was evident for instance in August 2012, when Adjumani 
District erected sign-posts in Apaa, welcoming travellers to Adjumani District. This act angered 
the Acholi residents, who uprooted the sign-posts, pointing out that Apaa belongs to the 
Acholi tribe of Amuru District, and not to the Madi tribe of Adjumani District.  
                                                          
11 The River’s name Lalopi signifies something like: “rush to the river or the Acholi will finish you up”. 
12 Interview, Itirikwa, Adjumani 06-05-2013 
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The role of the LRA/NRM war in the conflict about the land in Apaa 
In the preceding sections we explored the historical and political background of the Apaa 
evictions. As mentioned before, Apaa is located in an area which was heavily affected by the 
20 years of civil war between the LRA and the NRM government in Northern Uganda. To 
understand the Apaa evictions properly, an assessment of the impacts of this violent context 
is necessary. 
Displacement opened up space for land grabbing 
War creates ‘free’ land, which facilitates land grabbing. During and immediately after war land 
appears to be vacant, free or ungoverned due to displacement that took place. This attracts 
both outsiders and local people to appropriate land. In particular communal land –land which 
is collectively owned by the community for example hunting grounds and grazing lands– is 
vulnerable to such land grabbing (Cf. Wiley, 2006).  
In 1996 at the height of the LRA/NRM insurgency, the NRM government forcefully relocated 
people to Internally Displaced People’s (IDP) camps in northern Uganda. People were taken 
from Apaa to Pabbo and Amuru camp, while others were moved to Adjumani District. There 
is a strong belief among local people that if they had not been displaced to the camps, they 
would not have been evicted from their land by UWA. As a result of this displacement their 
land became apparently vacant. The fact that it was not used contributed to the flourishing of 
wildlife. Interviewees pointed out that this was the reason why UWA asked Adjumani District 
for the gazettement of the land as a game reserve in 2002. When the insurgency ended and 
people could safely return from the camps, they found out that their land had been allocated 
to a game reserve. 
Having been absent, people were not in a position to contest the changes in land ownership, 
or provide evidence for their previous claims. Officials from Adjumani District claim that the 
Acholi in Apaa illegally occupied the land after the war and that they should go back to their 
original lands.13 Likewise, UWA asserts that the people of Apaa cannot prove ownership of the 
land, and only settled in Apaa after the end of the LRA/NRM war. UWA claims that the 
community is in fact composed of a mixture of tribes, coming from different areas, which 
settled in the area after the war, but should eventually return to their home areas.14 However, 
during interviews and observation by the main researcher, representatives of the Apaa 
community consistently pointed out that Apaa was occupied by the Acholi tribe, even if a few 
Acholi men had married Madi wives. Against the argument that the Acholi occupied Apaa 
illegally, even documents proving land ownership were of no avail: some interviewees 
possessed valid lease-hold titles dating back to the 1970s, but they were nonetheless evicted 
from their land during the Apaa evictions.15  
Moreover, the people of Apaa interviewed noticed how the war brought in new stakeholders 
with an interest in land, and even facilitated the acquisition of land by people from outside. 
Over the course of the civil war (1986-2006), as part of counter insurgency operations, soldiers 
from different regions got to know about the potential and expansion of lands in Northern 
Uganda. In particular, people from the south and the wealthy are believed to have acquired 
                                                          
13 Interview with sub-county official, Itirikwa, Adjumani 06-05-2013 
14 Interview with game ranger,  Apaa 31-05-2012 
15 According to a leasehold title of one of the people evicted 06-03-2012 
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land in this way. Indeed during fieldwork, the main researcher visited lands in Apaa that 
belonged to army generals. The Acholi were convinced that this thirst for Acholi land by 
external people would not have been there if the war had not occurred and introduced these 
people to their area.16 Moreover, the war also opened up the area. In 1999, the government 
created numerous security roads in Northern Uganda, to patrol and drive LRA rebels out of 
the region. A security road was constructed through Apaa village as well. Local people believed 
that this road not only served security interests, but was mainly constructed for the sake of 
Lake Albert Safaris Company limited17, which wanted to exploit the area as a tourist site and 
game reserve.18  
Another important dynamic in post-conflict settings is that land virtually becomes the only 
source of livelihood, fuelling the potential for land disputes. Interviewees pointed out how 
during the civil war in northern Uganda, Karamajong cattle rustlers, the Uganda People’s 
Defense Forces (UPDF) and the LRA rebels took away all their cattle.19 When living in the IDP 
camps people could not access their land and lived on hand-outs. After the war, they felt that 
the only resource they were left with was land. As elders in a group discussion emphasized: 
‘we lost our animals during the war and now we hear that the government took the land too’.20 
As a result of the war and its impact on local livelihoods, the emotional value of the land had 
increased as well. 
Ambiguity of land governing authority and political competition 
Another important consequence of the LRA/NRM war is that land governance institutions are 
in disarray. This has resulted in ambiguity among government institutions about who is in 
charge of land governance, and the rules that should apply. On 15th of February 2012 the High 
Court in Gulu issued an injunction and ordered UWA to stop evicting the people of Apaa. 
However, UWA continued to terrorize the residents of Apaa, by demolishing their huts and 
confiscating their hoes when they went to their gardens, while soldiers and policemen moved 
around the village carrying guns. UWA claimed the court order was void, considering that Apaa 
is part of Adjumani District, and that the High Court of Gulu district has no jurisdiction there. 
The example shows contestation between different government institutions, the judiciary, 
and UWA, about who is in charge of the governance of natural resources. Likewise, the 
government surveyors went ahead with planting mark stones to demarcate the presumed 
boundary of Apaa, even before another branch of government –the judiciary– had given its 
verdict.  
This institutional confusion and ambiguity provides important opportunities for politicians to 
get involved in post-conflict land governance. Through taking positions and putting their 
weight behind either of the two sides in the conflict they may increase their popularity, and 
so assure support in the next elections. One politician in Adjumani promised during the 
elections that he was going to get land for local residents. Residents of Apaa claim that this 
politician has meddled in the Apaa evictions, precisely to show that he is fulfilling his election 
promise. Further still, politicians can use their offices (power) to antagonize society by 
                                                          
16 Interview with LC3 Councillor Pabbo 20-03-2012) 
17 Lake Albert Safaris Company Limited is a registered private company owned by a white South African national 
couple 
18 Focus group discussion with Apaa elders 06-03-2012 
19 Interview Pabbo 07-03-2013 
20 Focus group discussion with elders of Apaa 06-03-2012 
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choosing to take sides in land disputes yet they hold public offices that are supposed to serve 
all citizens. For example, a politician on his way to his constituency would casually park his car 
and chat with the UWA game rangers in Apaa. Local people would interpret this action to 
mean that this politician was responsible for their eviction from the land. On the other hand, 
during a September 2012 community meeting that was called by the chief of Pabbo to find 
solutions to Apaa evictions, politicians from the government used the opportunity to 
intimidate politicians from the opposition that had pointed out the role of government in the 
evictions, portraying them as sabotaging government programs. Likewise, politicians from the 
opposition instead tried to capitalize on the argument that those in power have failed to 
protect people’s rights to land.  
Some politicians try to use contestation around land to show that they are more powerful 
than the institutions responsible for land governance. In a post-conflict situation where the 
land governance institutions are still weak or struggling to regain authority, they can easily be 
influenced by strong politicians. 
The identity factor in a post-conflict setting 
The Apaa evictions turned out very problematic as they were re-interpreted locally in terms 
of larger, ongoing contestations between the Acholi and the Uganda state. The dispute was 
no longer seen only as a local issue between UWA, the District authorities and the residents 
of Apaa, but rather as an issue between the state and the Acholi community at large. Even 
Acholi people from outside Apaa felt affected by what happened in Apaa, and referred to the 
case as an illustration of how the rights of their ethnic community were infringed upon (Cf. 
Lenhart 2013). In the same way, the people of Apaa interpreted the eviction as a ploy by 
government to chase them off their land and in the long run wipe out the Acholi tribe because 
the Apaa conflict is not the only land conflict in Acholiland. As women in Apaa lamented, ‘there 
is no tribe in Uganda that is tortured like the Acholi and especially the Acholi from Amuru 
District. […] In Kololo and Lakang 10,000 hectares of land have been allotted for sugar cane 
growing, Wicere is a national forest, Apaa is a game reserve and all are in Amuru district. 
Where are the Acholi supposed to live?’21 The fact that elder women resorted to stripping 
before the ministers and authorities illustrates how high frustrations have risen. The conflict 
in Apaa turned into a significant event for defining the relation between people of Acholi and 
the state.  Their attitude towards the state may come to depend strongly on how the land 
dispute will be resolved by government institutions. Therefore, the evictions are closely 
connected to the larger issue of the re-establishment of the state in northern Uganda.  
Discussion and conclusion 
The case of Apaa underscores that to better understand land disputes in post-conflict settings 
requires one to take into account the impacts of violent conflict on land access and land 
governance. A political ecology perspective may help explain how post-conflict land disputes 
are the outcome of contested land governance practices and histories of exclusion and 
misappropriation. In the case of the Apaa evictions, colonial policies of creating reserves 
(game and forest reserves) were repeated and reinforced through gazettement and de-
                                                          
21 Focus Group Discussion with women in Apaa 27-05-2012 
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gazettement policies after independence, thereby creating uncertainty over land ownership 
and the laws applicable. The creation of new administrative units (districts) without clearly 
drawn boundaries resulted in struggles over territory and the jurisdiction of districts. 
Moreover, in combination with the conflict about Apaa this led to the articulation of tensions 
about ethnicity and grievances about those in power and the institutions that govern natural 
resources.  
The Apaa conflict has negatively affected the already poor relations between the Acholi and 
the state. In an attempt of the Ugandan state to demonstrate its control over the Acholi 
territory, it used heavy violence against the people of Apaa. Local land rights have been 
negated, in favour of the interests of a foreign investor from South Africa, who is believed to 
have obtained a lease contract on the contested land of Apaa. In a nut shell: through its 
institutions (like UWA, army), the state uses land governance to regain control over these 
post-conflict territories. This resonates with Unruh (2003) who notes that the way state 
handles land disputes in post-conflict situations can strongly shape people’s perception of 
(dis)trust in the state. 
However, to better understand post-conflict land disputes requires not only to consider how 
land and its access have resulted in conflict, but also to explore the impacts of violent conflict 
on land distribution and land governance. The LRA/NRM war significantly reshuffled the rules 
of access, utilization and ownership of land. The post-conflict phase brought in various new 
actors, including diverse new government institutions, military, and foreign investors that 
appropriated land, claiming that it was vacant. Violent conflict uprooted people from their 
land and displaced them to IDP camps, and upon their return local land governing institutions 
had weakened and were not capable to deal with the ensuing land disputes and a more 
powerful presence of the state and army. Land disputes are specifically difficult in post-conflict 
settings because people may not have trust in land institutions (Unruh 2003; Kobusingye et al. 
2016). The case of Apaa strongly brings out that, a focus on the impacts of violent conflict on 
land governance may help to understand why land governance becomes part of wider 
contestations about power in conflict-affected settings.  
In the case of Apaa, politicians used the chaos and confusion brought about by land disputes 
to promote their own interests, as a result of which land disputes became a playing field in 
which power relations were fought out by politicians and institutions. As a result, issues such 
as ethnicity, identity and political power games get a new meaning because of these new 
actors. This in turn produces tenure insecurity and new land conflicts. In the case of Apaa, 
while the Acholi and Madi have been coexisting harmoniously for a long time, the land dispute 
is antagonizing these relations again. Therefore, the way in which the Apaa conflict is resolved 
will have implications for the extent to which peace is restored, or conflict reignites.  This all 
underscores the significant impact that violent conflict may have on land access and its 
governance, and the importance of taking these dynamics into account when trying to address 
land conflicts in post-conflict settings. 
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Figure 1: An Illustration of the drivers of conflict in the Apaa Evictions 
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4. Decentralized Land Governance and Power Complexities 
in Large Scale Land Allocations: The Case of Amuru 
Sugar Project in Uganda. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Initial international enthusiasm for decentralization as a way to give small-scale producers in 
sub-Saharan Africa better access to land services is slowly giving way to awareness that 
decentralized land governance often fails to fulfil its promises of more transparent land 
governance and improved tenure security. Most analysts attribute this to unclearness in state 
legislation, governance failures, and resource inadequacies. However, this paper underscores 
the importance of power relations as a determinant of the extent to which decision making is 
truly decentralized. The paper builds on a case study in Uganda, where since 1993 
decentralization has been embraced as a policy for fostering national unity, transforming 
authoritarian, centralized practices of governance, and improving service delivery. 
Ethnographic research conducted between 2011 and 2013 in Amuru district in Northern 
Uganda demonstrates that, despite decentralization, decisions about land allocation at lower 
levels of government tend to reflect the interests of those at higher levels of governance. This 
is due to restricted powers attributed to local land governing authorities, ambiguous 
legislation and political appointments. As a consequence, instead of handing over power to 
local decision takers, decentralized land governance helps to increase the presence of the 
state at local level and has served to expand its power over local resources. As such, 
decentralized land structures end up protecting interests of powerful actors instead of local 
land rights.  
Key words; Decentralization, Decision making, Land governance, Power and Tenure security  
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Introduction 
Decentralization of land governance has been a key element of many land reforms in Africa, 
in order to improve tenure security of local small-holders (Boone and Duku, 2012; Kjær, 2017). 
Decentralizing land governance entails a transfer of powers from higher level authorities to 
decentralized land structures so that they are empowered to make independent decisions but 
also include views of local people in land governance. Proponents of decentralization argue 
that decentralization results in decisions that are more responsive to the demands and 
interests of local stakeholders (Shah and Thompson, 2004; Siegle and O’Mahony, 2006; 
Benjamin, 2008) and assures that local stakeholders are better represented in decision making 
(Quan, 2000). A key assumption is that this will lead to better protection of local land rights 
(Bartley et al. 2008; Hilhorst, 2010).  
Unfortunately, in many settings, decentralized land governance fails to result in transparent 
land governance and improved tenure security. Most researchers attribute these failures to 
ambiguities in state legislation and resource related inadequacies, like insufficient funding and 
poor staffing (Golola, 2001; Hilhorst, 2010; Joireman, 2007; Kjær, 2017). Some analysts 
suggest as a major problem that only limited decision-making powers are transferred to local 
institutions (Ribot, 2003; Andersson and Ostrom 2008). So far, this has received little attention 
in the literature. In this connection, important to note is that there are often also other 
(hidden and open) ambitions behind land reforms. These may include building electoral 
support (Kjær, 2017) or maintaining the prevailing political order for example in Ghana where 
customary institutions are left to govern rural lands (Boone and Duku, 2012). Such ambitions 
significantly influence how land reforms turn out and the actual impact they have on tenure 
security. Consequently, decentralized land governance may not effectively promote popular 
representation and downward accountability in land governance, and effectively ignore the 
role of customary authorities in providing some measure of tenure security,(Sjaastad and 
Cousins, 2008).  
This paper starts from the premise that decentralization provides space for new interactions 
among all actors involved in land governance (Golola, 2001; Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Van 
der Haar et al. 2009). However, these actors interact from different power positions which has 
a bearing on the decision making process. Boone and Duku 2012 show how the chiefs in Ghana 
have powers and influence national land policy, In the case of Uganda, although the new 
constitution recognizes the land governing capacities and authority of local customary 
institutions, in practice, national and decentralized statutory institutions at the local level 
continue to call the shots in land governance. Their bypassing of customary rights may lead to 
disempowerment, and a greater influence of the state in governing land at the local level. The 
case of Amuru demonstrates how the administrative set-up of decentralized land governance 
provides room for manoeuvre (Cf. Kjær, 2017) to powerful actors (including central 
government, wealthy business people, companies, elites, army officers, politicians etc) to 
expand their power in local land governance. As a result, decentralization of land governance 
fails to create tenure security and protect the land rights of local people. Instead, powerful 
actors determine how decisions are made about land allocation, land disputes, land 
ownership, land utilization by decentralized land governance structures.  
The case demonstrates that the real impediment to localizing land governance lies in the 
distribution of power between different levels of government, rather than in a lack of 
resources only. Moreover, in a post-conflict environment, decentralization provides an 
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important opportunity to diverse local state and non-state institutions to gain legitimacy and 
claim decision taking power in land governance. At the same time, the paper demonstrates 
that popular perceptions about central government and the decentralization reform are very 
important in the legitimacy of decentralized land structures. 
This paper is an output of the research programme ‘Grounding Land Governance’ that studied 
post-conflict decentralized land governance22 . Section one shows that local governments 
without power, which are driven by mandates from above, are ineffective in creating space 
for popular participation and representation in land governance. Decentralization in post-
conflict settings may also be just another way of asserting control over post-conflict areas by 
the central government. Section two discusses Uganda’s approach to and ambitions behind 
decentralization which have led to creation of numerous districts and increased the presence 
of the state at the local levels. It also presents the history of land governance in Uganda and 
how ambiguities in legislation related to land created room for the state and the powerful to 
influence local land governance. Section two further discusses the civil war in northern 
Uganda and its role in shaping perceptions of people of the north in relation to the state and 
land governance. The third section presents the case study of sugarcane plantation in Amuru 
district. The case demonstrates that despite decentralized land governance, important 
decisions on the allocation of land remain the domain of central authorities and popular 
participation in those decisions remains limited. Consequently decentralized land structures 
cannot effectively provide tenure security to local people vis-à-vis large scale land allocations. 
Decentralization, power and accountability 
Due to the wide spread failure of post-independence African states to provide adequate 
services decentralization was identified as an approach of rolling out the role of states in 
service delivery (Prud’homme, 1995). The rationale for decentralization was bringing services 
closer to the people (Ribot et al. 2008) where local views and ideas would be included in 
governance. It was argued that people would be empowered to make decisions about local 
issues that affect them and that decentralization would improve the quality of governance 
because decisions are made at the local level and local administration could be held 
accountable (Golola, 2001). However the sharing of powers among different levels of 
government may not always have been the primary reason for decentralization (Shah and 
                                                          
22This paper is based on ethnographic research about decentralized land governance in post conflict settings that 
was conducted for a period of 2 years from 2011 to 2013 in northern Uganda. The research is part of the 
Grounding Land Governance Program which is funded by WOTRO Science for Global Development grant number 
W 01.65.332.00 Fieldwork was conducted in both Amuru and Gulu districts in the Acholi sub-region, in northern 
Uganda. This paper is based on a number of interviews that provided data about understanding how power 
influences decisions that are made by decentralized land structures at lower levels. The study employed purely 
qualitative methods of data collection. Primary data was obtained from 31 interviews, 6 focus group discussions, 
1 dialogue meeting on investments in Acholi region, 1 community meeting at the proposed site of Amuru sugar 
factory, 2 meetings with all leaders from Acholi sub region, 1 swearing-in ceremony of area land committee in 
Amuru, 2 northern Uganda land platform meetings and through field observations by the researcher who lived 
with the community. Categories of people interviewed included; politicians, local people, members of district 
land board, members of area land committee, local council members, civil servants at districts, traditional 
leaders, the youth, representatives from NGOs. Secondary data is based on review of documents especially the 
land laws for example the 2013 National Land Policy, the 1998 land act, the 1995 constitution, the 1975 Land 
Reform decree and other related literature. Additional data for this paper was obtained from interviews 
conducted for two weeks between April and May 2014 for a short research entitled “governing commercial 
pressure on land: what is the role of local government” that was commissioned by Landac. 
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Thompson, 2004) because African states are not willing to share power (Olowu, 2003, Larson 
and Soto, 2008). Yet, this is a critical determinant of decision making. As Ribot et al. 
categorically stated “without powers, no authorities are worth influencing - even if they are 
accountable” (Ribot et al. 2008:6). Inevitably local governments without power and which are 
driven by mandates from above may be ineffective in creating space for popular participation 
and representation in governance. Based on such circumstances district level authorities may 
not always be accountable to local communities (Peluso, 2007). Therefore, though 
decentralization may be portrayed as a channel of taking services closer to the people, in 
practice it might be a cover-up to actual increasing local presence of the state for more 
effective control and governance of people (Romeo, 2002). Under such circumstances people 
may start to resent devolved local government structures because they perceive them as 
agents of the state, instead of representing their local interests. 
In addition, decentralization is supposed to create space for interaction between the actors 
involved in governance processes (these include; central government, local government, 
traditional institutions, local people, civil society and outsiders) (Golola, 2001; Benjamin, 
2008). However, these actors dispose of different sources of power and in most cases local 
people may be disadvantaged and decentralization may increase their exposure to external 
influences (Siegle and O’Mahony, 2006). Local governments may engage in non-transparent 
allocation of resources to powerful groups like elites, army generals and wealthy businessmen 
for example by registering customary land. This may lead to frustration of the powerless and 
result into violence (Jackson and Scott, 2007). In post-conflict settings violence, defined as a 
social process where violent actions shape new structures and new forms of behaviour, 
thereby redefining the forms of societal organization (Bakony & Stuvǿy (2005), may be one of 
the means local actors use to influence decisions. Local people often resort to use of violence 
when they perceive local government as inefficient and unresponsive structures (Olowu, 
2003; Peluso, 2007) and in cases where local institutions are manipulated by the powerful. 
Moreover, in a post-conflict situation where most of the formal land institutions are broken 
down and weakened, population and the state may be accustomed to use violence in order 
to enforce their own land claims. Therefore violence also plays a critical role in shaping 
decentralized land governance in post-conflict situations.    
Post-conflict settings are characterized by extraordinary conditions like mass displacement, 
rapid land access by returning populations, weak institutions, communities accustomed to use 
of violence, and low levels of trust between the community and the state (Siegle and 
O’Mahony, 2006). Such circumstances pose enormous challenges for decentralized land 
governance in post-conflict settings. Local governments, especially in a post-conflict setting, 
face various political pressures from actors at local, national and international levels (Van der 
Haar et al. 2009). Therefore interactions and pressure from various actors in governance 
influence how post-conflict decentralized land governance takes shape. Due to low levels of 
trust between community and state, decentralized land institutions in post-conflict settings 
may fail to provide tenure security because people perceive local governments as instruments 
for actualizing goals at higher level (Van der Haar et al. 2009). Decentralization in post-conflict 
settings may also be just another way of asserting control over post-conflict areas by the 
central government. During violent conflicts states tend to lose authority over some territories 
or areas. Therefore, at the end of war, decentralization might be seen as a way through which 
this lost authority over such areas can be regained.  
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Decentralization in Uganda 
Decentralization of land governance in Uganda should be seen as part of policies to transform 
the ways in which governance is performed at the local level. Uganda took up decentralization 
as a governance reform in 1993, 7 years after the National Resistance Movement (NRM) seized 
power in 1986 under international pressure as a condition to obtain aid or support (Golola, 
2001; Onyach, 2003). Decentralization in Uganda specifically aimed to transform previous 
practices of centralized, authoritarian, non-participative governance of the Amin and Obote 
regimes through transferring powers and responsibilities to districts (local governments). 
Resistance councils (RC) that were used by the NRM rebels to organize and mobilize support 
from the community during the 1981-1986 guerrilla war were later transformed into Local 
Councils (LC) by the 1993 local government (Resistance Councils) statute. Decentralization was 
further entrenched in the 1995 constitution under article 176 where the districts became a 
unit of local government. Then the 1997 local government act made local councils the official 
tools through which decentralization was implemented. Decentralization involves transferring 
some functions, powers and responsibilities from central government to local governments 
so that all stakeholders are involved in governance decisions (GOU, 1995). Some of the powers 
and functions transferred to local governments include; ensuring democratic participation in 
and control of decision making by local people, establishing sources of revenue and financial 
accountability (GOU, 1997). 
To this end, a five layer system of elected councils was set-up that starts from local council 1 
(village level LC1), upwards to local council 2 (parish level LC2), local council 3 (sub-county 
level LC3), local council 4 (county level LC4) and finally local council 5 (district level LC5). 
Important to note is these reforms were made hastily in the bid to decentralize yet the 
institutional structure was still weak. Local council members or councillors are elected into 
office after every 5 years and it was envisaged by government that elected leaders would 
represent views from the local people and in turn the local people would make these elected 
leaders accountable through elections. However, since 2001 there have been no elections for 
LC1 and LC2 and consequently the members currently holding office lack a legal mandate. 
Critics have argued that decentralization has done little to increase popular participation in 
government. The Ugandan way of decentralization has also led to an enormous increase in 
the number of districts from 33 when the NRM came to power to 112 districts as of 2014 and 
more districts are in the pipeline to be approved by parliament. The usual justification for 
creating new districts given by government is effective administration and taking services 
closer to people (New Vision, 2012). Some academics suggest, however, that the creation of 
new districts should be seen as part of strategies to maintain a loyal electorate.  
Creation of districts is often used to manipulate elections in order to prolong NRM’s stay in 
power by tactfully gaining loyalty of the new districts and gaining votes (Green, 2008: 16). New 
districts are always promised by president Museveni during presidential campaigns as has 
been the case in the 1996, 2001, 2006 elections (Green 2010: 94). People in new districts are 
compelled to vote for Museveni because gaining a district status is considered a political 
reward. Although the constitution stipulates devolution of powers to local governments, in 
reality local governments only carry out administrative procedures or roles, with the actual 
power to make decisions left to the central government. This “districtification” of Uganda has 
contributed to the creation of powerless local governments that cannot make independent 
decisions because they are always reliant on the central government for their existence. 
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Various authors point out that in fact those promoting decentralization in Uganda were not 
interested in increasing citizen participation but rather in strengthening the presence of the 
state at local levels, increasing the grip of their political party on power and the population, 
complying to demands from donors even if political will for real devolution of power was 
lacking and getting rid of difficult political issues like development inequalities by putting them 
on the plate of lower government levels (Golola, 2001; Green, 2008; Nsamba, 2009; Manyak 
and Katono, 2010). Such arguments correspond to Smoke’s observation that decentralization 
is often driven by a political desire to appear to be decentralizing,  while political will to 
actually devolve power is lacking (Smoke, 2003: 12). Therefore under such motives 
district/devolved institutions like the district land board cannot perform their mandates 
without interference from the central government (cf. Nsamba-Gayiiya, 1999). And without a 
doubt, when local administrative structures are weak, enforcement of property laws is 
uncertain (Joireman, 2007: 467).  
Decentralized land governance in Uganda 
In this section we analyze legislation and policy changes which indicate a lot of unclearness 
and ambiguity, the implications of which are explored in the case study. On paper, 
decentralization plays an important role in policy reforms to improve tenure security, it 
provided for popular participation and representation in land governance. Uganda has had 
two major land tenure reforms since independence notably the 1975 land reform decree by 
President Idi Amin and the 1995 constitution of Uganda followed by the 1998 Land Act. The 
1975 land reform decree by president Idi Amin made all land in Uganda public which was 
administered by the Uganda land commission in accordance with the Public Lands Act of 1969 
(Section 1 (o) of 1998 Land Act). The 1995 constitution overturned the 1975 land reform by 
stipulating that land in Uganda belongs to the citizens of Uganda and shall be held under four 
tenure systems which include; customary, freehold, Mailo and leasehold (Article 237 section 
1 of the constitution). Important to note is the 80 percent of the land in Uganda is held under 
customary tenure and only 20 percent is registered land (MISR, 2003). This signifies that land 
in Uganda is largely locally governed. 
The 1998 Land Act was created to further elaborate the constitutional provisions and to make 
steps towards actualizing decentralized land governance in the country. The Act elaborates 
the roles and functions of local government land institutions that are charged with the 
provision of decentralized land administration services. The local government structures that 
work on land include the district land board, the district land office – both at LC5 (district) 
level, the area land committee and the sub-county court committee – both at LC3 (sub-county) 
level. In relation to decentralized land governance, the 1998 Land Act gives power to district 
land boards to administer public land and allocate land that is not owned in a district (Section 
59 (1) a and b of the 1998 Land Act)23. In addition, the district land boards also facilitate the 
registration and transfer of interests in land. The area land committees are mandated to work 
on applications for land allocation and land registration. Area land committees also determine, 
verify and mark the boundaries of all interest in the land which is the subject for the 
                                                          
23 Section 59 of the 1998 Land Act elaborates the functions of a district land board. Some of which include; 59 (1) 
(a) states; hold and allocate land in the district which is not owned by any person or authority. And 59 (1) (c) take 
over the role and exercise the powers of the lessor in the case of a lease granted by a former controlling authority 
(Uganda Land Commission) 
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application. The area land committee then advises and makes recommendations to the district 
land board after inspecting the land.  
On the other hand the Land Act also recognizes a parallel system where customary institutions 
govern land under the customary tenure system. In order to increase tenure security, 
customary tenure received formal recognition from the state and it attained legal status as a 
form of land tenure in the country in the 1995 constitution. Customary tenure is defined as a 
form of tenure where people’s access and ownership of land is governed by rules generally 
accepted as binding and authoritative by the class of persons to which it applies, under this 
form of tenure land is owned in perpetuity (Land Act 1998). In a move to increase tenure 
security under customary tenure, article 237(4a) of the constitution provides for any person, 
family or community holding land under customary tenure to acquire a certificate of 
customary ownership (CCO). The 1998 Land Act further elaborates under section 4 (2-3) that 
applicants for CCOs shall submit their applications to Area Land Committees at Sub-county 
level who are mandated to carry out land inspections, mark boundaries, verify if there are no 
disputes on the land and then make recommendations to the district land board. The District 
land board has the power to reject an application or to issue the CCO. It also provides for land 
under customary tenure to be converted to freehold tenure through land registration. There 
is a desire by government to formalize previous informal rights to land. However a number of 
impediments exist in the way to achieve that, therefore insufficient legal changes have been 
made (Joireman 2007). These include provisions in the Land Act for converting customary 
tenure to statutory tenure through registration of land. However, the recognition of 
customary tenure or rights is increasing state control over property and territory (Martiniello, 
2015: 658).   
This legal reform has created a number of ambiguities. Whereas the 1975 land reform decree 
declared all land public, the 1995 Constitution distinguishes only 4 types of land, technically 
this means that there is no longer public land and that land not under (registered) freehold, 
leasehold and Mailo tenure regimes is by default under customary tenure. However, this 
leaves the question on the status of land that was officially designated as public land before 
the 1995 constitution. As we will see in the case of Amuru, this is a legal gap that creates room 
for manoeuvre for government to take land. Whilst land belongs to the citizens of Uganda, 
the government or local government can acquire land for public interest (GoU, 1995).24 The 
controversial issue is that public interest is not well defined; the constitution just describes 
public interest as in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or 
public health without a clear set of criteria. This ambiguity in land laws gives power to 
government to acquire land in disguise of public interest. Therefore, large-scale land 
allocations to investors can be categorized as public interest by the government since they are 
seen as projects that will bring development to the country. Kjær 2017, argues that in most 
cases land governance is maintained as a grey zone by government in order to attract 
investors, maintain the ruling coalition. This ambiguity or legal gap in land laws may be a 
                                                          
24 Article 237 (1) of the 1995 constitution stipulates that Land in Uganda belongs to the citizens of Uganda and 
shall vest in them in accordance with the 4 land tenure systems. Then still Article 237 (2) (a) the Government or 
a local government may acquire land in the public interest and the conditions governing such acquisition shall be 
as prescribed by parliament. Article 26 (2) (a) of the 1995 Constitution states that; the taking of possession or 
acquisition is necessary for public use or in the interest of defense, public safety, public order, public morality or 
public health  
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deliberate political choice because there are political benefits of non-enforcement of land 
laws for example using land as a political resource for political settlements (Kjær, 2017).  
The provision to formally record customary rights to land through the district land board did 
not have any effect. Fourteen years after this provision by the land act the implementation of 
this law did not take effect. Firstly, the decentralized structures like the district land boards, 
the area land committees which were to offer the CCOs were not operational in most of the 
districts in the country. With funding from non-governmental organizations like Norwegian 
Refugee Council, the government of Uganda launched the first 15 CCOs which were to be given 
out to the applicants in February 2012. However, by 2014 not a single person had received 
any CCO in Acholi region. Issues like how will transactions, deaths and births be updated on a 
CCO, the degree of detail of the sketch maps that are attached to the CCO, how to determine 
the Customary Land Identification Number, and the costs involved like transport costs for area 
land committee could be the reasons why the Acholi community is reluctant to embrace CCOs 
or why no single person has received CCO in Acholi-land. It is also difficult to see what is left 
of the customary character of tenure when land has been registered. The nature of customary 
tenure is that it is regulated and sanctioned by local customary authorities. The very fact of 
registering land takes it out of the customary realm and annihilates the authority of those 
administering land under customary tenure. 
Customary tenure in Acholi region 
To explore how decentralization of land governance works out in practice and to comprehend 
the role of decentralized land institutions such as the district land board in a large-scale land 
allocation, the research was conducted in Amuru district which is part of Acholi sub-region, a 
post conflict area in northern Uganda. Acholi sub-region forms part of the greater northern 
Uganda, it is made up of seven district including; Agago, Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum, Lamwo, Nwoya, 
and Pader district. It is in majority inhabited by the Acholi tribe and it is a region that was 
affected the most by the activities of a series of rebel movements that occurred between 1986 
and 2006 in Northern Uganda. 
90 percent of the land in Acholi and Northern Uganda at large is customary land and 
customary institutions or authorities play a major role in governing this land (Burke and Egaru, 
2011; ARLPI, 2012; Atkinson and Owor 2013; Martiniello, 2015). Customary institutions 
determine how land is accessed, how rights are transferred, how use rights are determined, 
size of the land that extended families access and also resolve land disputes. Customary land 
in Acholi, northern Uganda is largely communal (Atkinson and Owor 2013). In Acholi land is 
held in different ways and it is utilized for various purposes for example for; settlement, 
agriculture, grazing, hunting and for forests. Clans organize and perform activities such as 
controlled hunting; this shows that customary institutions have some power to govern land. 
Before colonialism, Acholi land governance was highly decentralized. Small chiefdoms that 
were headed by chiefs existed. These various chiefs governed land in their chiefdoms 
(Atkinson and Owor 2013). The chiefs and clans had power over land and not individuals. 
During colonialism the British created a system of paramount chief to whom all other chiefs 
reported, inspired by how governance was organized in Buganda in the south (Cf. Burke and 
Egaru 2011). However this system was not well rooted in the Acholi custom –in which 
authority was less centralized than in the southern Kingdoms- and recognized among the 
Acholi. Presently chiefs have some powers to govern land though the structure is highly 
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interfered by the statutory system especially statutory institutions (whether central or 
devolved local government land institutions).  
In Acholi, there exists a system of Rwot Kweri (chief of the hoe), who are very knowledgeable 
about people’s boundaries and they act as the first court of instance for land disputes. 
Customary land rights cannot easily be transferred through sales, there is need for clan or 
family approval to sell land (Burke and Egaru, 2011; Lenhart 2013). It is important to mention 
that the war significantly disrupted and weakened the Acholi customary system. The authority 
that customary institutions have over land cannot be compared to that before the war when 
they commanded considerable of authority (Kobusingye et al. 2016).   
Though customary institutions play a major role in local land governance they were not 
consulted in the Amuru sugar land dispute when the district land board allocated land to 
Amuru Sugar Works Limited. After the allocation of this land and the case being taken to court, 
both central government and Amuru Sugar Works Limited tried to lobby for support from 
customary institutions and traditional chiefs so that they appreciate the development project. 
The case demonstrates how non statutory local land institutions were circumvented and 
statutory institutions took the centre stage in governance of customary land (Cf. Martiniello, 
2015). The interesting part with the Amuru sugar project case is that land was already 
presumed to be public (out of the realms of customary authority) and under the authority of 
statutory decentralized Amuru district land board. Which virtually allocated land to Amuru 
Sugar Company before it was clear whether the land was customary or public. Another 
fascinating factor is that the central government through the ministry of trade already 
instructed the district land board to allocate land, the board had no option but to execute the 
orders. What this case shows is the dependency of the district land board on the central 
government and that powers are not actually devolved. 
A brief history of the LRA conflict 
The LRA/NRA conflict started in 1986 to overthrow the National Resistance Army/Movement 
(NRM) government because it had toppled the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) 
government that was led by Acholi officers. The rebellion against the NRM government 
underwent several transformations and took on new motives and new actors. The rebel 
movement went through a series of leadership changes. At first it was called the Uganda 
People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) and then changed to Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) led by 
Alice Lakwena which led the rebellion between 1986 and 1988. Then Lukoya Severino the 
father of Alice Lakwena took on from 1988 to 1989 under Holy Spirit Movement ii (Also see 
Branch, 2010; Atkinson, 2010). During the same period (1987) armed Karamojong cattle 
rustlers also terrorised the region, raiding almost 98% of the cattle in all of Acholi region 
(HURIFO, 2002). From 1989 onwards, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) under the leadership 
of Joseph Kony became the face of the guerrilla movement. The LRA which was getting 
support from the government of Sudan, abducted children and youths, mutilated people by 
cutting off their limbs, lips and ears and massacred civilians. However atrocities were 
committed by both the LRA and the Uganda People’s Defence Army (UPDF) (Also see Branch 
2007; Atkinson 2010). 
In 1996 because of intensified brutalities, the government of Uganda forcefully ordered all 
people of Northern Uganda specifically in the Acholi region to relocate to protected camps so 
that the UPDF could drive the LRA rebels out of the villages where they had access to food and 
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could disguise as civilians. The Acholi population stayed in these camps until 2006 when the 
fighting and violence gradually phased out.25 The conflict in Northern Uganda led to the death 
of more than 30,000 people and the displacement of over 2,000,000 people (ARLPI, 2010; 
Mabikke, 2011). Literally all families in Acholi land were displaced to Internally Displaced 
People’s camps (IDP). In 2006 after peace talks held in Juba between the NRM government 
and the LRA rebels, there was cease of hostilities bringing an end to the civil war that had 
lasted for over 20 years in Northern Uganda. Gradually people started returning to their lands 
however upon their return, they are now faced with rampant land disputes some of which 
turn out to be violent. These include intra-family land conflicts, clan conflicts, and large scale 
land investments displacing communities. Land conflicts as a result of land acquisition in illegal 
ways, land allocations done by area land committees and district land boards (Mabikke, 2011; 
Lenhart, 2013:3). This displacement also facilitated that apparently empty lands run the risk 
of being taken over by others, as happened in the case of Amuru. 
Power plays in decentralized land governance - the case of Sugar cane 
plantation in Amuru district 
Amuru is a comparatively new district that was carved out of Gulu district. It gained a district 
status in 2006 by the Act of Parliament of Uganda. However due to the 20 year civil war and 
the district being a relatively new creation, the local government institutional structure is still 
weak. The land dispute between the community of Amuru and the district land board over 
allocation of 10,000 hectares of land to Amuru Sugar Works Limited shows the complexity of 
the problems in land governance in Uganda. The case involves diverse actors with different 
power sources and representing different interests in the disputed land. The actors include 
the ministry of trade, district land board, the area land committee, the high court, politicians, 
customary institutions and local people and Acholi community at large. 
The conflict over the allocation of the land to Amuru Sugar Works found its origins in February 
2008, when the ministry of tourism, trade and industry wrote a letter to Kakira Sugar Works 
Limited giving approval to establish a sugar complex in Amuru district on the basis of an 
investment proposal by this company. It was agreed in the letter that 20,000 hectares of land 
would be allocated to the company by the relevant authorities for a sugar cane plantation and 
setting up a sugar factory. This investment would create employment to over 8,000 people 
and other farmers would benefit as out growers and it would also contribute to infrastructural 
development (Cf. Atkinson and Owor, 2013 ). The government of Uganda would hold 40% of 
the shares and the sugar company 60% shares and both government and the company would 
solicit financing from international agencies for the project.  In March 2008 Amuru sugar works 
which is part of Madhvani26 group of companies wrote a letter to Amuru district land board 
informing the board that after discussions with various government authorities the company 
                                                          
25 The conflict was never formally ended, because peace negotiations never led to an official cease-fire. The LRA 
was gradually weakened militarily and the remnants retreated via South Sudan and Northern Congo to the 
Central African Republic, where Joseph Kony is still hiding in the forest. 
26The local people use the name Madhvani when they want to refer to the land dispute between Amuru district 
land board and the community over allocation of 10,000 hectares of land to Amuru Sugar Works Limited. The 
Madhvani family owns Madhvani group of companies which comprises of Amuru sugar works and Kakira sugar 
works in Jinja. The proprietors are Ugandans but of Indian descent. The group started in 1914 and it is the largest 
private sector investor in industry in Uganda. The group deals in agriculture, agro-processing, soup, steel, 
packaging, tourism and many more; it has a turnover of USD 100 million and with assets valued at USD 200 
million. 
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had identified a site at Amuru where it wanted to set up a sugar factory. On the same day the 
company formally requested for allocation of 20,000 hectares and a letter from the ministry 
of tourism was attached to the application. The district land board approved the allocation of 
10,000 hectares with the remaining 10,000 hectares to be approved after the commencement 
of the project. In November 2008, the Amuru district land board approved the allocation of 
10,000 hectares of land in Pailyec parish, Amuru sub-county for a period of 49 years to Amuru 
Sugar Works Limited.  
However, different parties with various interests contested this land allocation and decided 
to seek justice from higher authorities. Consequently, on 28 November 2008, two weeks after 
the allocation of the land to Amuru sugar factory, the community of Amuru (including local 
people and politicians) filed a case in the high court suing both Amuru district land board and 
Amuru sugar works for unlawful allocation of customary land to Amuru sugar works limited 
and depriving the community of their customary rights to land.  
After the case had been in high court for more than 3 years, in February 2012 the judge ruled 
that the disputed land was public land and that the district land board acted within its 
authority to allocate the land and that the right procedures were followed. “The land in 
question is not customary land but public land which has and is still available for allocation by 
Amuru district land board27”. The judge of Gulu High Court during that time applauded Amuru 
district land board in the judgment that “Whatever the district land board did in the 
circumstances was in the interests of development, not only for Amuru district but for Uganda 
as a whole28”. The rulings angered the Acholi fraternity and the case was taken to the court of 
appeal. In September 2012 the court of appeal put on hold the commencement of the sugar 
project in order to try the case again. As of 2017 a final ruling about the case has not been 
made yet but the community of Amuru has maintained access to the disputed land through 
use of violence.  
There is a lot of debate about whether the proper procedures were followed. The formal 
procedure for acquiring a lease on public land according the Land Act is, persons or companies 
with interest in land should go to the sub-county verify if the land they are interested in is 
available for leasing, then pay an application fee of 20,000shs (8 USD) to the sub-county chief. 
The applicant is then given an application form which is filled in and returned to the recorder’s 
office. Then a notice of hearing is written in 3 copies one is filed, another is displayed at the 
sub-county notice board, and the last one at the location of the land. After 14 days the area 
land committee goes to inspect the land, mark boundaries and ascertain rights to land, this is 
done by consulting all the neighbours bordering the land which is the subject of application. 
Then the area land committee makes recommendations to the district land board. For 
leasehold applications the land has to be surveyed. When all the procedures are followed then 
the district land board can approve the application. In reality the duration of this process can 
drag on from months to years because of issues like lack of sitting allowances and transport 
facilitation for the district land boards. In this case, these procedures were not followed 
 
Some members of the district land board interviewed said that;  
                                                          
27 Gulu High Court judgment HCT-02-CV-MA-No. 126 of 2008 
28 Gulu High Court judgment HCT-02-CV-MA-No. 126 of 2008 
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“A board meeting that approved allocation of land to the sugar company was illegal because; 
it was abruptly called, members were sent messages on their phones in the night before, it 
had no quorum, the documents and minutes were fabricated and the acting chairperson of 
that meeting had been fired from the board.”29 This contributed to a perception among other 
board members and the community that the member who called that meeting was acting 
under pressure from ‘above’ and they were in a hurry to finalize the allocation before all 
procedures were followed.  
Although we failed to have interviews with representatives from Madhvani group of 
companies, they no longer wanted to discuss the case that was before the court of Appeal. 
Other researchers noted that a Madhvani representative (director of corporate affairs) claims 
that the company used proper procedures at the district to obtain land because the company 
knew that the land was owned by Amuru district land board. (Van Leeuwen et al. 2015). This 
testifies to the fact that there is a grey zone as regards rules around land governance. 
The dispute about the allocation of land to Amuru sugar should be seen in the context of a 
prominent perception that people from Northern Uganda have about the central government 
and the whole decentralization reform. There is a perception of the people in Amuru that 
every program that the central government undertakes in the region is not for their benefit 
but for the continuity of discrimination and exclusion of people from the north by people from 
the south and central parts of the country which they have been subjected to since the colonial 
times. The British rule created a socio-economic division between the north and the south, 
this contributed to marginalization of the north (Omara Otunu 1995; Doom and Vlassenroot, 
1999; Atkinson 2010; Branch 2010). The region has lagged behind in terms of development 
compared to the south; essentially it has been designated as a labour reserve for security 
services (like army and police) and plantations in the south. There is a general conviction 
among the population that it was systematically calculated by the NRM government to force 
people into IDP camps so that their land can be used for large-scale farms30. There is doubt 
among the local people whether the wish by government to bring development to the region 
is real because of the many other land grabs going on since land is considered empty and 
redundant and other interests in the land by the investors because of presence of oil in the 
area (Atkinson and Owor, 2013). Too much support of the land allocation to Amuru Sugar 
Works Limited by government and bribery by the state to make Amuru community accept the 
project make people suspicious of the intension of the project to be development (Cf. 
Serwajja, 2014; Martiniello, 2015).  
The people from Acholi region attribute their perceptions to the fact that they have never 
received explanations from government substantiating why the civil war that started to claim 
people’s lives in 1986 only became publicised after 1996. The Acholi lived under terror, 
massacre and displacement in secrecy for 10 years without the government stepping in to 
curtail the conflict.31 People in the northern region believe that people from the south want 
to get access to their land because there is land scarcity in the south. Consequently whatever 
land policies or reforms that are made by the central government are treated with scepticism 
in the northern region. The expansion of state intervention and institutions in local affairs in 
                                                          
29 Letter to CAO Amuru, 19-01-2009, Interview with a key informant 06-05-2014,  
30 Focused group discussion with elders, 22-09-2012, focused group discussion with youths, 21-06-2012, 
interview with a politician, Gulu 17-03-2012. 
31 Interview with a politician, Gulu 17-03-2012 
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Amuru justifies the general perception that government is after the land in Acholi (Cf. 
Martiniello, 2015). The Acholi who are the main tribe in Amuru district have interpreted land 
allocation to Amuru Sugar Works Limited as an indirect way through which the government 
has collaborated with the district land board to deny them their customary rights to land.  
Finally, an important dynamic is the strong local perception that decentralization mainly 
serves the interests of power holders, making the reforms severely contested. The way 
decisions about land are made at local level reflects power relations between national level 
institutions and local government institutions. When large scale land allocations are not done 
under clear procedures, they create mistrust and a general feeling of tenure insecurity 
develops among the local community. The interview excerpts below about the procedure used 
to allocate land to the sugar company speak volumes about the importance of transparency 
in land governance. 
An elder in Amuru said during an interview; 
“Don’t we need factories for development, don’t we need schools for our children, don’t we 
need hospitals for our children, and don’t we need roads for our farmers? We need them but 
we want them to come through the door and not through the window. The government wants 
to come through the window and we are saying no there is a door let us use the door.”32 
Then a cultural leader said;  
“People are not happy when you overlook them, Madhvani used crooked means to get land… 
if Madhvani had come clearly and openly to ask people for land by now people would be taking 
the sugar in tea.”33  
And then from a community meeting;  
“We want a clear procedure to be followed, if an Indian came and begged us to give him land, 
we will not refuse but if he comes fighting, then we will fight back.”34  
The views of local people as expressed in the excerpts demonstrate that transparency is of 
critical importance in land governance but also they confirm people’s mistrusts and 
perceptions about statutory decentralized land institutions. The local people are not against 
development but are not happy with the procedures used (Lenhart, 2013). It is therefore 
imperative to note that when local people feel that decisions about land are made over their 
heads and that statutory decentralized land structures are manipulated by the powerful and 
the government then they gradually start to lose trust in land institutions. After the allocation 
of land to Amuru sugar works, there are now over 8 land cases in court against the Amuru 
district land board all the cases contest the manner in which land allocations were made by 
the board 35 . This challenges and crushes the authority of statutory decentralized land 
structures among the local people even though they are formally or legally recognized. Land 
tenure security cannot be provided by decentralized land structures that have lost credibility 
and trust from the local people. This justifies that the failure of statutory decentralized land 
                                                          
32 Interview with 65 year old resident, Amuru 04-05-2013 
33 Interview with cultural leader 06-11-2012 
34 Community meeting at Kololo, Amuru 04-05-2013 
35 Interview with civil servant, Amuru 29-04-2014 
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structures to provide tenure security does not only emanate from resource inadequacy but 
availability of power to make independent decisions about land.    
From the time when the high court ruled that the contested land was public and that the 
district land board had the authority to allocate it, the community of Amuru retaliated by using 
violence to “protect” their land. The youth on several occasions have beaten up outsiders and 
local government officials who go to Lakang36 to try to mediate over the land dispute. To the 
community the use of violence in protest of large scale land allocation is attributed to failure 
of statutory decentralized institutions to provide tenure security to local people. Local people 
equally perceive the court as being corrupt; the people of Amuru felt that there was a 
predetermination in court that land should go to Madhvani and that is why the Acholi chose 
to go the “native way” 37  because the state institutions had disappointed them. People 
perceive statutory decentralized structures as organs working for interests of the regime or 
state and not for the local people. In most cases local people assert their agency through 
violence when their tenure rights are threatened (Kandel, 2015). Ineffective legal systems 
both traditional and statutory are responsible for the way people respond to land tenure 
threats. The violence that the community of Amuru has put up resonates with what Hall et al. 
(2015) note as rural communities resisting land enclosures, commodification and 
commercialization and seeking land sovereignty and autonomy from the state and markets.  
There is a general feeling that the state has a lot of influence in the way local decentralized 
land structures make decisions about land. For instance politicians in Amuru categorically 
stated that Madhvani has turned the president or the government into a land agent working 
on behalf of Madhvani38. A district official stated for example “Madhvani wanted land in 
Amuru and went to the government and then the government directed the district land board 
to give the land. With ‘something given’ (bribes) to the area land committee, they sat in one 
day and endorsed all Madhvani’s requests.”39 Common people describe Madhvani as a face 
of powerful persons and the powerful persons who are in government.40 This has created a 
desire for a change of regimes among the community for it is seen as the only way through 
which power relations between the national and local institutions can be reshuffled and 
probably create room for the (re)establishment of decentralized land structures that can 
protect people’s rights to land. But also people patiently wait for a change of government so 
that they punish or rebuke however gave away their land.41  
 
Analysis - Decentralized Land Governance in Practice 
The decisions made by decentralized land governance structures have contributed to local 
people feeling excluded from the process of land allocation. The dispute about the allocation 
of land to Amuru Sugar Works demonstrates the extensive pressure that external actors exact 
on decentralized land structures during land attribution. The civil war in northern Uganda 
                                                          
36 Lakang is the proposed site for sugar factory in Amuru district 
37 By native way or (let us go Acholi Acholi) people mean putting dialogue and reasoning aside and use violence 
to resolve conflicts. Interview with a lawyer in Amuru, 13-06-2012. 
38 Dialogue meeting on investment in Acholi, 17-03-2012. 
39 Interview with district official, Amuru 07-11-2012 
40 Interview, Amuru 13-06-2012 
41 Interview with cultural leader 06-11-2012 
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opened up the Acholi sub-region to outsiders, these include people from the south and central 
parts of the country, army generals and investors came to know about the availability of 
extensive land resources in the region and hence they want to gain access to this land. 
However, this has created tenure insecurity for the local people who now have to compete 
for land access and ownership with external powerful actors. Powerful external actors have 
an advantage in acquiring land over the local population because they use both national 
institutions (like line ministries) and local institutions (like area land committees and district 
land boards) to acquire land. This may be described as decentralized land grabbing where the 
powerful use decentralized land structure like land boards to acquire land fraudulently. Apart 
from outsiders making the competition for land access with the community harder, once they 
gain access to land it becomes very easy to expand their access to land because not only do 
they have the connections to land institutions but also economic power in terms of money to 
buy off customary land owners willingly or unwillingly. This then puts tenure security of local 
land owners at risk.  
When merely administrative powers are transferred to decentralized land structures, room is 
created for irregularities such as in this case to occur during decentralized land attribution. 
However, from the Amuru case we see that the process started from above at ministry level. 
The land had already been allocated: it only needed official approval of the district land board 
which was supposed to execute the orders from above by taking a decision about the land in 
an incorrect procedure. The failure by national authorities like line ministries to let local 
government authorities to independently make decisions undermines the relevance of 
decentralized structures like land boards in land governance, and make them part of the 
executive arm of the government instead of decentralized government. The case also shows 
clearly that the way in which power and authority have been distributed among different 
levels of land governance influences decision making and the protection of local land rights. 
Under such circumstances, governing commercial land acquisition and protection of local land 
rights by decentralized land structures becomes a challenge when they are faced by powerful 
external actors with connections to government. Such structures end up allocating land based 
on directives, rather than following procedures and land laws.    
Popular participation in land governance cannot be realized and encouraged in statutory 
decentralized land structures where the members are politically appointed. Although 
members of decentralized structures are expected to front local interests, this is not the case 
in practice, especially when they are politically appointed. For example, the area land 
committee are appointed by the sub-county council and approved by the district council and 
the members of the district land board are appointed by the district council and approved by 
the ministry of lands. This type of appointment has a bearing on the way decisions about land 
allocations are made, as one civil servant lamented that;  
“It is difficult to hire and fire area land committees who do not perform well because their 
coming to office is political….they come through the interest of the sub-county chairperson, 
he always appoints people who are close to him so firing them is hard although sub-county 
council has the power to fire them…. for example a list of area land committee for sub-county 
X came from the chairman and all were approved yet there are names of some area land 
committee that the sub-county council wanted to throw away but the chairman refused.”42 
                                                          
42 Interview with sub-county official 19-03-2012 
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In most cases such members are accountable to, and they make decisions about land that 
replicate the interest of the appointing authorities where their allegiance is placed. This does 
not necessarily reflect the interests of all stakeholders. In the Amuru case, local people wanted 
to maintain their customary access to land well as the government and powerful actors 
(Madhvani and central government) wanted the land to be used for commercial purposes 
which required a change of land ownership to statutory forms of land holding. Hence it is the 
interest of those at the higher level of authority that are implemented vis-à-vis protection of 
local land rights. 
Ambiguities and lack of clear definitions in land laws and policies which are embedded in a 
weak institutional structure create opportunities for interpretations according to the interests 
of the powerful including government. Undeniably conflicts on land in Northern Uganda 
emanate from contradictory customary and statutory land tenure systems (Burke and Egaru, 
2011; Lenhart, 2013:3). For instance when the high court ruled that the disputed land in 
Amuru was public land and unutilized, this was a question of playing with the ambiguities in 
complex land laws43. The contested land is part of former Kilak hunting area that was gazetted 
by the colonial government in 1959, however the area was de-gazetted by Idi Amin in 1972. 
This means the land went back to the community and re-assumed the status of customary 
land44 (Kobusingye forthcoming). But also going by the law, public land may have ceased to 
exist by the 1995 constitution because it recognizes only four land tenure systems of which 
public land is not part.  
Interestingly, during a community meeting where lawyers representing the community of 
Amuru were giving feedback to the local people on the progress of the court case, the lawyers 
informed the people that from the negotiations between the lawyers and government, the 
attorney general accepted that the disputed land is customary and that people were going to 
be compensated. Through the lawyers, the government advised people to form and register 
an association so that it works and negotiates with government about how the local people 
will benefit from some shares in the sugar company.45 This contradicted the court ruling that 
the land is public. And therefore this change of goal posts could be taken to mean that the 
government can declare customary land to be alienated on the basis of ‘public interest’ 
thereby denying customary authority power to govern that land. Such judgments about land 
allocation create jurisprudence that any land that is presumed “unoccupied” is likely to 
become public land and at risk of being mismanaged by the district land boards. This confusion 
works in the interest of the powerful because they have the capability to manipulate and 
influence state land governance bodies in a situation where land laws are ambiguous. 
 
As noticed during this research study in Acholi region, it is imperative to point out that this 
ambiguity on acquiring land for ‘public’ interest is mainly affecting customary land, which 
happens to be not only the type of tenure that is most common in the country but whose 
ownership is also very insecure and unregistered. Decentralized land governance has proved 
to be more of a predator than a protector of customary land in Uganda. Hence not only do 
most of the large land acquisitions take place on customary land but also customary land 
                                                          
43 Gulu High Court judgment HCT-02-CV-MA-No. 126 of 2008 
44 Dialogue meeting on investments in Acholi 17-03-2012 
45 Community meeting at Kololo 04-05-2013 
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governance creates space for interaction which in turn becomes a stage for power play among 
formal, informal institutions and external actors. 
Conclusion 
This paper sought to understand how power influences decision making about land at local 
levels, and the role of decentralized governance institutions in large scale land acquisitions. 
From the way land was allocated to Amuru Sugar Company, it shows that decentralization in 
Uganda has contributed to the establishment of powerless/weak structures or institutions 
that promote national policies with little consideration for local issues and customary rights. 
This contrasts with the intended objectives of decentralization like encouraging popular 
participation and representation in governance. The case demonstrates that decentralization 
creates an array of opportunities for the state to have greater control or influence over what 
happens at local levels, because these local institutions serve to justify and legalize (rubber 
stamp) higher order decisions. Paradoxically decentralization was supposed to aid the 
devolution of powers from the central government to the local government or districts, this 
has taken place on paper but in reality the central government continues to pull strings of 
power at local levels especially through implementing national policies. The research findings 
resonate with Ribot that lower authorities become subjects of higher authorities with little 
discretion of their own (Ribot, 2003: 58) especially when power to make decisions is restricted 
by the central government. Therefore by creating numerous districts in Uganda without 
transfer of real power to decentralized structures, decentralization will continue to be 
ineffective as a channel of incorporating popular participation in decision making, but will 
rather increase control of the state over land allocation.  
From the Amuru case we see orders vertically flowing from higher authorities to lower 
authorities and eventually influencing the way decisions about land allocations are made at a 
local level. This is contrary to section 60(1) of the land act which states that the district land 
board shall be independent and shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person 
or authority. This therefore leads to an analysis that local land rights can only be protected 
through decentralized land structures if these institutions have real power to make decisions 
about land. Similarly the case demonstrates that large scale land allocation cannot be 
effectively governed through decentralization. Unless the issue of power distribution among 
different administrative levels in relation to land governance is sorted out, decentralization of 
land governance may not protect local rights vis-à-vis powerful external actors. This paper 
asserts that the real impediment to local governance lies in the distribution of power between 
levels of authority and not only lack of resources as most scholars and researchers emphasize. 
Decentralization in itself is not a bad governance policy. However to be successful real powers 
should be transferred from central government to local governments in order for local 
government structures to make independent decision. Cosmetic reform in the form of 
administrative decentralization cannot empower decentralized land structures to make 
decisions that can guarantee local tenure security and protect local land rights in the era of 
large scale land acquisition for commercial agriculture. 
There is a big disparity between how land tenure security was foreseen from the decentralized 
land laws and how the tenure security is in practice. The research shows that it is difficult to 
strike a balance between national objectives and interests at the local level. While the cabinet 
ministers who approved the sugar complex at Amuru wanted to achieve the national 
objectives and policy of commercialization of agriculture, the protection of local rights to land 
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was disregarded. Therefore under such circumstances decentralized land governance fails to 
translate into transparent land governance and improved tenure security. People of Amuru 
have strongly opposed the sugar project/land allocation to the sugar company not because 
they do not want development but because decisions about their land were made at higher 
levels and they were bypassed during the process of land allocation. Yet whatever decision 
that is made about land directly affects the local people and their tenure security. Popular 
participation in statutory decentralized land governance should be encouraged not only 
because it contributes to making decentralized land structures accountable but also it 
improves people’s perception and trust in decentralized structures. 
Important to note is while decentralization was being implemented in 1993, northern Uganda 
was deeply engrossed in a civil war. Therefore this makes decentralization not to be rooted in 
the local system; this may also explain why people of northern Uganda do not have a strong 
attachment to the decentralized structures and have not been able to re-occupy them and 
make them work for their interests. On the other hand the government has given a lot of 
power to statutory decentralized structure especially district land board and area land 
committee to govern customary land. Despite the fact that majority of land in northern 
Uganda is held under customary tenure, the formal procedure for land allocation has 
neglected customary institutions. For instance in the process of area land committees 
inspecting land for issuance of CCOs customary institutions are not consulted, only neighbours 
bordering the land which is the subject of application are involved. Large land allocation orders 
come from national authorities to local level authorities for implementation and in the process 
customary authorities are ignored. This could be a source of land disputes in future as 
communities will contest the authority of formal institutions in allocating customary land. 
There is an appeal to government to establish clear guidelines for investors in northern 
Uganda (ARLPI, 2012). 
The main study area for this chapter is shown below; 
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Map 4: Showing Study Area of Pailyec Parish, Amuru Sub County in Amuru district 
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5. Where do I report my land dispute? The impact of 
institutional proliferation on land governance in post-
conflict Northern Uganda.  
 
ABSTRACT 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, Uganda has been hailed for embarking on an intensive decentralization 
program. Whereas a lot of literature assumes that decentralization leads to improved service 
delivery, it is unclear to what extent this is the case in practice, especially when it comes down 
to decentralized land governance. This paper, which is based on ethnographic research carried 
out between 2011 and 2013, argues that decentralization of land governance in post-conflict 
Northern Uganda fails to realize the expected benefits and instead has increased tenure 
insecurity. Decentralization of land governance gave rise to institutional multiplicity by 
creating new institutions that add on to the already existing authorities and regulations. 
Institutional proliferation in land governance that is fuelled by  legal pluralism and 
decentralization results into confusion in land dispute resolution and the failure of institutions 
to effectively resolve land disputes in post-conflict settings. This exacerbates the dilemma of 
people who do not know where to go to seek redress to land disputes. While this multiplicity 
of both statutory and customary institutions creates choices and opportunities for both 
people and institutions in relation to land governance and in particular land conflict resolution, 
they are also used by power holders and authorities in political competition at local level, 
complicating the process of land dispute resolution. The struggle for authority between 
representatives of the state and of customary land institutions becomes especially 
problematic because it merges with local and national politics. 
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Introduction 
Decentralization has been a core component of land reforms implemented by many African 
governments, with the ambition to improve land governance, increase agricultural production 
and economic growth (Toulmin and Quan, 2000, Peters, 2004). Decentralization is the 
devolution of governance from higher to lower level organizations in the governmental 
hierarchy, most commonly from a central government to provincial, regional, district, and sub-
district levels (Bartley et al, 2008). Proponents of decentralization argue that decentralization 
creates space for popular participation, representation of all stakeholders in decision making 
and encourages accountability in governance (Ribot, 2003). Overall, decentralization is 
believed to improve state-society interactions significantly (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2008). 
Regarding the governance of land, policy makers hope that decentralization improves land 
tenure security and the resolution of land disputes. It is from such anticipated benefits that 
over the past two decades decentralization has been a core strategy of Uganda’s National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) government efforts at reforming land governance.  
The question is of course how decentralized land governance works out in practice. Like in 
many other African countries, in Uganda, decentralization of land governing authority by the 
state does not take place in isolation, but comes down to a re-division of land governing roles 
at the local level and restructuring the relations between customary and statutory institutions. 
In the case of Uganda, decentralization strongly plays into the division of responsibilities 
between state and customary institutions.    
Before the colonial period, land in Uganda was governed by customary institutions according 
to different cultural norms, practices and rules, and these were different among the various 
ethnic groups. Generally, such customary systems build around collective rights to land: rights 
to land were vested in the group (clan, lineage) and the membership of people of these 
entities. The colonizers introduced statutory tenure, which was significantly different from 
customary tenure as it granted opportunities for acquiring individual land rights directly from 
the state and not from an intermediate authority. Yet, the introduction of statutory tenure by 
the colonial authorities did not replace customary tenure, but instead resulted in a dual tenure 
system (G.o.U. 2013), with customary tenure systems continuing to exist alongside (and to a 
certain extent intermixing with) statutory systems. Up to today, 80 percent of the land in 
Uganda is held under customary tenure, and only 20 percent of the land is subject to statutory 
tenure combining freehold, leasehold and Mailo land (MISR, 2003). In Northern Uganda, even 
90 percent of the land is still held under customary tenure, administered by customary chiefs, 
who are considered to be the custodians of land while the land is owned by individual families 
(See ARLPI, 2010). The Ugandan situation is not unusual: The majority of the people in 
developing countries continue to access land through customary tenure systems (See 
Deininger, 2003; Wiley, 2006; Deininger and Castagnini, 2006).  
Considering this situation, there is an ongoing debate about the extent to which customary 
tenure should be replaced or instead might serve as an alternative to provide tenure security 
instead of statutory systems based on private property and land titles. In the past, customary 
tenure was considered as irrelevant and in need of replacement by state tenure. Yet, 
increasingly there is acknowledgement of the often valuable role customary tenure may play 
in securing local tenure, and of the ineffectiveness or failures to establish state tenure 
systems. An evolutionist perspective, which is increasingly influential, even argues that the 
evolution of land tenure towards individual ownership is a gradual process and that one 
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should not interfere in local land tenure systems but leave them to evolve and determine their 
own outcomes and eventually result into well-defined property rights (See Platteau, 1996; 
Peters, 2004; Fitzpatrick, 2005).  
In the case of Uganda, a more positive assessment of customary tenure certainly plays a role 
in the government’s approach to tenure reform, which combines decentralization of land 
governance with legal acknowledgement of the valuable roles of customary institutions in 
protecting local tenure. The reform of tenure administration in Uganda has been regarded as 
the most extensive and decentralized of any of Sub Saharan African countries (Tripp, 2004). 
The 1998 Land Act, which was to strengthen tenure on customarily held land and enhance the 
resolution of land disputes, aims at comprehensive decentralization of land governance. It 
extensively elaborates the roles and functions of statutory decentralized land structures like 
Land Tribunals, District Land Boards, District Land Offices, Area Land Committees and 
Recorders at the sub-county levels (1998 Land Act), even though up to date land tribunals are 
not in operation. In addition, the 1995 constitution legally recognized customary tenure as 
one of the four tenure systems in Uganda. According to the 1998 Land Act, customary land is 
supposed to be governed according to the norms and practices of a community, and provides 
for so-called Certificates of Customary Ownership (CCO), 46  for persons, families and 
communities holding customary land who wish to document their claims on land.  
The question is of course how this works out in practice. So far, despite elaborate legislation 
and policy guidelines with respect to the decentralized land institutions that need to be 
established, their respective responsibilities, and the regulations that apply, unresolved land 
disputes and tenure insecurity continue to be present at local level in northern Uganda. The 
majority of the cases in local courts, both customary and statutory, are land related, and in 
the villages land dispute mediations have become a daily routine 47 . This resonates with 
findings by the Ministry of Justice (2008) which reported that land disputes ranked the highest 
among all conflicts in the country. 
This paper demonstrates that decentralization of land governance in northern Uganda itself is 
part of the problem. The establishment of decentralized institutions is erratic, incomplete and 
contested. Moreover, though the government had the ambition to decentralize land 
governance and enable customary authorities to take charge of land governance, it effectively 
resulted in the establishment of new decentralized state institutions, next to already existing 
authorities and regulations about land, while the division of responsibilities between those 
institutions remains unclear. This institutional multiplication and unclearness fuels rivalry and 
competition between representatives of decentralized state and customary institutions. This 
local competition is made even more complex as a result of the interference by national 
politicians in local disputes. Institutional multiplicity and competition, combined with a large 
number of contested land claims in post-conflict settings creates confusion among people 
over which institution (customary or statutory) to approach with their land disputes. Local 
people navigate through multiple institutions to promote their claims on land. 
Representatives of these institutions even use land disputes to try to (re) establish their 
authority.  
                                                          
46 cap.227 section 4 (1) of 1998 Land Act 
47 Interview with district official Amuru, 7-11-2012, interview with court official, Amuru 22-05-2012 and field 
observations 2011-2013 
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A very problematic consequence of this is indecision in land dispute resolution. Land governing 
authorities fail to effectively resolve land disputes, either because decisions continue to be 
contested or are never implemented, due to unclearness and competition about who is in 
charge. As a result, land disputes remain undecided upon, which undermines tenure security 
of small land owners and trust in the system of land governance. 
Methodology 
This paper is based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the Acholi sub-region 
in Northern Uganda. We will focus on one detailed case study; the Kigwe land dispute in Pader 
district and other smaller land disputes to illustrate our argument. Data for this paper was 
gathered from 52 interviews, 6 focus group discussion, 4 land dispute mediations and 3 
workshops about land issues across the 7 districts of Acholi region including Gulu, Amuru, 
Pader, Kitigum, Nwoya, Lamwo and Agago districts in Northern Uganda. Interviews were 
conducted between November 2011 to May 2013 and people interviewed included 
chairpersons and representatives of the different levels of the local council system from LC1, 
LC2, LC3 and LC5, traditional leaders (chiefs and rwod kweri), Area land Committees, District 
land board members, lawyers, politicians, policemen, NGO employees, conflicting parties and 
local people. Various topics related to land governance were discussed such as the impact of 
decentralization, issues of institutional competition, authority of land institutions in the 
communities, where people report their land disputes, reasons why people choose those 
institutions, why people use violence in land matters and effects of war on land institutions. 
One of the researchers worked with a local organization of Acholi leadership called Ker Kwaro 
Acholi (KKA) that helped her to access the field and later she made independent field visits to 
verify the data obtained about the different topics48.  
The paper is structured as follows; the next section discusses the notion of legal pluralism 
which is the co-existence of multiple legal systems and competition between formal and 
informal land institutions. It further shows how decentralization feeds into institutional 
multiplicity. Section 3 illustrates how, despite the existence of a well-elaborated decentralized 
land structures on paper, land dispute resolution continues to be problematic. The Kigwe land 
dispute in Pader district shows how a land dispute can go through many forums but fails to 
get resolved. Section 4 shows that the presence of many forums for dispute resolution leads 
to fierce competition among land institutions while trying to authorize land claims but also 
contributes to weakening of those land institutions because people lose trust in them.   
Legal pluralism and institutional competition  
In Sub-Saharan Africa conflict over land is intensifying at the local level (Peters, 2004). 
Escalating land conflicts raise questions about the authority of land institutions that are 
supposed to resolve land disputes and sanction claims on land. Looking through the lenses of 
legal pluralism, the co-existence of multiple systems of legal order within a society or confines 
of the state (Hooker, 1975; Griffiths 1986; Unruh, 2003), might be a useful way of better 
understanding how people organize land governance when plural legal systems are in 
existence and how this fosters struggles and intensifies land disputes. Unruh (2003) notes that 
                                                          
48 This research is part of a PhD project on land governance reform in northern Uganda, which is a component of 
the larger Grounding Land Governance program that was funded by NWO-WOTRO, Science for Global 
Development grant number W 01.65.332.00.  
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legal pluralism with regard to land tenure signifies the presence of different sets of rights and 
obligations concerning land and property. Legal pluralism does not necessarily mean that  
systems are equal but that they interact with, influence and oppose each other (Peters, 2004). 
State institutions significantly determine the space in which representatives of customary 
institutions may operate. The state can choose to recognize customary institutions or curtail 
the scope of their powers (Fitzpatrick, 2005). In this context of a state, customary institutions 
cannot be regarded as autonomous but as institutions whose representatives may challenge 
the authority of statutory institutions (Benjaminsen and Lund, 2003). Lastly, customary tenure 
is not static it keeps on evolving and this process is also shaped by interactions with state 
institutions, market policies and political crises like war.  
FAO defines land governance as a process by which decisions are made regarding the access 
to and use of land, the manner in which those decisions are implemented and the way 
conflicting interests in land are reconciled (FAO, 2007). In a post-conflict setting land 
governance becomes challenging and problematic in practice after the guns have gone silent 
because of the unique circumstances created by war especially in relation to tenure security. 
In our case, people were displaced for a long time and many died in the IDP camps. The LRA 
war in Acholi land led to a reshuffle of power because of increasing influence of the Ugandan 
government. As a result of the war both statutory and customary institutions which are 
supposed to administer property rights were in disarray (Daudelin, 2003; Unruh, 2003). War 
erodes the institutional order in place, and puts it adrift; therefore new modes of organizing 
land both customary and statutory may proliferate in order to fill the institutional void created 
by war. After violent conflict customary and statutory institutions may compete to sanction 
land claims. This is because those institutions might have “overlapping jurisdiction of 
authority” (Ribot and Peluso, 2003:170) but also in order to regain their pre-war authority. 
Areas going out of violent conflict are prone to land disputes because there are multiple actors 
seeking to access and utilize land (Unruh, 2003; Clover, 2010). It is thus important to 
understand how both customary and statutory institutions work to sanction the competing 
claims to land in post-conflict environments.  
In many places in Sub-Saharan Africa there is hardly any land formally registered by the state; 
most land is effectively under customary tenure; yet there is institutional multiplicity and 
ambiguity because it is unclear when and where state legislation or custom apply. Different 
tenure systems may apply simultaneously to the same piece of land. In Africa over 90 percent 
of the land is accessed through customary tenure arrangements and formal tenure covers less 
than 10 percent of the area (Wiley, 2006; Deininger and Castagnini, 2006). Little land is 
formally registered but that does not imply that the land is not governed. Instead most land is 
still held under customary tenure arrangements and customary institutions govern the land.  
Reform programmes do not necessarily resolve this ambiguity. Instead, reforms often result 
in new struggles between people that try to use these systems and the opportunities provided 
by legislation and acknowledgement of particular forms of authority by the state to their 
advantage. Statutory institutions may in fact be created to oversee land matters in customary 
tenure. However the introduction of statutory tenure does not necessarily lead to increased 
tenure security (Peters, 2004) but rather this gives opportunity to conflicting parties to 
manipulate the overlapping jurisdiction which is put in place when statutory institutions come 
in to manage customary tenure (Fitzpatrick, 2005). But also since customary and statutory 
land systems were never merged, it might not be clear who has the authority to define rights 
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and deal with land disputes (Carfield, 2011). Literature on legal pluralism fronts the notion 
that the presence of more than one legal order in land governance provides individuals and 
institutions with opportunities to use either of the systems (Fitzpatrick, 2005; Carfield, 2011). 
However important to note is there might be conflicting rules between these institutions over 
authority to determine land rights but also conflict between local people and institutions that 
govern land (Cf. Lund 1998b: 2). 
Institutional competition promotes forum shopping by people that approach those 
institutions that might best serve their interests in a conflict (Von Benda-Beckmann, 1981; 
Firmin-Sellers, 2000). Forum shopping is the ability of some actors to select the arena of law 
or custom that will favour their objectives (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). In situations of post-
conflict where there is lack of clarity about the role of statutory and customary institutions in 
land governance (Cf. Deininger and Castagnini, 2006) room is created for forum shopping in 
land governance institutions according to what suites people’s interests (See Lund, 1998a, 
Unruh, 2003). Legal pluralism may facilitate the resolution of land disputes by providing 
choices (Unruh, 2003) or contribute to confusion (Ramirez, 2002) because there might not be 
a clear structure to follow and this might contribute to indecision in land dispute resolution. 
In sum legal pluralism fuels into institutional competition among land governance institutions 
and this competition between different authorities may make both customary and statutory 
systems dysfunctional (Eck, 2014). This might explain the persistence of land disputes in post-
conflict settings.  
The other side of the story is that institutional pluralism provides representatives of 
institutions that govern land with opportunities to look for claims to authorize in order to 
solidify their legitimacy in relation to competitors (See Boege, 2006; Sikor and Lund, 2009; 
Huber, 2010). This is not a level playing field; power is very important in the extent to which 
certain people may use institutions to their advantage, and some in particular fail to reap the 
benefits of institutional competition for example single women. Institutions are not neutral, 
but often reflect power relations in a given society thus conflicting parties may take advantage 
of a situation where power holders are competing for authority to achieve their interests in 
land (cf. Okuku, 2006; Lund et al. 2006; Bartley et al. 2008). Therefore power struggles and 
competition that occur among institutions create opportunities for conflicting parties. The 
important question is how people representing competing land institutions are able to assert 
their authority and influence the resolution of land disputes and tenure security. 
Recently more attention has been given the renegotiation of authority and legitimacy in 
situations of institutional multiplicity. In particular, the paper demonstrates that a major 
consequence of institutional multiplicity is not just the negotiability of regulations and 
authority (See Francis and James, 2003; Ribot and Peluso, 2003) but also the indecision in land 
dispute resolution. Indecision in land dispute resolution is a result of many processes for 
example limited authority to implement and sanction decisions, as a consequence resolutions 
of such institutions may not be binding; lack of commitment of dispute resolvers that are more 
interested in establishing their authority than in solving disputes; the fact that in a situation 
of institutional multiplicity those involved in conflict may always approach another institution 
to present their land disputes or interests; and the reality that one of the conflicting parties 
does not recognize the legitimacy of one of the institutions in case they get a negative 
decision.  
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Decentralization of land governance in Northern Uganda 
Decentralization in Uganda is regarded as a strategy of taking services closer to the people, 
and it is implemented through a hierarchical local government structure. Through 
decentralization some functions, powers and responsibilities are devolved and transferred 
from the central government to local governments (GoU 1995). Uganda’s decentralization has 
often been hailed and taken as an example for the rest of Africa especially by the way power 
has been devolved to lower levels of government (Cf. Francis and James, 2003; Green, 2008). 
However the way decentralization is implemented has instead contributed to the 
mushrooming of local governments in form of new local government units (Green, 2008; 
Hilhorst, 2009; Kobusingye, 2010).  
The decentralized government structures have their origin in the Resistance Councils (RCs) 
that had their roots in the civil war staged by the National Resistance Army which were a 
system of organizing the community. These RCs were later moulded to become local councils 
(LC) by the 1995 Constitution. The local council system of local government has five levels 
ranging from village to the district. These include LC1 at village, LC2 at parish, LC3 at Sub-
county, LC4 at County and LC5 at district level. With this decentralization of the 
administration, decentralized land governance structures like district land boards, land 
tribunals, area land committees were put in place. Despite the decentralized statutory 
structures being closer to the people, management of land disputes continues to be 
problematic and a source of further conflict in land governance. As we will see in the case of 
Kigwe there is decentralized land governance on paper, but in reality it is largely the informal 
system that is dealing with conflicts about land on the ground. Land disputes are still rampant 
in Northern Uganda despite the existence of these well elaborated decentralized land 
administration structures. This requires us to further explore how decentralized land 
governance works out locally. 
The 1995 constitution clearly stipulates the various functions of decentralized land structures 
for example district land boards are charged with holding and allocating land in the district 
which is not owned by any person or authority and facilitating the registration and transfer of 
interests in land. The district land tribunals are charged with a role of determining of disputes 
concerning land matters within the district49. Section 38 (1) of the Land Act provides for Area 
Land committees at the sub-county level that are responsible for inspecting land, determine 
if there are no land disputes and aid in the process of issuing certificates of customary 
ownership (CCOs) on customary land. CCOs as earlier mentioned were envisaged by 
government to increase tenure security under customary tenure. There is also a provision for 
the CCOs to be converted to freehold titles. The area land committees undertake the process 
of issuing CCOs without consulting customary leaders or chiefs whereas before the war the 
chiefs made all the decisions on customary land. Therefore the issuance of CCOs by statutory 
land institutions is perceived by the Acholi as a mechanism by the state to take away their 
customary rights to land. And it is seen as a starting point of aiding the process of converting 
customary tenure into statutory tenure. Thus policies to enhance the role of customary tenure 
in land administration and land dispute resolution in fact seem to contribute to the contrary. 
Formal structures (statutory) that directly deal with land dispute resolution include; the LC2 
which is the first court of instance for land disputes, the sub-county court committee at LC3 
                                                          
49 Article 243 (2a) of the 1995 constitution 
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which handles land disputes that are referred from LC2, the chief magistrate’s court which 
adjudicates land cases that are referred from LC3, and the Resident District Commissioner 
(RDC) at the district level (LC5). Conflicting parties can also take their land disputes to the 
president’s representative, High court and police. However, the police only comes in when a 
civil land case/dispute turns criminal in nature through assault, malicious damage or murder. 
These decentralized land governance structures are a contributing factor to the confusion in 
land conflict resolution and institutional multiplicity as we will see in the Kigwe case. 
The customary structures that handle disputes in Acholi region include; Rwodi Kweri (chief of 
hoe), the first instance to handle land disputes at village level under the Acholi customary 
system, the Rwodi Moo (council of chiefs) to mediate land disputes at clan level that fail to be 
resolved at the Rwodi Kweri level, and the Ker Kwaro Acholi at regional level which is headed 
by the paramount chief, which consists of customary chiefs and is the highest institution in 
the Acholi customary system. Other institutions that are outside statutory and customary 
spheres but engage in land matters include NGOs and religious leaders who offer legal and 
financial assistance and also engage in mediation of land disputes. In practice, all the 
mentioned structures above have some powers to resolve land disputes but lack a clear 
structure to follow. 
The decentralized statutory land governance structures were created by the state in a hasty 
without proper planning and a clear division of power between the different levels of 
government but also between state and customary institutions. For example the land 
tribunals at LC5 that were mandated to deal with land disputes and were part of decentralized 
land governance could not resolve land disputes due to lack of funding. The LC2 is taken to be 
the first court of instance of land disputes in decentralized land governance while traditionally 
in Acholi that same role is played by the Rwot Kweri (the chief of the hoe) who existed since 
time immemorial50. So at this level there is a parallel offer of services in land governance. The 
institutions do not collaborate and thereby contribute to confusion, because people are in 
dilemma over which institutions to approach in order to resolve their land disputes. Local 
people continued to suggest that the best system to manage land disputes is the customary 
institution through the Rwot Kweri because they live with the community and know the 
boundaries of people’s land more than anyone else51.  
In addition in the last 10 years, there have not been elections of members of local council 1 
and 2, yet these decentralized structures are supposed play a big role in the administration of 
land disputes. Local people pointed out that the LC 1 and LC2 chairpersons and their 
committees were last elected in 2001 and now they lack legitimacy due to the expiration of 
their mandate. In reverse, LC1 and LC2 committees do not feel obliged to serve their people 
but it also unclear whether their decisions will eventually be legally binding, considering that 
elections did not take place. The structures are closer to the people and they are supposed to 
be the first court of instance of land disputes at parish level. However despite these structures 
being “illegal” people continue to take their land disputes to them. Local people are not 
interested in the legal status of institutions but in the legitimacy of their operations and 
decisions. This explains why in Uganda people continue taking their land disputes to LC2 
despite the structure being regarded illegal by the judiciary.  
                                                          
50 Interview with a customary leader, Gulu 14-11-2011 
51 FGD with elders, Pabbo 28-09-2012 
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In the rest of the paper we will discuss some cases from northern Uganda, and demonstrate 
the unpredictability of outcomes of reform that result from this. This argument is made by 
exploring the case of Kigwe land dispute in Pader district, northern Uganda and interviews 
across the Acholi region. According to interviews and field observations, the common types of 
land disputes experienced in Acholi region include; boundary disputes, these occur between 
neighbours and between neighbouring clans especially over hunting and grazing lands, double 
sales where the owner of the land sells it more than once, false sales where people pretend 
to be the owners of land and sell it, land grabbing where the targeted land is usually for the 
widows and other vulnerable groups, retracted land gifts where the youth or younger 
generations demand back land that was given by their grandparents. 
Institutional proliferation and land dispute resolution - the case of Kigwe 
dispute in Pader district. 
Northern Uganda experienced one of Africa’s most brutal civil wars which resulted into the 
displacement of over 2,000,000 people. The war that started in 1986 and ended in 2006 
destabilized the entire greater northern region and specifically displacing 90 percent of the 
population in Acholi region. When the war ended, there were a large number of competing 
claims on land because of previous displacement, return and re-accessing of land. People took 
the opportunity to claim land that belonged to others but also people may have forgotten 
their boundaries. To make matters worse this took place in a situation where the institutions 
that deal with land were incapacitated to carry out land conflict resolutions. People lost trust 
in these land governance institutions when they failed to ascertain or protect people’s claims 
on land. This situation not only created opportunities but also reasons for people to leap from 
one institution to another in order to find a solution to land disputes.  
The Kigwe land dispute is an interesting case, because it has been taken to over six forums but 
a settlement of the conflict has never been reached. It is a unique case that meticulously 
explains why a land dispute can go through many institutions but a resolution is not arrived 
at. It demonstrates; 1. The ambiguity of land governance attributes of different institutions; 
2. Decentralization and institutional competition evolving between customary and statutory 
decentralized land institutions; 3. The failure of those institutions to reach a conclusion on the 
case or to implement it; and 4. The particular role of the post-conflict context in Acholi land in 
this process. 
The dispute is about land that was acquired or given in the past before the LRA war but 
contentions over the land came up after the end of war. The actors that are involved in the 
land dispute include; the two conflicting families, the local council structures and the 
customary institutions.  
The two families are the family of Obalim which received land and the family of Akena which 
gave land. The contested land is over 1,000 acres and located in Laguti sub-county, Aruu 
county, Pader district. The family of Akena gave land to the family of Obalim as a gift around 
1967 and the two families lived peacefully together until the war between the LRA and NRM 
government broke out and everybody left for IDP camps in 1997. The two families stayed in 
different IDP camps during the war for 10 years. The family that gave the land went to Pajule 
camp and the family that received the land went to Lacekocot camp, all the camps were in 
Pader district. When the war came to an end in 2006, the government disbanded IDP camps 
and both the families returned to their land in 2008. 
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After returning from the IDP camp, the family of Obalim started to cultivate their land in 2009 
and then the dispute began. While working in the garden, the family of Obalim was disturbed 
with gun shots by soldiers who were acting on the orders of the family of Akena. The family of 
Akena claims the land belongs to them because the family of Obalim only stayed on that land 
for only three years and relocated to two other areas before the war so they argued that the 
family of Obalim no longer had a right to the land in question. The family of Obalim took the 
case to the LC3 chairman of Laguti sub-county who referred them to go to the police because 
it was now also a criminal case since the family of Akena had used violence. The police dealt 
with the criminal part of the case and told the families that land disputes are civil cases that 
are not handled by the police. The family of Obalim then took the case to the RDC and LC5 
they both advised the families to resolve the dispute through mediation. The RDC and the LC5 
chairperson tried to solve the land dispute and advised the family of Obalim to go back home 
and ordered the family of Akena to stop accessing the contested land until a solution was 
found. However the family of Akena did not heed to that advice and continued utilizing the 
contested land. When the family of Akena continued to utilize the land despite the 
recommendation from the RDC and LC5, the family of Obalim reacted by accessing the 
contested land too. 
In 2010 the family of Obalim returned to cultivate the land and they were intercepted by a 
group of 30 people from the family of Akena with machetes, spears, bows and arrows. Family 
members of Obalim were beaten and injured; they reported the case to the LC3 chairman 
again. The case was transferred to police, and 6 people from the family of Akena were arrested 
and taken to Pader police station. A customary chief of the clan to which the family of Akena 
belongs visited the 6 suspects at the police station and they were immediately released. The 
family of Obalim was disappointed by the release of the suspects from police under unclear 
procedures before the suspects could be tried before courts of law and then decided to take 
the land dispute case to the magistrate court. The magistrate court then referred the case to 
Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA), the highest institution of the Acholi for mediation.  
In 2012 on the 22nd of February and the 1st of March mediations organized by KKA were 
conducted to find a solution to the land dispute. During the first mediation a resolution was 
not found because the mediation team did not manage to visit the locus (the disputed land) 
because the team’s car broke down and arrived late for the mediation. In the second 
mediation by KKA on the 1st of March, traditional leaders started the mediation by applauding 
the family of Obalim for choosing to resolve the land dispute under the customary institution 
and immediately started pointing out what they felt were shortfalls of statutory institutions. 
For example “We should leave out government courts and appreciate Obalim for seeking 
redress to this land dispute from the chiefs, formal courts fill people’s hearts with anger, they 
are not good and people should not waste their time in them”.52 
The mediation team from KKA then invited the conflicting families to present their sides of the 
story before the gathered congregation. The family of Obalim talked about existence of a tomb 
of a particular family member in the disputed land as proof of owning that land. The mediation 
team, elders and other people eventually visited the place and found the tomb however 
according to all those present; the tomb belonged to a different person. During the mediation 
the sons of Akena refused their father to speak claiming that he was deaf. It was later 
discovered that he was not deaf and he was forced by his sons to demand back the land from 
                                                          
52 Land dispute mediation in Kigwe 01-03-2012 
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the family of Obalim. The chiefs then concluded the land dispute mediation by asking the 
family of Obalim to apologize to the family of Akena. And the chiefs promised that later (time 
unspecified) they would come back to divide the land between the two families. However they 
did not yet return to help the two families divide the land. Therefore no definite resolution 
has been reached to settle the land dispute and by 2015 the dispute was still ongoing. 
From interviews with the conflicting families it appeared that the family of Obalim had 
relatives within the LC3 and LC5 administrations and this explains why it was easy for the 
family of Obalim to approach these institutions. The family of Akena could not accept the 
resolutions made by LC3 and LC5 because they felt they were not neutral. On the other hand 
the family of Akena is related to the chief who heads a clan and this chief has contributed to 
the indecision of the conflict. He talked to the police and the 6 suspects who allegedly beat up 
members of the Obalim family were released. But the chief also wants the disputed land to go 
to his clan mates. He is accused of holding secretive meetings with the family of Akena 
encouraging them not to accept the land to go to the family of Obalim which belongs to a 
different clan53. The family of Obalim also feels that chief was inclined towards the Akena 
family because of those relations.  
Discussion 
Although this study was conducted in a post-conflict setting, the issues of land governance 
that are discussed are not limited to only post-conflict environments. These also occur and are 
relevant in non conflict situations. This case demonstrates that in this post-conflict setting the 
problem of land disputes is expounded by the confusion about the administration of land 
disputes. There are so many land governance institutions that people can go to different 
institutions to seek redress or solutions for their land disputes. The various land institutions 
kept on tossing the conflicting families without clearly resolving the land dispute because 
neither of the land institutions has ultimate authority to make a ruling over the dispute. The 
family of Obalim kept on moving from one land institution to another because they did not 
know right procedure to follow. Important to point out is that the procedure to follow in the 
case of land dispute is not well stipulated that is why there is confusion in land dispute 
resolution. Conflicting parties moving from one institution to another and the land institutions 
meddling in land disputes.  
But there is also the mixing up of official and informal relations, which is the downside of the 
local level government whether from one side or the other. This contributes to lack of 
legitimacy of these institutions. From the Kigwe case we see that all the conflicting parties had 
connections or support from representatives of the different institutions and exploited these 
relation networks. These relation networks contribute to persistence of land disputes in 
situations of legal pluralism.  
We also see that decentralization changes local politics and land governance. The 
establishment of various decentralized administrative structures from LC 1-5 and formal 
courts created a parallel structure for the governance of land and the resolution of conflict 
next to customary chiefs. This invites confusion, further conflict and corruption in land conflict 
resolution. The Kigwe case shows that the initiation of local politics, decentralization and 
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competition between representatives from these institutions contribute to the politicization 
of land disputes and the process of land dispute resolution.   
Customary institutions basically employ mediation as the major form of land conflict 
resolution and try to sell their way of dealing with land disputes. For example customary 
leader opened mediation session by stating that; “we have not come as judges but as 
customary leaders, when children fight in the house the father takes control that is why this 
land conflict is going to be finished at the Acholi level”54. Customary leaders believe that they 
are best suited to deal with land disputes under customary tenure. However the resolutions 
from mediations made by customary institutions are not binding legally because they do not 
have a legal status: it is up to the conflicting parties to choose to accept the resolutions or not. 
Customary institutions are relevant where there is dialogue but when it comes to litigation 
they become irrelevant. Customary institutions make decisions but they do not have the 
authority to enforce their decisions. For example a cultural leader noted that “people who 
have money do not respect our rulings on land and our poverty contributes to people not 
honouring our decisions”55. However it is also important to note that mediation teams are not 
always neutral, there is preferential treatment given to conflicting parties because of the 
relations that these conflicting parties have with institutions or people acting on behalf of the 
institutions. The fact that people do not believe that mediation teams are independent 
contributes to persistence of land disputes and land dispute going to many forums. The issue 
of legitimacy of both institutions is important not only based on what people think but also 
political alliances and relations. Both the customary and state institutions use these relations 
to become legitimate before one party and lose legitimacy before the other. But this also 
influences conflict resolution. The lack of impartiality undercuts the legitimacy of these 
institutions. 
Competition between customary and statutory land institutions is displayed as 
representatives of one institution try to sell their mediation to the litigants while tarnishing 
the other institution. The land dispute mediation was used as a strategy to tell people that in 
case of a land dispute they should seek the services of traditional chiefs. Therefore, as well as 
on the one hand people want their land disputes resolved or land rights recognized by 
institutions, the institutions use land dispute resolution to legitimize their power and authority 
on the other hand. The multiplicity of land institutions gives an opportunity to their 
representatives to prove their relevancy and market themselves in land governance. 
Important to emphasize is that institutional competition and ambiguity explored in the 
previous section is not only a single case study but a condition that is prevalent in all post-
conflict settings. This is shown by other interviews not specifically related to the Kigwe case 
that were conducted throughout the Acholi sub-region. 
The impact of war on land institutions 
Some Acholi people still believe that clan leaders have authority and control over land 
governance. They still envisage the pre-war picture of land governance, where people adhered 
to what traditional chiefs said in relation to land, where cultural norms, traditional practices 
and customs applied to land and where the population was smaller with less land disputes. 
However land governance in Acholi has changed due to the 20 years’ war and in reality 
                                                          
54 Land dispute mediation in Kigwe 01-03-2012 
55Interview with a customary leader, Pabbo 09-11-2012  
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customary institutions no longer have the authority to manage land. This is also attributed to 
the deliberate effort by the state not to respect or recognize the authority of customary chiefs 
to govern land. Statutory institutions claimed a greater role in managing land under customary 
tenure through the issuance of CCOs on customary land which makes them competitors for 
power over land under customary tenure.  
The war created a vacuum in land governance, for both customary and statutory institutions 
that deal with land governance, because there was a power vacuum. People were displaced 
and land institutions became non-operational since people were not in position to demand 
for their services. War devastates the authority of cultural leaders that would have checked 
land disputes. Before the war the cultural institutions had a lot of authority over land but now 
it has reduced56. All the land disputes were solved by traditional leaders but now some people 
bypass traditional institutions and go to judicial courts. Clan leaders were wealthy and 
commanded a lot of respect and authority and did not need to be corrupted.57 However, 
during the war the customary chiefs of Acholi lived in the same IDP camps with their subjects, 
struggled for basic necessities of life like food, clothing, shelter like their subjects and this had 
a detrimental effect on the authority that the chiefs commended. The consequences of this, 
is that decisions that are made by chiefs about land governance are no longer respected. 
“After war we even need to be facilitated to go to locus to mediate conflicts. Yes we speak but 
there is nothing to make our ruling firm”58. Thus in such circumstances when the traditional 
chiefs who are the custodians of customary tenure no longer have the authority to determine 
land claims then space is created for land disputes to linger on without proper resolutions.   
Simultaneously, the government put in place new administrative structures to better 
administer and control Achol land when it took over power. Despite the fact that many of 
these institutions were not fully operational it led to the creation of parallel structures. As we 
observe this leads to confusion and strategic manoeuvring by people having conflicts. This 
leads to the exclusion of the poor or vulnerable groups in land matters because they may not 
have the money to shop from one institution to another in the pursuit of justice to land 
disputes. Both customary and statutory institutions have problems while dealing with land 
disputes. Customary leaders may settle the vast majority of disputes but their decisions 
cannot be legally enforced, so they are dependent on their moral authority, which is 
jeopardized by the war. The formal justice system is marred with corruption, time wastage 
and it is expensive but its rulings can be executed. Like one respondent noted that the 
“magistrate court favours people with money this makes me fear to take my land dispute to 
the courts of law” 59 . Local people indicated that they prefer reporting land disputes to 
customary leaders or authorities like chiefs and structures closer to them because they are 
cost effective, time saving and they employ friendly means of dealing with land disputes like 
mediation. “We should go back to the traditional means of solving land disputes, the Rwodi 
Kweri know where boundaries pass and the size of land people own”.60 The government 
should take away land management from the LCs and leave it to the chiefs because LCs are 
minting money from land cases, for a land case to be heard one has to part with over 
                                                          
56 Interview with customary leader, Appa 06-05-2013 
57 Interview with a cultural leader 14-11-2011 
58 Interview with a cultural leader 20-11-2012  
59 Interview with a 56 year old, Unyama 18-09-2012 
60 Interviews with an elder, Gulu 02-03-2012, 12-11-2012 
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80,000shs which is equivalent to 32 US Dollars61. The people who can afford to pay that money 
win the cases. This has contributed to land disputes not being solved but also people who do 
not have money accept to die on their land. The real poor owners of the land may lose their 
land rights because they do not have money to pay to LCs or make appeals in the higher courts.  
LC2 chairpersons disputed the bribery allegations and claimed that even if a poor person wins 
a land dispute, the party that loses always says that the person who won the case gave the LC 
committee a bribe. LC2 chairpersons interviewed continued to emphasize that the problem is 
that the first person who takes the case to the LC even if they are wrong or the offenders; they 
expect sympathy and the LC to rule in their favour. “And if the LC is not careful he might make 
mistakes and people will say that the LC was bribed”62. 
However, as we have seen, traditional leaders also have personal interests in mediating land 
disputes; some of them do not handle land disputes in the right manner because of poverty 
and power relations. The moral values of traditional institutions have been infected by 
corruption and harsh economic conditions.63 Some traditional leaders are not neutral while 
dealing with land disputes they tend to ally with the state and combine land matters with 
politics at the expense of the local people’s land rights. During elections chiefs become 
politicians, chiefs are not neutral, chiefs make decisions without consultation64. 
The case of Kigwe also shows that when confusion about land conflict management and the 
multiplicity of land institutions soar, the use of violence in land disputes is escalated. People 
resort to violence because they do not know where to report their land dispute or approached 
multiple land institutions that fail to resolve land disputes. For example, during an interview 
with the family of Akena, they expounded that “we use violence because it brings quicker 
solutions than following the law and other structures”65. When we cross checked with the 
records of one police post, in a month more than 10 cases had been received and recorded by 
police about malicious damage, assault, threatening violence which were all related to land 
disputes.66 From the Kigwe case we can infer that the use of violence in land conflict resolution 
is connected to loss of confidence in land institutions. When people lose trust in land 
administration institutions that handle land disputes, they use violence to solve their land 
dispute cases and protect their interests or rights to land. 
However on the other hand the multiplicity of land institutions might create opportunities for 
land conflict resolution because people have options to choose from. The result of people not 
knowing where to report their land disputes is forum shopping, where people go to as many 
institutions until their interests in land are served even if they are the perpetuators of the land 
dispute. For such individuals it is not about having the right claims to land but being able to 
validate those claims through the various land institutions. Based on field observations, 
competition among land governance institutions may contribute to land conflict resolution. 
As a result of competition some land institutions become strengthened and better equipped 
to manage land disputes. When people choose a particular institution or forum to take their 
land disputes, those that are not chosen improve their services to have more clients. Or those 
                                                          
61 Focus group discussion Pabbo 22-09-2012 
62 Interviews with LC 2 chairmen 19-09-2012 and 10-11-2012  
63 informal discussion in a judge 14-11-2011 
64 interview with cultural leader, 06-11-2012 
65 Interview with a family with a land dispute, 11-03-2013 
66 interview with police man and records at the police post, 18-11-2012 
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institutions might close down because they do not have clients and they leave the stronger 
better institutions to deal with land matters. In northern Uganda customary structures are 
becoming stronger, for example a traditional leader noted that the cases that are referred 
back to the chiefs from the magistrate courts bring back honour and authority to the chiefs.67 
In the process of confusion in land conflict resolution, customary institutions have become a 
preference for the people because they are regarded to be cheaper, accessible, employ more 
friendly means of land conflict resolution like mediation. Therefore if customary chiefs 
manage to organize themselves better and improve their reputation by judging in an impartial 
way in land disputes they might become an attractive option for the people. On the contrary 
statutory structures that are charged with land conflict resolution like LC and magistrate 
courts are regarded expensive, time wasting, easily corruptible and for the rich.   
Conclusion  
Decentralization in northern Uganda pushes aside or takes over roles of customary institutions 
by creating parallel structures. Customary institutions are made less relevant when 
decentralized land structures such as area land committee are introduced or created and the 
relationship between the state and customary tenure becomes more antagonistic. By 
introducing CCOs the state undermines customary authority over land. At the most, one can 
say that the “state effectively bypasses customary institutions” in order to govern customary 
land directly. The relationship between state and land is shaped by both statutory and 
customary institutions. However customary institutions can operate within the boundaries set 
by statutory institutions. The state significantly impacts on the way customary land 
institutions operate either by legitimizing their authority over land governance or by coercing 
them to forcefully evolve and become more like statutory institutions. The politics that is 
played by both customary and statutory land institutions during land governance contributes 
to the process of state formation by “gathering authority over persons and resources” (Lund 
and Boone 2013:2). 
Despite decentralization, land conflicts are still rampant in northern Uganda. Therefore 
decentralization is ineffective in ensuring better treatment of land disputes in post-conflict 
northern Uganda. The presence of many forums for dispute resolution leads to fierce 
competition among representatives of these institutions who become entangled in political 
struggles while trying to authorize land claims. This may lead to the weakening of those land 
institution because people lose trust in them. Example is the Kigwe land dispute which was 
taken to 6 forums/institutions but not resolved. Therefore it might not be about the number 
and character of land governance institutions but about their legitimacy and their ability to 
authorize people’s claims to land. Local people prefer a better division of tasks and 
responsibilities among the institutions that deal with land matters in order to make the 
institutions relevant. In post-conflict North Uganda a large number of land institutions came 
into play leading to indecision in the solution of land conflicts therefore harmonizing the 
activities and normative frameworks of these land institutions to resolve land disputes and 
protect land rights is critical. 
The availability of options or choices in land dispute resolution that is brought in by 
decentralization further complicates the process of resolving land disputes. Not only do 
people resort to land governance institutions to have their land disputes resolved, but also 
                                                          
67 Interview with cultural leader, 06-11-2012 
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these institutions use that opportunity to rebuild their authority in post-conflict setting for 
example in the case of Kigwe where the customary institution used the mediation to sell itself 
to local people. In many cases, the result is unresolved land disputes and intensification of 
conflicts as people leap from one institution to another because of the fierce competition 
between the statutory and customary land institutions over who has authority. However 
confusion in land conflict resolution is one of the avenues through which institutions can 
achieve their legitimacy and this process of resolving land disputes makes some institutions 
more powerful and relevant than others. When conflicts emerge, space is created for 
institutions which can then deal with such conflicts. The state of confusion in land resolution 
may only be a phase that leads to legitimizing land rights and strengthening land institutions.  
Legal pluralism is a reality and a situation which will not go away soon, therefore there is need 
to understand how both customary and statutory institutions can work together in order to 
improve tenure security and land dispute resolution. Local people in Northern Uganda prefer 
approaching customary institutions while seeking redress to land disputes however it is very 
critical to enhance the authority and legitimacy of customary institutions so that their 
resolutions on land conflicts can be legally enforced. Critical to mention is customary tenure 
should be left to evolve gradually since is not static rather than imposing the superiority of 
statutory systems on customary tenure in the bid to change it like the case of issuing CCOs. 
This is possible because natural evolution of customary tenure is affected by state and market 
policies and in certain cases by violent conflict. The state can create more space for customary 
institutions to locally determine their rules. Therefore there should not be a replacement of 
customary with statutory systems but an adaptation of the two systems (Migot-Adholla and 
Bruce, 1994) because their interactions can give rise to new legal shopping platforms. 
Integration of the two systems is the way to go because each system working alone cannot 
adequately respond to the rampant land conflicts so fostering an atmosphere of coordination 
between them is of critical importance. To reduce the confusion in land conflict resolution and 
to optimally benefit from the two land systems, clarifying responsibilities of customary 
institutions and statutory institutions is of fundamental essence. 
The main study area for this chapter is shown below; 
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Map 5: Showing the Study Area of Kigwe village, Lapul Sub County in Pader District 
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6. African Youths; The Forgotten Category in land 
governance. A Case study of Post-conflict Acholi Region, 
Northern Uganda. 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper demonstrates how war may significantly enhance the authority of male youths in 
land governance, at the expense of the elders and customary authority. Conventional analyses 
of rural youth in Africa describe their migration to cities in search of education and 
employment, and due to pressure on rural land, which leaves elders and customary 
institutions firmly in charge of land governance. This paper, in contrast, suggests that in post-
conflict environments an entirely different dynamic may take place, as the majority of youths 
remain in rural communities and become the new power holders over or managers of land. 
This argument builds on findings from ethnographic research conducted between 2011 and 
2013 in Acholi sub-region in Northern Uganda. The analysis highlights different war-related 
processes through which youth claim and establish authority in land governance. First, after 
war, youth fill up the vacuum in land governance left by the death of elders during the 
violence. Moreover, war favours youth in the ongoing struggle for authority between youth 
and elders, in particular when staying in IDP camps and participation in the war have eroded 
conventional legitimacy of the elders. Third, the youth are better disposed to seize 
opportunities created by war, notably the commoditization of land. An important dynamic is 
also that war legitimizes violence as a way of accessing land, a strategy which is mainly 
employed by youth. The paper concludes by asserting that this new (claims to) authority of 
youth in land governance may have irreversible effects on customary tenure, as ownership of 
rural land is becoming increasingly individualized and conflicts become more difficult to solve. 
Key words: Youth, Land governance, War, Post-conflict, Authority  
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Introduction  
Literature on rural youth in Africa sketches a picture of youths migrating to cities or urban 
areas in search of better opportunities to make a living like education, employment, health 
services, leisure, and due to pressure on rural land (Hope, 1998; Ruble et al. 2003; Tulchin et 
al. 2003; Abbink, 2005; Bannon and Ricardo, 2006; Sommers, 2006). This effectively leaves the 
elders who stay behind firmly in charge of rural land ownership and land governance. Some 
literature highlights that youth migrate to towns precisely because of power struggles about 
land occupation and land governance between the youth and elders (Richards, 2006). In this 
paper, we suggest that in post-conflict environments an entirely different dynamic may take 
place, as a result of which land tenure dramatically changes, and youth become the new 
power holders or managers of land. We build our argument on the basis of case-material from 
the Acholi sub-region in Northern Uganda To start with, in post-conflict Northern Uganda the 
push and pull factors for urban migration identified in existing literature might be less 
prominent. For instance, a UNICEF report on war-affected youth in northern Uganda mentions 
that one third of the youth interviewed reported that a parent had died violently (Annan et al. 
2006). Consequently, youth may be able to take over properties of their parents. The report 
also notices that the number of youth that can be absorbed in the urban employment sector 
is limited, while youth lack relatives in urban centres to receive them there. We are interested 
here in how the youth make new claims to land governing authority and actually take over 
authority over land, and how this is facilitated by particular circumstances related to the 
violent conflict. The brunt of our argument is not that land governance transforms because 
youth in Northern Uganda tend to stay in the rural areas, but because of their changing 
position because of the LRA war.  
My argument deviates from existing literature on rural youth in important ways. First, our 
paper underscores the critical agency that rural youth have in post-conflict northern Uganda. 
In that, it contrasts publications that depict youth as vulnerable, marginalized, victims of war, 
child soldiers, at risk of HIV/AIDS, unemployed and uneducated (See Abbink 2005; Kagwanja, 
2005; Sommers, 2006; Blattman and Annan, 2008; Van Dijk et al. 2011; Chinsinga and 
Chasukwa, 2012). Berckmoes and White (2014), for instance, highlight how youth in post-
conflict Burundi find it difficult to rebuild their lives, due to lack of alternative sources of 
livelihoods and scarcity of land. Most research on youth in northern Uganda has focused on 
child soldiers and formerly abducted youth (see Annan et al. 2006) and their problems in 
reintegrating in the community and gaining access to land, depicting them as the ‘lost 
generation’ (See Blattman and Annan, 2008). Research on agricultural reform underscores 
how youth are often marginalized in the process (See Chinsinga and Chasukwa, 2012). The so-
called ‘youth bulge’ theory equally depicts the young generation as having barely any future, 
and due to their numbers pose a risk to stability (see Cincotta et. al, 2003; Barker and Ricardo, 
2006). This understanding of youth as victims of war and a potential structural security threat 
explains policy makers’ and funding agencies’ concern with reintegration and rehabilitation of 
youth. This paper, instead, points out the need to understand the youth not only as a 
vulnerable category, but as a cohort of people with significant potential. Our case material 
illustrates the many ways in which youth in Northern Uganda have devised ways to cope with 
the circumstances caused by war, challenging the notion of the youth as vulnerable, but 
instead as important and powerful stakeholders in land governance, as a result of which social 
relations radically alter.  
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Second, several existing studies indeed take the agency of youth seriously, highlighting their 
involvement in struggles for political power, seeing the youth as a vanguard for political 
change (see Kagwanja, 2005; Burgess, 2005). In Uganda, struggles between the youth and 
elder generations are witnessed in social, political and economic spheres. In the political 
sphere, younger politicians clash with the old guards, demanding for more political space for 
their new ideas (Daily Monitor, 2015, The Observer, 2015). For instance, the youth demand 
the retirement age for those employed by government to be brought down from 60 to 50 
years, in order to create chances for young people to enter the civil service sector, which is 
currently dominated by older officials. My paper focuses on local politics and power struggles 
between generations within communities and within families. Land and its governance may 
be an important stake in such conflicts, constituting a critical factor of production in rural 
livelihoods; but may also serve as an important theme around which youngsters may try to 
assert their authority vis-à-vis the elder generation. 
This paper is based on ethnographic research that was conducted for a period of 2 years from 
2011 to 2013 in Northern Uganda. The research studied decentralized land governance in a 
post-conflict context and it was part of the Grounding Land Governance Program68. The study 
employed qualitative methods of data collection. Fieldwork was conducted from all the 7 
districts (Gulu, Amuru, Pader, Kitgum, Nwoya, Lamwo and Agago) of the Acholi sub-region, 
northern Uganda. This paper is based on 37 interviews, 12 focus group discussion, 2 land 
dispute mediations, 2 community dialogues, 1 workshop, life histories of youths and field 
observations by the researcher who lived with the community. Categories of people 
interviewed included; youths both male and female, elders (adult men and women), 
traditional leaders (chiefs), clergy, politicians, members of area land committee, local council 
members, civil servants at districts, representatives from NGOs and local people. Secondary 
data is based on review of documents such as the Uganda Youth Policy, books, publications 
from Acholi Cultural Institution (Ker Kwaro) and other related literature. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our notion of the concepts of authority, 
violence, vulnerability, access and masculinity, and how these impinge on the role of youth in 
land governance in post-conflict settings. Section 3 presents case material from the Acholi 
region, Northern Uganda, illustrating the different practices through which land governing 
authority of youth transforms. The discussion and conclusion highlight the implications of 
these developments for customary tenure, underscoring how rural land is individualized, 
customary institutions are side-tracked, and intra-family conflicts become more frequent and 
difficult to solve. 
How intergenerational conflicts, power and violence shape the role of youth 
in land governance 
There is limited literature that explores the connection between violent conflict and the 
position of youth, with Chauveau and Richards (2008) as a notable exception. Their analysis 
points out how patriarchal tenure relations – in which youngsters highly depend on the elders 
for accessing land, being able to marry, and acquiring esteem and manhood – may constitute 
an important source of grievance for young men. While in peaceful settings, elders may be 
able to suppress demands for change by the youth, a context of civil war can provide an 
                                                          
68 Grounding Land Governance Program was funded by WOTRO Science for Global Development grant number 
W 01.65.332.00. 
 90 
 
opportunity to escape from patriarchal control by joining a rebel group, or to violently settle 
the scores and acquire local land and power. Likewise, after war, poverty levels may soar so 
much that elders become incapable of contributing to their son’s marriages, which further 
weakens elders’ legitimate hold on power (Chauveau and Richards, 2008). Their analysis aptly 
shows how war disrupts existing social relations between the generations, and youth roles 
(see on this also Richards 2006), and reshuffles prevailing ways of accessing and owning land.  
To understand how this works, the notion of ‘access’ comes in particularly useful. Access is 
defined as “the ability to derive benefits from things” (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 153). Access to 
land is achieved and conditioned by a variety of social mechanisms, including formal property 
rights, but also the extent to which claims to land have local legitimacy; local power relations 
and authority; illegal access; and access to technology, markets, and labour (Ribot & Peluso 
2003: 156). People may derive benefits from land even without holding land titles, for instance 
through occupation or market exchange. Likewise, people may hold formal property rights, 
yet fail to derive benefits from the land, for instance, if this requires particular knowledge, 
additional labour capacity, or wealth to invest in its exploitation. All forms of access are 
embedded in power relations. Though the elder generation may formally have the right to 
benefit from land according to customary system, the youth may instead be able to derive 
benefits from land by their better knowledge of and connections to the market. Similarly, after 
war, youth may challenge the customary authority of elders in land governance and so 
transform the ways in which land has been accessed so far, because they fought themselves 
up in the power hierarchy by getting access to other sources of income and maybe even 
weaponry. The youth gaining authority over land in post-conflict settings may be seen as an 
outcome of the “versatility and survival skills of the youngsters” (Abbink, 2005:2) they gained 
during the conflict. Other than that it is also important to note that communities always have 
more youths compared to elders (Richards, 2006) and this can be used as an advantage by 
youth to exert leverage in land governance in post-conflict settings. Therefore, power shift in 
land governance as a result of war may enable the youth to benefit from land, yet constrain 
the elders from benefiting from their right to land.  
In this paper, an important avenue for gaining access to land by the youth is through violence. 
There are different reasons for this predisposition towards the use of violence. Violence may 
become a normal way to assert one’s claims in post-conflict environments, with some authors 
even talking of the coming about of a ‘culture’ of violence (Ryter, 2001; Peluso 2007). Critical 
to emphasize is that violent acts tend to increase when daily life is disrupted, like through 
displacements or war (Gómez and García, 2006: 97). Youth in post-conflict communities may 
have become accustomed to the use of violence because they were abducted, heard gun 
shots, witnessed killings, or were beaten while living in the IDP camps. Some researchers, 
policy makers and NGOs point out that youth in Africa are relatively violent anyway (Abbink, 
2005; Blattman and Annan, 2008; etc). For instance, Abbink (2005) notes that African youth 
often grow up in communities that are not well integrated may be because of violence and 
forces of global capitalism. The youth’s resort to violence in post-conflict settings may be 
rather a manifestation of this general lack of communal integration. Other authors have 
pointed out that the youth’s resort to violence plays an important role in building masculinity. 
As mentioned before, the struggle for authority over land governance between the youths 
and elders may be deeply rooted in unequal, sometimes exploitative relations of patriarchy. 
This struggle is ongoing, and not just the result of conflict-related poverty and unemployment: 
to enter into adulthood, male youth need to access land so that they can build a house, marry, 
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start a family and so prove their masculinity and adulthood. This inevitably pitches them 
against their elders, who tend to refrain from relinquishing power over the land. In more 
stable countries like Rwanda, youth may opt to migrate to urban centres so that they can 
escape the pressure of obtaining adulthood (Sommers, 2012). In post-conflict settings, where 
conditions such as poverty delay or obstruct male youth to attain adulthood but no alternative 
livelihoods are available, young men may resort to violence to express their manhood (See 
Barker, 2006). The case-study material suggests that violence is indeed a very important 
strategy for male youth in Northern Uganda to access land and assure their survival, as there 
are few other possibilities to make a livelihood, and has significant consequences for land 
governance practices.  
Power struggles between generations are not a new phenomenon, and academic literature 
points out how these have been going on since time immemorial (see, for instance, Burgess 
2005 on youth revolutions in Zanzibar; and Last 2005, on youth politics in northern Nigeria). 
However in this paper, we emphasise the particularities of how such power-struggles evolve 
in conflict-affected settings. The case material demonstrates that war significantly accelerates 
societal and political change, contributing to abrupt shifts in power as well as social relations 
(cf. Richards 2006), effectively enhancing the roles of male youth in land governance, at the 
expense of elders and customary land governing authorities.  
In Northern Uganda, different processes change the position and claims to authority of the 
youth.69 In many instances, youth become in charge of holding and governing land simply by 
replacing members of the elder generation that have died during the violence. In many 
families, youth no longer patiently wait to inherit authority over land from the elders, but 
pressure their fathers to relinquish authority over land while they are still alive, legitimizing 
themselves with new rationales for land inheritance for example use of force. 
Commoditization of land, which saw an upsurge during the war, enhances the interests of the 
youth to control and govern land. Moreover, war favours youth in the ongoing struggle for 
authority between youth and elders, in particular when staying in IDP camps and participation 
in the war have disrupted the customary system or have eroded the conventional legitimacy 
of the elders. Further, the youth profit from post-war policies of decentralization of land 
governance. Finally, an important dynamics is that national and regional politicians manage 
to mobilize the youth around land conflicts, turning them into very visible players in 
transformations of land governance. It needs to be seen to what extent this co-optation of 
youth in large-scale contestations over land amounts to a real increase in the role of youth in 
land governance.  
The paper is careful, though, to assume that all youth benefit from these trends. Clearly, the 
case material brings out that some youth are more capable than others to actually strengthen 
their authority in land governance. Youth is a diverse category, and there are important 
differences between urban and rural youth, educated and illiterate youth, orphans and youth 
with parents, disabled, youth with HIV and other illnesses, employed and unemployed youth, 
and between those who that were displaced due to violence from the LRA insurgence, those 
that participated in it, and those that lived through the war in relatively stable environments. 
                                                          
69The policy definition of youth in Uganda encompasses all young people both females and males aged 12 to 30 
years (GoU, 2001). According to the National Youth Policy (2004) the youth constitute between 65-75% of 
Uganda’s total population and majority of the youth live in rural areas. Important to mention is that 63% of 
inmates in Ugandan prisons are youth, this is alarming and indicates that the youth are not productive. 
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The examples in the case studies notably underscore the differences between young men and 
women in how they have expanded their landed properties and gained authority in land 
governance.  
The Role of Youth in Land Governance – the case of Acholi Region, Northern 
Uganda 
Northern Uganda experienced one of Africa’s most ferocious civil wars which resulted into the 
displacement of over 2,000,000 people. The 1986–2006 war between the LRA and the 
National Resistance Movement in Northern Uganda destabilized the entire northern region, 
displacing 90 percent of the population. Many of them moved into displacement sites, which 
strongly affected social relations and how people relate to land. When the war ended and 
people returned to their home communities, numerous competing claims on land emerged. 
Initially, land disputes were mostly between communities and clans. However, at the time of 
fieldwork, after 6 years of relative peace, the majority of land disputes are now witnessed 
within families: between sons and fathers, between brothers, uncles and nephews. This is 
connected to the shift in authority over land governance where the youth challenge the 
customary authority of elders.  
In Acholi the term youth is used to mean young men and women and not specifically young 
people aged between 14 and 35 years as conventionally portrayed. Males and females as 
young as 12 years and as old as 45 years can still be regarded as youths in the Acholi setting 
for as long as they have not achieved some traits and attained assets that society expects adult 
men to possess such as marriage, children and wealth. For example boys aged 12 years and 
above are not expected to share a hut (housing) with their parents, they are supposed to build 
and sleep in their own huts. These are some of the expectations of the youth from elders yet 
also such social expectations make the youth to yearn for adulthood. . Masculinity is 
represented by assertiveness and dominance which traits are always possessed by elders. The 
patriarchy system instils such traits in male youths as a way of initiating the youth into 
adulthood. Marriage is one of the ways through which youth are initiated into young adults. 
The actions of the youth with regard to land governance may be just a means of asserting their 
masculinity in society so that they can be considered adults.  
To ascertain how youth’s access to land as well as their involvement in land governance 
changed, we look at three levels: transformations of land holding and authority over land 
within the family; land governance practices at community level, and the involvement of youth 
in political contestation about land. 
Changes in land governance relations within the family 
“After the war in 2006, I returned to my home and stayed with my sons, but I had to return to 
the camp on the 1st of April, 2012 because of the land dispute with my sons. My sons from my 
first wife do not want to share land with the children from my second wife. That land is my 
personal land which I got from my father who died in 1959. My sons have beaten me two 
times and they were taken to the police, but I forgave them and we withdrew the case from 
police. The police officer told them that this should be the last time they were behaving like 
that” (Interview with a 70 year old man, Pabbo 20-09-2012) 
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Although the case was withdrawn from police the sons continued to use the land while their 
father continued to stay in a former IDP camp. The above quote provides a clear example of 
the ways in which youth have gained more authority over land within their families in post-
conflict northern Uganda. The way in which the sons acquired the land of their father strongly 
contrasts earlier practices.  
People in the communities describe a past in which strong kinship relations played an 
important role, and sons lived with or stayed near their fathers. Sons or youth in Acholi did 
not have a voice in land matters for as long as the fathers or the generation of their fathers 
were still alive, but nonetheless were granted user rights on some of the land for farming and 
grazing while growing up. “The elders had a lot of authority in land matters and the youth 
patiently waited for their turn to become elders and assume powers over land”.70 When boys 
reached the marriage age then they were given portions of land to start a family and some 
land was left for the girls in case their marriages did not work out. A father would administer 
land until his old age and the power to govern land would only be transferred to the younger 
generation (son) upon the death of the father or elders. The fathers expect their sons to look 
after them in old age. As one youth said: “when I was born I found when my parents were 
using the land to feed me, now that my parents are old the responsibility is upon me to use 
the land and feed my old parents”.71  
These conventional relations certainly included an element of competition over the land, 
between sons and fathers, but also among the sons. A struggle for power to govern land comes 
in when the youth do not wait for this ‘natural’ transfer of authority to occur. For example two 
sons forced their father to go back and live in a former IDP camp. The sons claimed that their 
father was mentally unstable but they actually wanted to manage the land without their 
father.72 Some youth for their own interests determine when their parents get old and when 
they should assume authority to control land for example the 2 sons who forced their old 
father back to the former IDP camp. Some youth have now taken up the positions of their 
parents and the youth are the ones managing land. Because they are energetic they have 
taken over the management of land from the other family members. The youth do not agree 
with what the elders tell them in relation to accessing, utilizing and owning land for not to sell 
land73. Another example to show that youth had become the new custodians of land was 
during a land dispute mediation between two youths that was organized by sub-county 
officials. One elder told the mediation team that; “the grandparents of these children did not 
have boundaries on this land but it is the youth who have started demarcating the land. These 
youth now say that this is mine and individualization is setting in.”74 It was agreed during the 
mediation that the land would be divided among the youth in the next visit. 
After the 20 years war in northern Uganda, the elders are now under pressure from the youth 
to relinquish authority over land like in the case of sons chasing their father from land75. 
Paradoxically the elders are vulnerable and powerless, elders are waiting for their death and 
thus they are just observers in land governance. On the contrary the youth have gained 
                                                          
70Interview with civil servant, Gulu 05-02-2013  
71 Interview with a youth leader, Apaa, Amuru 28-05-2012  
72 Interview with one of the son who claimed the father was mentally unstable, Pabbo, 10-11-2012 
73 Focus Group Discussion with members of  area land committee, Amuru 21-03-2012 
74 Land mediation in Kal Parish, Pabbo sub-county, Amuru district 21-09-2012. 
75 See excerpt from Interview with 70 year old father, Pabbo 20-09-2012 
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authority to govern land as a result of the war disrupting the customary setting under which 
the elders possessed land governing authority. Some youth feel that they are victims of war 
who were trapped in and affected by the war that is older than them. The youth believe that 
if the elders had made right choices then the war would not have occurred so they blame the 
mess of the 23 years on their parents76. In the discussions below I will present the processes 
that explain why youth have gained more important roles in land governance within families 
in post-conflict northern Uganda. 
First is the death of elders, the youth fill up the vacuum in land governance. Death of elders 
affects most the customary tenure system where land rights are not documented but are 
orally passed on from elders to the youth or younger generations. After war the demand for 
land access is always high because of the increase in the youth population due to the high 
birth rates in the camps. As the youths struggle to access land without the elders to manage 
land, land disputes are bound to happen in post-conflict settings. Some elders lamented that 
people were idle in the camps, and most of the time was spent reproducing, on coming back 
home, the population had swollen with young ones but the elderly had died. “We lost many 
elders who could be instrumental in showing demarcations” 77 . War reorganizes the 
population structure of a community. War leads to death of elders and a shrink in their 
numbers while the youth population surges because of high birth rates in camps linked to 
redundancy. Under customary tenure, the authority to govern land is embedded in elders 
therefore their abrupt demise due to war contributes to an increase in intra family land 
disputes especially disputes over land boundaries.   
Secondly, the youth utilized opportunities created by the war especially to turn land into a 
commodity. Initially the clan owned land and everybody had access to it but after war 
communal ownership is steadily changing to individual ownership. The desire to acquire and 
accumulate more land has risen because land has become a commodity, it can be sold and it 
can exchange hands. Commoditization of land has contributed to the sudden interest by the 
youth to control and govern land because they want to benefit from land sales. The new 
perception that land is wealth which is a result of the war, and the high poverty levels among 
the youth have contributed to the youth selling land. Due to the need for money by the youth 
to get themselves out of poverty, youth opt to sell part of the land without consulting their 
fathers or elders78. Such actions disregard the authority of elders in land governance. The 
reasons for selling off land by the youth include; getting start-up capital so that they can invest 
in small scale businesses, pay dowry for their wives, pay school fees for their children and buy 
motor cycles commonly known as boda-boda to transport passengers and earn a living out of 
it79. The youth have a belief that the only wealth they have is land and they should use this 
land to improve their lives. On the contrary the elders argue that the youth want to get powers 
to control land so that they sell it off and indulge in risky life styles like alcoholism because the 
youth are no longer interested in agriculture. The elders further say that this is foolishness of 
the youth because they will sell all the land including where they will be buried. Therefore the 
                                                          
76 Interview with land officer 31-01-2013 
77 Interview with an elder, Amuru 17-11-2012 
78 FGD with the youth of Unyama 19-09-2012 
79 FGD with the youth of Unyama 19-09-2012 
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elders do not allow selling land yet the youth want to sell, and this has contributed to land 
disputes within families80. 
Finally an important trend is also that due to commoditization of land, some youth want to 
also benefit from historical land gifts that were given by their forefathers to institutions and 
individuals. Before the LRA war land was not sold but it was given as gifts. However the young 
generation is demanding back such land gifts claiming that their ancestors did not know the 
value of land or the gifts were extravagant. These can be referred to as retracted gifts. The 
retracted gifts are affecting most of the health centres, schools and churches in Amuru district 
because elders gave out land for development purposes 81 . Such demands by the youth 
become complicated because most of the institutions that received land gifts never surveyed 
the land and it becomes difficult to determine boundaries of such lands. But also in most cases 
the elders who gave out those land gifts passed on and it is the youth that have assumed the 
responsibility of governing land. Interesting to point out is that some youths know that such 
developments cannot be demolished so they demand compensation from government. Some 
youth who were born in the camps claim that they were not consulted when their forefathers 
gave land gifts even though some land gifts date from the 1940s before the youths were 
born82. Therefore it all goes back to land gaining value after the war that the youth feel they 
should benefit from land gifts that were given before they were born. This reflects a change 
in the management of land because before the war in the Acholi tradition young people never 
had a say in land gifts. These trends (disruption of the customary system, death of elders and 
youth utilizing opportunities created by war) all contribute to change of land governance 
within the family.  
Changes in land governance at the community level 
After the war, the youth increasingly present themselves as a stakeholder in their own right 
in land governance, positioning themselves as apart from the elders and local authorities, and 
promoting their own ideas about how land should be governed. 
“I want to talk on behalf of the youth of Apaa. I was born from Apaa but brought up from the 
camp. After the war, our elders led us back home. When we got to our land, the effects of the 
war started to manifest themselves. To us the youth if land conflict could be solved through 
boxing, it would not have lasted for this long. For those of us who grew up in the camps saw a 
lot of bad things and never studied. Some of us served in the bush as child soldiers. So when 
we look at what is happening in Apaa, we feel like the government wants to clear the Acholi 
as a tribe. We did not go to school, we know little and we believe we can only survive through 
digging the land to send our children to school. Once we are denied to access our gardens, 
then we are ready to be killed in Apaa because it is impossible to go and live with other people 
outside your home. We have not rejected development, but we request that our opinion must 
be sought. We will not leave the land even when we do not have weapons to fight the 
government”83.  
                                                          
80 Purong community dialogue, interviews with clergy 22-06-2012,  elder representing women at KKA 23-05-
2012, clan leader in Unyama 12-03-2013 
81 Interview with cultural leader, Gulu,  representative from a local NGO, Gulu, Informal discussion with a 
magistrate 07-03-2012 
82Interviews with land officer, civil servants Amuru 22-03-2012 and 23-03-2012 
83Interview with a 28 year old youth, Pabbo 27-09-2012 
 96 
 
This quote is from a youth in his late twenties, he tries to assert that the opinions of youth in 
decision making on land should be considered by other actors in land governance. He talked 
about a dispute between the community of Apaa and a government agency that culminated 
into violent eviction of people and where 2 youths were killed by police and 25 youths were 
imprisoned. 
The youth have become vanguards in land governance at the community level in post-conflict 
northern Uganda. The youth are more in numbers compared to the elders. The youth have 
used their numbers to their advantage, to organize themselves and refute decisions on land 
that are made both by the government and elders that do not work in the interest of the 
youth. They have become actors in social change because they have motives to benefit from 
authority or control of land. A big population of or many youth in a family can strategically be 
used as an asset by the youth to access land that does not belong to them. There are clans 
that have many children and others have few children, the clans with many children forcefully 
grab the land of the clans with few children. The clans and families that have many children 
always prefer to resolve land conflict in the local way (through fighting)84. For example in one 
of land conflicts that I followed during fieldwork, two families peacefully co-existed and shared 
land before the war, but the relations changed after war. The reason for change is that the 
population of one family had grown bigger and it wanted the other family with fewer boys to 
look for land elsewhere. The family with more boys used the advantage of numbers to 
coercively displace the family with fewer boys85. Before the war nephews and nieces stayed 
with relatives peacefully but after the war the uncles tell the nephews to search for their own 
homes and land because numbers in families increased. Therefore increase in the youth 
population after war significantly offers the youth an opportunity of using their numbers 
(numeric strength) to determine what happens to land.  
Local people allege that during the war the Acholi community was opened up and exposed to 
a series of new behaviours and circumstances for example many evangelists from America 
and other places went to the camps preaching the word of God this exposed the youth to 
western culture86. Then youth base on such a background to challenge and drop the Acholi 
traditions that are considered evil yet they were used to peacefully organize or structure 
society for example consulting rain makers and visiting shrines. Both the youth and elders 
learnt new practices which are considered vices in the Acholi culture. These included; 
alcoholism, addiction to drugs, paid sex, gambling, opting for violence instead of dialogue 
during disputes. In the camps elders struggled and lined up for food from world food program 
with everybody this reduced their respect87. But also poverty that is attributed to the war has 
contributed to children/youths losing respect for their parents. For example parents used to 
marry wives for their sons but now sons can work and can marry their own wives and they do 
not see why they should respect their parents. Before the war traditional leaders such as chiefs 
commanded authority in land governance especially during conflict resolution and they even 
fined people who did not respect them but after the war the youth ignore their resolutions. 
                                                          
84 The local way is called “Acholi Acholi” meaning using violence to settle disputes. Based on community dialogue 
in Purongo, Nwoya district. 
85 Land mediation and interviews with two families conflicting over land in Laguti sub-county, Pader district.  
86 Interview with member of Area Land Committee, Amuru 07-03-2013  
87 Interview with elder, Agago 17-03-2012 
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After war authority of elders to govern land is challenged by the youth. One elder expounded 
that “Our land is part of our culture, we are now suffering because the war destroyed our 
culture” 88 . People in Acholi asserted that the post-conflict generation is in conflict with 
culture, there is a ‘cold war’ between the youth and elders. The dynamics of participating in 
the war and staying in IDP camps contributed to deterioration of moral values and the 
breakdown of the Acholi social fabric. The insurgency created a new situation in Acholi land 
where the children born in the IDP camps are now over 20 years, they are now fathers and 
mothers but they know nothing about the Acholi culture.89 The Acholi community claims that, 
the custom of the Acholi were diluted when people stayed in the camps, customs and norms 
from other tribes were imported into the Acholi culture. Most of the good Acholi cultural 
norms were lost for example before the war vulnerable people were protected nephews, 
nieces and aunts, orphans, widows and widowers could not be chased from the land. The 
Wangoo 90  (bonfire) is a cultural norm that was used by elders to educate and share 
experiences with the youth but it was lost during the camp life.  
It is also important to point out that elders have equally contributed to the youth capturing 
power to govern land from the elders. Majority of the youth interviewed said that elders 
advised them that if the youth do not defend their land and other people take it then it will 
be the youth to suffer and lose out. In addition the youth suggested that the elders of these 
days (after the war) also behave like the youth, they too like discos and drinking alcohol and 
to sustain this new life style the elders sell land to get money. Therefore conflict of authority 
to govern land then comes in when the youth refuse to accept or endorse such sales91. Under 
such circumstances the elders leave the youth with no option but to manage the land on 
behalf of the elders.   
There is also the use of violence as a new form of access to land by the youth; this may be 
attributed to getting accustomed to violence during the war, ignorance about customary way 
of governing land but also to the fact that the youth are energetic. Some elders make decisions 
about land in favour of the youth because they are scared of facing the wrath of violent youths 
if the elders do not succumb to their land demands. For example in response to the son’s 
violence, a father ‘cuts’ off a piece of their land and gives it to his son when a son wants to sell 
it and get money to buy a boda-boda. The use of violence works in the benefit of the youth 
because they get access to land and govern it the way they please. This was demonstrated 
through a land conflict between a 58 year old man (Otim) and 33 year old youth (Odong). The 
youthful Odong has used force and violence to stay on the land that belongs to Otim. The 
youth has been summoned over 10 times by different land governing institution to resolve 
the conflict but the youth refused to honour the summons of any of the land institution. 
However Odong continues to utilize and benefit from the land while the true owner (Otim) of 
the land cannot access the disputed land. 
The inability to find jobs outside agriculture influences the role of youth in land governance. 
Majority of the youths cannot be absorbed in the formal economy (unemployed youth); this 
leaves them with only land as a source of livelihood. They were denied education because 
                                                          
88 Interview with a retired politician, Gulu 17-03-2012 
89 Interview with an elderly clergy, Gulu 22-06-2012 
90 Wangoo means a bonfire where elders and the youth sit and discuss social, political and economic issues. The 
forum was used by elders to instill cultural norms and good values into the youth. 
91 FGD with the youth of Unyama,19-09-2012 
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they were confined in IDP camps. Most of them are not competitive in the labour market 
therefore they cannot get formal employment because they do not have the required skills. 
The youth are so energetic and this energy has to be sunk into productive work but since they 
cannot get jobs elsewhere, the energy is diverted to land but in most cases in a negative way. 
“If you want a job elsewhere you should have gone to school, if you did not go to school you 
then work on the land”92. For example the youth are not employed and when they want to 
marry then land has to be sold to pay for dowry but if the father refuses the son to sell the 
land violence erupts93.  
On the other hand education elevates the status of the educated youth in land governance 
and in the society at large. The educated and wealthy youths assume the responsibility of land 
governance. When investors are interested in land for large scale agricultural investments 
elders consult the educated youth whether the land should be given to investors or not. On 
the other hand elders also pointed out that the educated youth disrespect and challenge the 
authority of elders in land governance. The educated youth are contributing to 
individualization of land that was once communally owned under the customary setting. This 
is because education makes people to understand the profitability of land and the educated 
youth are now claiming big chunks of land in former communal hunting grounds called Aker.94 
Education equally determines how the youth handle land matters especially land conflicts. 
Where the family is educated a widow might not be chased from land after the demise of her 
husband and where a family is not educated they might not hesitate to chase away a widow95.  
Another important issue is that decentralization in a way contributes to increasing the role of 
youth in land governance in the community. The youth are elected into positions in 
decentralized structures which give them authority to govern land. This reshuffles power 
relations between the youth and elders in customary settings because authority to govern 
land was entrusted to elders. In Uganda the central government devolved some powers to 
local government structures to govern land. These include the district land board, the area 
land committee, the sub-county court committee and the local council structures such as local 
council 1, 2, 3 and 5. The members of these local government structures play a role in land 
dispute resolution especially by being part of land mediation teams. It is imperative to point 
out that it is the youth who are being appointed or elected to take up positions in the 
decentralized land governance structures and these youths make decisions on the way land is 
accessed, owned and how land disputes are resolved. For example in Pabbo sub-county in 
Amuru district the sub-county court committee, the area land committee and Local Council 3 
were all headed by young men and they were actively involved in land dispute mediations96. 
The elders believed that the youth who head decentralized structures do not have the 
knowledge about the customary system of land governance, they are not cooperative thus 
they fight amongst themselves and they contribute to more land disputes97. The elders further 
claimed that the youth use their positions in decentralized land structures to allocate land 
fraudulently and to resolve land disputes unfairly because they are easily corrupted. 
                                                          
92 FGD with women from Apaa center, 27-05-2012 
93 Interview with traditional leader, Gulu 12-11-2012 
94 Interview with elder, Gulu 22-06-2012 
95 Interview with youth, Amuru 07-03-2013 
96 Field observations by the researcher 2011 to 2014  
97 Interview with female elder, Amuru 07-03-2013 and Interview with a youth in Pugwang, Pabbo 20-11-2012  
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The role of youth in political contestation about land 
The youth have also assumed important roles in land governance issues when it comes to 
contentious land matters at political level. At this level, the youth mainly seem to have gained 
leverage through the use of violence. In one of the prominent land dispute in Acholi region 
which is about allocation of 10,000 hectares of land to a sugar factory. The youth have put up 
strong resistance against the allocation of land to the sugar factory to the extent that they 
have managed to block the commencement of sugar cane growing in this disputed land for 8 
years. In a bid to recognize the importance of the youth in land governance the government 
decided to bring the youth on board and make them to appreciate large scale land 
investments. This was done through government taking a group of youth from the disputed 
land to a sugar factory in another part of the country (Eastern region) so that they appreciate 
the development done by that sugar factory and when the youth return home they would 
convince the other youths to support the sugar factory in their area (Acholi region). However 
this has not yielded much result as some youths said that they cannot be bought to give away 
their land.98   Due to the continued demonstration by the youth in Acholi region that they are 
the new managers of land, various actors in land governance especially land institutions have 
come to recognize the role of the youth in land governance.     
Furthermore, at the regional level, politicians in post-conflict situations have the ability to 
mobilize the youth and use the power of the youth to their advantage. This in turn influences 
the role of the youth in land governance. When politicians are dissatisfied with the way 
statutory land institution govern land or the way a particular land conflict is resolved they 
organize the youth through community meetings and over FM radios to show their grievances. 
But also the politicians use the youth to achieve their individual interests such as self-
realization, popularity and to gain votes for the next elections. The politicians have the power 
to manipulate the youth because the youth perceive the politicians as fighting for their plight. 
Therefore the politicians can organize the youth to use violence in retaliation of perceived 
violation or denial of land rights. In post-conflict Acholi region the youth do not know much 
about customary land governance because they were born in the camps therefore the 
politicians drive on this ignorance to influence the way the youth relate to land. The youth are 
more than the elders but the elders no longer have the power to mobilize the youth to take 
on their ideas in land matters therefore the youth are easily mobilized by the youthful 
politicians. In the land dispute between the community and government where 10,000 
hectares were allocated to a sugar factory for sugar cane growing a youthful popular politician 
has been so prominent in organizing the youth to resist this land allocation. He told the youth; 
“Our land should not be played with and if it is to be given out it should be done in the right 
way, many people have been arrested for no good reason. The youth of Lakang you should 
not be fearful like the people of Apaa. The persistence of the people of Apaa has made them 
to stay on their land. I urge you people not to fear even if the government has put a barracks 
on standby to execute government orders like evicting you from the land”99. Such statements 
from popular youthful politicians can unite the youths to refute some decisions made on land 
by land institutions.  
                                                          
98 FGD with the Youth from Lakang 21-06-2012  
99 Community meeting in Kololo, Amuru 04-05-2013 
 100 
 
In another land conflict, the Apaa eviction another youthful politician was able to organize the 
youth from Apaa to chase away government surveyors who had come to demarcate land. 
Before the surveyors came, some youths had been mobilized to use boda-bodas to do 
surveillance around the villages in Apaa. When the youth saw the government surveyors 
demarcating land without first informing the community, the youth rushed and informed the 
politicians. The politicians dashed to the scene, the youth then asked the politicians what they 
we supposed to do to the surveyors and the politicians responded with a question that; what 
do the Acholi do when they are angry or annoyed? The youth then beat up the surveyors, put 
them in a truck, collected the mark stones and sand and wanted to head to Apaa centre so 
that the surveyors could explain to the community of Apaa what they had come to do. By this 
time the police arrived and rescued the surveyors and dispersed the youth with tear gas and 
bullets100. Therefore the youth can be mobilized of by politicians to resist changes in the way 
land is governed.  
The youth in Acholi region believe that land institutions have failed to govern land properly. 
Not only have they used violence as a form of land governance but also as a response to land 
governing institutions that have failed to provide tenure security to the youth. Both customary 
and statutory institutions that govern land are considered corrupt and have contributed to 
the youth using violence to settle land disputes. As the youth vented out; the Local Council 
structure resolve land disputes according to money and not the truth and, the elders go to 
land management institutions first and bribe the officials who even arrest the youth and since 
the youths do not have the money they lose out and end up using anger101. The youth further 
justified the use of violence in the land dispute with Amuru Sugar Company by saying that “we 
have decided to deal with lands issue with very high tempers and self-help or violence; we 
have caned so many people who have come to our land whom we are suspicious of. We have 
thrown stones at people we regard as invaders. We have blocked the road on so many 
occasions and we are going to do more of these actions”102. These actions point to use of 
violence to settle land issues. The youth in Lakang, Amuru district (the site of the proposed 
sugar factory) vowed to continue to fight for their land on the ground even if the land dispute 
is in courts of law because they do not trust them103. To sum up, the youth use violence 
because they want land governance institution to respect their rights to land.  
On the other hand the youth claimed that the elders encourage them to use violence in land 
matters. During interviews some youth pointed out that they just follow orders from the 
elders. For example in case of a land conflict, fathers advise their sons to fight for the land 
indicating to them that it is the youth who suffer if they do not have access to land. Most 
youth get involved in land conflicts because they are ignorant and sometimes elders drag the 
youth into land conflicts that the youth do not know about. But also the youth end up acting 
with violence while relating with land because they were raised in Camps and are ignorant 
about the customary way of owning land104.  Some elders do not tell the truth to the youth 
especially about boundaries and instead the elders use the youth to guard their land. The 
elders extend their land boundaries verbally and the youth put it in action through using force 
or violence to protect the verbal boundaries communicated by elders. In addition some elders 
                                                          
100 Interview with a youth politician, Amuru 07-03-2013  
101Interview with 28 year old youth, Pabbo 21-09-2012 and FGD with youth of Pabbo 22-09-2012.  
102  FGD with youth from Lakang 21-06-2012 
103 Community meeting in Kololo, Amuru 04-05-2013 
104 FGD with the youth of Unyama 19-09-2012 
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take advantage of the outcomes of the war such as the death of elders to grab land that 
belongs to the youth whose parents died and the youth retaliate by using violence to get back 
their land. After war some youths went back home as heads of households and they had to 
protect the land but in most cases they did not know how big their land was. The elders take 
advantage of the situation and take the land away from the youth because their parents 
passed on.  
Discussion and conclusion 
This paper has presented the different ways in which in a post-conflict setting, authority 
around land is redefined, which may have significant implications for the roles that the youth 
play in land governance. After war, the authority of elders to govern land is challenged by the 
youth and in various instances, the youth claim new roles in land governance or effectively 
become the new managers of land within their local communities. The case studies have 
highlighted four important trends in this process.  
First, after war, youth take over roles in land governances that are no longer fulfilled by the 
elders, who have died during the violence. The inability to find jobs outside agriculture implies 
that many youth remain in the rural communities with only land as a source of livelihood.  
Moreover, war favours youth in the ongoing struggle for authority between youth and elders, 
in particular when staying in IDP camps and participation in the war have eroded conventional 
legitimacy of the elders. The youth are also better disposed to seize the opportunities created 
by war. Advancing commoditization of land contributes to increasing interest by the youth to 
control and govern land and to benefit from land sales. In addition, after conflict, the state 
plays an important role in restructuring land governing authority at the advantage of the 
youth. Post-conflict policies such as decentralization that are carried out by the state in 
practice tend to come down to a transfer of land governing authority to youth.  
An important dynamic is also that war has legitimized violence as a way of imposing authority 
over land, which is the most accessible strategy for acquiring authority over land in post-
conflict settings by the youth. In Northern Uganda, youth tended to be the specific target for 
rebels or fighting factions, for recruitment purposes. Those experiences may have made youth 
to conclude that violence is a legitimate, if not a very effective way to get what you want.  
However after war most of the youth go directly to their communities or homes without 
rehabilitation or counselling. This may explain why the youth opt to use violence to solve land 
disputes in Acholi region. Youth happen to be better disposed in the use of violence than 
others because they are energetic, accustomed to the use of violence, they perceive land as 
the only source of livelihood and the youth do not patiently wait for land governing structures 
to be re-established to take charge of land matters in post-conflict settings. But also violence 
as a response to land governing institutions that fail to provide tenure security to the youth. 
Consequently, politicians in post-conflict situations have the ability to mobilize the youth and 
influence the way the youth deal with land matters. Politicians use the youth to achieve their 
individual interests such as self-realization, popularity and to gain votes for the next elections.  
While the case study materials highlight the new claims and increasing role of the youth in 
land governance, at the same time they underscore that this is an uneven process, benefiting 
particular youth more than others. Despite the fact that in post-conflict settings the youth gain 
prominence in land governance, this is true for a category of youth who are powerful either 
through use of violence or attaining education. On the contrary, various categories of youth 
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fail to strengthen their influence on post-conflict land governance or Their rights to land are 
instead denied or violated. Notably widows, girls/female youths, and orphaned youth that 
were previously catered for under customary tenure, may become more vulnerable.  
The female youth can only access land through their fathers, husbands, and brothers. 
However when the war disorganizes the social fabric and these relations are severed, 
accessing and utilizing land by female youth becomes a problem. This is illustrated by the life 
history of a 16 year old female youth called Aketo. “During the LRA war my parents ran to Gulu 
town when I was in primary four. But later after the war my father died in 2008 and my mother 
died in 2009. My parents gave birth to two girls, I and my younger sister. After our parents’ 
death my aunt (my mother’s sister) brought us to our father’s land in Labala parish. But my 
step brother chased us away saying that girls do not own land and he did not cause the death 
of our parents. I and my sister we left the land now we live in the trading centre with my aunt 
and her 3 children but she does not have land herself”105. 
Irrespective of their gender, youth who lost their parents during the war are equally powerless 
in land governance. Some of them were born in the camps and they do not know the 
boundaries of their father’s lands so they cannot claim access to the land that they are not 
sure of. Most of the youth live with their uncles and whichever land their uncles show them, 
that is the land which the youth believe that belongs to them. Some youths are threatened to 
be killed by their uncles if they start claiming land or disputing what their uncles or elders 
showed them.106 The account of a youthful police officer illustrates this: “It feels so painful 
when your uncle takes land that belongs to you. Our uncle has no sons of his own and he is 
HIV-positive, and he sold off most of his land because he thought he was going to die. Then 
our uncle started selling off our land too. So I and my elder brother we reported the case to 
the local council 2. The local council 2 chairman said that we were very young and by the time 
our father died land had not been divided. We then took the case to local council 3 and the 
same ruling was made. We proceeded to take the land dispute to a Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) but we were not helped much. Finally we took the case to a cultural leader 
the chief of Alokolum who helped to stop our uncle from selling our land. And then my elder 
brother got letters of administration for the land. However our uncle still connives with our 
corrupt local council chairmen to sell the land they even back date the sale agreements of land 
for it to appear as if the sale was done before the ruling of the chief or letters of 
administration”107.  
This study highlighted how new claims to land governing authority are made, and illustrated 
how in some instances these claims were effective. The study did not investigate the impact 
of this shift on land governance practices. Yet, it is clear that this shift is at the disadvantage 
of the authority of elders and of more traditional ways of gaining authority around land in 
northern Uganda. It may well contribute to a further individualization of land that was once 
communally owned under the customary setting.  
Moreover, we can only speculate about the impacts of the ongoing struggles between the 
generations over land governance on authority more generally. The case study material makes 
clear, that Acholi society struggles with its own self-image after the two decades long 
                                                          
105 Interview with female youth 16 years old,  Pabbo, Amuru  21-09-2012 
106 FGD with the youth of Unyama 19-09-2012 
107 Interview with a youth police officer at a police station 18-11-2012 
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traumatic experience. People are left with a lot of frustration, trauma, and uncertainty about 
who they are. They are impoverished and their life cycles have been ruptured. On top of that, 
the new world comes in with new moralities, new economic opportunities, land investors, 
education for some but certainly not for all and a government that manifest itself much more 
through decentralization. This leads to a discussion in society which seems to be articulated 
along the axis youth-elders, not surprising because this is the moment to renegotiate authority 
and to question all kind of authority relations. That land is a pivotal point for this struggle is 
not surprising, as land provides the basic livelihood opportunities. 
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7. General Discussion and Conclusion  
Land governance reform in Northern Uganda; decentralizing or establishing 
the state? 
The starting point of this thesis was to find out how land reforms, notably decentralization, 
impacted local institutions and contributed to tenure security in conflict-affected northern 
Uganda. The study was sensitive because of the fact that land disputes might be connected to 
other contestations in society, and thus that land governance reform might have 
consequences beyond land disputes and tenure security. To answer this main research 
question, the research explored in particular:  
• How has the LRA/NRM conflict in northern Uganda affected land access and land 
governance practices? 
• How do decentralization policies of the government influence land governance? How 
do they impact the legitimacy and authority of local institutions and the resolution of 
land disputes?  
• How does this amount to a restructuring of power relations among land governing 
institutions and how does it impact tenure security in Acholi region?  
• How has the war impacted and transformed the role of youths and women in land 
governance in Acholi region? 
The preceding chapters have shown how the LRA war not only reshuffled land ownership but 
also distorted and transformed prevailing land governance practices. In particular, the analysis 
brings out how war transformed the roles of youths and women in land governance. 
Decentralization, meant to deal with the legacies of conflict and improve tenure security, 
turned out to have mixed results. An important dynamic observed in the fieldwork is that 
decentralization increased state power over local-level decision-making on land. Moreover, 
all case studies illustrate how local changes in land governing authority do not necessarily 
result in more tenure security, yet are often understood as efforts by outsiders to acquire local 
land.  
Over the course of the research, I came to realize that land governance reform in northern 
Uganda in fact amounts to a contested political programme of re-establishing the state. The 
state uses land governance and its reform as a means of building a strong state in post-conflict 
areas where previously state control and power were not felt. In this final chapter, I elaborate 
this argument, exploring how post-conflict land governance and its reform are fundamental 
in the process of state formation.  
To make this argument, the following sections bring together the main findings from the 
preceding chapters. I review the impacts of the LRA war on land governance in northern 
Uganda. I assess how current land reforms continue to be interpreted in terms of historical 
divides between the North and the South of Uganda, and of ongoing contestations between 
the Acholi community and the state. I highlight how decentralization does not result in a 
fundamental change in power relations between local citizens and the state, while it adds to 
local institutional competition which makes it even more difficult to resolve land disputes. 
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After this assessment of ongoing struggles around land governance, I then argue that these 
are actually part of a larger process of state formation in northern Uganda. The re-
establishment of the state that they result in is contested, though. The imposition of a new 
land governance regime and of the state entails the use of state violence and provokes violent 
responses by local people.  
The impact of LRA war on land governance in northern Uganda  
The 20 year civil war in northern Uganda significantly reshuffled access and occupation of land, 
culminating in disputes and tenure insecurity after the war. In both cases of the Apaa evictions 
(chapter 3) and the Amuru sugar project (chapter 4), the war displaced people from their land 
and when people returned after the war, their land had been occupied by others in their 
absence. The cases illustrate the important ‘window of opportunity’ provided by post-conflict 
settings (Chauvet et. al 2010). In the case of Apaa evictions, the land had been gazetted into 
a game reserve in the absence of its occupants, while in the case of Amuru sugar project, the 
district land board had allocated land to a sugar company before people could fully resettle 
on their land. Many of the evolving conflicts around land in post-conflict settings are directly 
connected to the past violent conflict. 
However, conflict not only distorted land access and distribution, but also transformed 
practices of land governance in the Acholi region. War affects the authority of both customary 
and statutory institutions. In the case of Kigwe (chapter 5) we see that war creates a vacuum 
in land governance, as both customary and statutory institutions lost authority and legitimacy. 
People could not effectively demand for their land services due to displacement, while these 
institutions themselves also became non-operational. After the war, these weak land 
institutions start competing and struggling to regain their authority. In the process, people 
lose trust in them, as they question the capability of such institutions to enforce rights to 
property or natural resources (cf. Daudelin, 2003; Unruh, 2003). The consequence is that 
people’s claims to land cannot be sanctioned by these weak institutions and this escalates 
conflicts around land. Moreover, when war displaced people from their land, their absence 
created space for introducing new arrangements and rules governing access to land. In the 
Amuru sugar project (chapter 4) land was changed from customary land accessed by local 
people to leasehold accessed by investors. In the Kigwe case (chapter 5), war contributed to 
the breakdown of both customary and statutory land institutions. Because people had stayed 
in IDP camps for a long time, families that had peacefully co-existed together before the war 
were no longer willing to share land with their neighbors upon their return.  
Analyses on the consequences of civil war in terms of land occupation and governance (e.g. 
Daudelin, 2003; Unruh 2003), tend to emphasize how this contributes to tenure insecurity and 
disempowerment of local resource users. Likewise, literature on youth tends to show how the 
younger cohorts are vulnerable when there is competition for resources especially land 
(Jacobs, 1999; Odgaard, 2005). The case-study on the role of youth in land governance in post-
conflict settings (chapter 6) instead demonstrates how war may also create opportunities. In 
particular, war restructures relations between generations, and provides opportunities for the 
youth to gain authority in land governance. The breakdown of both customary and statutory 
institutions, the extended stays of rural communities in the IDP camps, the commoditization 
of land, youth’s increased (military) power and status due to participation in the war, and 
opportunities to participate in decentralized structures of land governance result in a shift in 
land governing authority from elders to youth. Important to note, though, is that this social 
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change is uneven: while some youth become powerful and prominent, especially young 
women and orphans lose power in land governance. At the same time, the important roles of 
the youth in mobilizing around land, like in the case of Amuru sugar project, make local land 
authorities recognize the important role the youth may play in contributing to their own 
authority. This makes youth a valuable constituency in political struggles around land.  
Such shifts in land governance are always contested. As a consequence, violent conflict not 
only directly distorts land governance, but may easily set the stage for a reoccurrence of 
conflict over the ways in which land is governed. Such findings underline that land conflicts 
are not the result of scarcity (Homer-Dixon 1999) but rather of contested governance. In these 
contestations over land governance, all kinds of historical and political issues may be played 
out. Conflicts about land and its governance are not only just territorial struggles, but also 
relate to issues of identity and ethnicity, wider power struggles, historical processes and 
institutional failures (see Peluso & Watts, 2001; Turner, 2004; Benjaminsen et. Al. 2009; Peluso 
and Vandergeest, 2011). Hence, the way in which land issues are dealt with by policy makers 
touches also on these other contestations, and makes land reform not only critical for 
reconstruction and development, but also risky and potentially jeopardizing political stability. 
This is also very problematic in the case of Uganda, where post-conflict land governance 
reform gets interpreted in terms of political divides in the country.  
Land reform and the continuing struggle between the North and the South  
Land and its governance are a critical element in dealing with the LRA legacy. Land and its 
governance did not play a central role in the development of the LRA war. However, the ways 
in which the Uganda government deals with contemporary land issues is locally assessed in 
light of earlier episodes of exclusion that contributed to the LRA war.  
In Uganda there is not only a visible inequality between the northern and southern regions 
but also a continuous struggle between the north of the country and the Ugandan state, which 
is often perceived as mainly representing the south, where its political basis is found. This 
inequality and struggle can be traced back to colonialism when the south was favored and the 
north neglected by the British (see chapter one). Land reforms by the British, especially 
gazzettement of land into nature reserves, limited northerners’ ability to utilize local land 
resources to improve their livelihoods. People from the north, especially the Acholi, were 
targeted for recruitment for military service, contributing to their dominance in the security 
system. Before 1986, the Acholi enjoyed state power under the different post-independence 
regimes (1962-1985) of Obote and Amin. However, when the NRM government came to 
power in 1986, the position of the Acholi in the Ugandan state strongly reduced. Well as the 
Acholi are still nursing the wounds of being removed from power by the NRM, the NRM 
government is perceived as trying to expand its control and restore order in Acholi, notably 
through its dealings with land and its governance.  
Many Acholi believe that the 20 year civil war in northern Uganda, and in particular the forced 
resettlement in IDP camps, was meant to keep the land in Acholi in turmoil, in order for the 
NRM government to maintain control over the land and its people. From such an 
understanding of the intentions of the government, few Acholi believe that the NRM 
government will now carry out land reforms that are against the interests of the Acholi. In the 
case of Apaa, people see strong continuity between the colonial displacements to create game 
reserves, and contemporary land reforms by the government that again include the 
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gazzettement that was so detrimental to the people of the north. Also, many Acholi are 
convinced that the NRM government is paving the way for the people from southern Uganda 
to have access to land in Acholi. Local people refer to the examples of the Amuru district land 
board allocating 10,000 hectares of land to Amuru sugar works limited (chapter 4); the 
evictions in Apaa (chapter 3); and the fencing off of thousands of hectares of land in Nwoya 
district, because of prospects of oil, which they consider as an effort by the government to 
acquire their customary land. Even interventions, court judgements, and government actions 
around land that are not meant as such are interpreted by local people as part of efforts to 
subdue the north.  
The fieldwork makes clear that land and its governance are a central theme around which 
relationships between the government and people In the Acholi region are renegotiated after 
the war. Interventions in land governance by the state -but also the appalling service delivery 
in northern Uganda- contribute to the fact that many Acholi do not perceive themselves as 
citizens, and as part of the Ugandan state. Instead, they identify themselves primarily as 
belonging to the Acholi tribe. Large-scale land allocations, evictions, and gazzettement in the 
Acholi region are seen as an encroachment on Acholi territory, and as deliberate state efforts 
to wipe them out. Such perceptions pose real dangers because they nurture resistance and 
instability. It is clear that the Uganda government should take very good care to prevent that 
land governance reforms undermine the land rights of particular ethnic groups (cf. Borras and 
Franco 2010).  
Decentralization and power relations among land governing institutions  
Important in the development of relationships between the government and people from the 
north is decentralization. Decentralization was portrayed as a key strategy of the Uganda 
government to deal with land disputes and tenure insecurity, and was also considered as an 
alternative to the centralized, authoritarian practices of governance of the predecessors of 
the NRM regime. 
Contemporary literature on decentralization emphasises the different ways in which 
decentralization may contribute to better governance (Shah and Thompson, 2004; Siegle and 
O’Mahony, 2006; Benjamin, 2008) and the mitigation of resource conflicts at local levels (GTZ, 
2006; Diprose and Ukiwo, 2008). Uganda’s decentralization programme has often been hailed 
and taken as an example for the rest of Africa, especially the ways in which power has been 
devolved to lower levels of government (Francis and James, 2003; Green, 2008). 
In contrast, findings from northern Uganda demonstrate that decentralization does not 
necessarily result in better governance, but has divergent and very important consequences. 
Many of those are related to the fact that elites manipulate the process of decentralization in 
such a way that it comes to serve their interests. Moreover, decentralization turned out to be 
largely ineffective, because no real devolution of power took place: despite decentralization, 
the central government still tends to make decisions on land allocation. While literature on 
decentralization emphasizes how it may potentially create space for interactions, 
representation and participation of all stakeholders (Bigombe et al. 2000; Golola, 2001; 
Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Meinzen-Dick et al. 2008; Van der Haar et al. 2009) in practice, 
power relations play an important role determining who participates and who is represented 
in decentralized land governance. 
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The case of the land allocation Amuru sugar company by the district land board illustrates how 
decentralization leads to elite appropriation of the decision making process. State legislation 
provides for the creation of decentralized structures such as the district land board, the area 
land committee, district land tribunals and sub-county court committees. The functions of 
these structures are well stipulated in the 1998 Land Act, and include responsibility for 
ascertaining people’s land rights, allocating land that is not owned and hearing and resolving 
disputes related to land. However, In the Amuru sugar project case, these bodies took 
decisions that failed to reflect the interests of majority of stakeholders and without 
representing all the actors in land governance. Line ministries effectively instructed the 
District Land Board of Amuru to allocate land to Amuru Sugar Works Limited. This government 
power over local affairs seems to result from the fact that members of decentralized 
structures are politically appointed. Therefore, in practice, decentralization leads not so much 
to improve land tenure security and local participation in land governance, but rather seems 
to further state interests.  
The allocation of land to investors with the implication of decentralized land structures creates 
major tenure insecurity among people of northern Uganda. Moreover, the actual practices of 
decentralization strongly suggest that, rather than enhancing local tenure security, the reform 
aims to secure government control over local resources and expand local state power. Instead 
of devolving power to local governments, we see the expansion of the state in Uganda in the 
areas where authority is weak, a concentration of power in central (statutory) institutions (See 
Leftwich, 1995) and resistance to transfer of power to local governments (Ribot et al. 2006: 
1866). Such practices contribute to people losing trust in decentralized land institutions. 
Likewise, such dynamics are again locally interpreted in terms of the North South divide. 
Decentralized land governance is viewed by the people of Acholi as a mechanism put in place 
by the state to take away their customary rights to land. To them the state has proved to be 
more of a ‘predator’ than a ‘protector’ of customary land. 
Institutional competition and the acknowledgement of customary tenure 
Another important consequence of decentralization is that it leads to the creation of partially 
new institutions that add on to and compete with the already existing authorities and 
regulations about land. The resulting legal and institutional pluralism (also see Benjaminsen 
and Lund, 2003) increase unclarity and ambiguity about which rules apply and who has the 
authority to deal with land issues. While ideally customary and statutory institutions may work 
together, this is often not the case, as certain people and institutions benefit from 
competition. 
A prominent example is unclarity about the distribution of responsibilities between the local 
council 2, which is the first court of instance of land disputes under the decentralization 
system; and the rwot kweri (chief of hoe), which is the first court of instance of land disputes 
under the customary system in the Acholi region. These two structures from different legal 
settings (statutory and customary) both work to solve disputes about land under customary 
tenure, but they do not speak to each other. This duplication of land services creates confusion 
among local people who do not know which institutions to approach in order to have their 
land disputes resolved. The Kigwe case (chapter five) showed that institutional competition 
and rivalry among land governance institutions at a local level contributes to that land disputes 
never come to a final closure. Because of competition between the customary and state 
institutions about who has the right to decide, land conflicts remain unresolved and conflicts 
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become more complex as people move from one land governing institution to another. 
Moreover, while diverse land institutions may hope to gain authority in this process of 
institutional competition (also see Sikor and Lund, 2009), in practice, competition seems to 
further weaken land governing institutions because people lose trust in them. And while the 
presence of many forums for dispute resolution may broaden the opportunities for people 
involved in land conflicts, it is at the disadvantage of the poor who lack the money to 
strategically move from one structure to another.  
An important trend noted in this thesis on the institutional competition accompanying 
decentralization is that it may result in an increasing role of youth in land governance (see the 
youth case in chapter six). The youth may be elected into positions in statutory decentralized 
structures. This gives them authority to govern land, and changes power relations between 
the youth and elders, considering that in customary settings the authority to govern land was 
entrusted to elders. As a consequence of this reshuffle, land disputes may escalate and 
disadvantaged groups like orphans, widows and the aged may become more vulnerable in 
land governance. On the positive side, however, when youth gain access to land then they can 
improve their livelihoods.  
At the same time, the reforms effectively disqualify customary institutions. Considering that 
the majority of small scale farmers access land through customary arrangements, this weaker 
position of customary institutions reduces local tenure security. Publicly, the government 
promotes the protection of customary rights and customary authorities. In 1995, customary 
tenure received formal recognition from the state and attained legal status as a form of land 
tenure in the country. However, at the same time, the government reserves the right of 
appropriation if land is required for development, which poses a threat particularly to 
customary rights. Moreover, while the constitution provides for recording customary land 
rights through a Certificate of Customary Ownership (CCO), these CCOs can be converted to 
freehold if the holder of the land wishes to do so. The reverse procedure does not exist. This 
implicitly shows that customary tenure has an inferior position compared to the other forms 
of tenure like freehold. The CCOs actually change the rules and rights of land access and 
ownership under customary tenure: the issuance of CCOs by decentralized land governance 
structures (Area Land Committee and District Land Board) negates the role of customary 
institutions in the governance of customary land (Chapter 4). Local people in northern Uganda 
believe that the issuance of CCOs by statutory land institutions is a mechanism designed by 
the state to take away their customary rights to land. Considering that in northern Uganda 90 
percent of the land is held under customary tenure, the increased role of statutory land 
institutions in the governance of customary is creating tension and conflict between statutory 
and customary institutions. Likewise, the appropriation of (customary) land for large scale 
commercial farming in Uganda, is done by state institutions like the district land board. In the 
case of Amuru Sugar, this board singlehandedly, with little involvement of customary 
institutions, changed rules of access and ownership, and introduced leasehold titles on that 
land.  
Overall, rather than protection of customary tenure, local people see an increased 
interference in customary land governance by the state. Important to note here is that 
decentralization started in 1993. At that time, violent conflict was at its height, and in 1996 
many people were forced to move to IDP camps. Being associated with war-time 
displacement, decentralized statutory institutions are not well accepted in the Acholi region, 
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and many people see them as a coup d’état to customary institutions. The un-sincere 
acknowledgement of customary tenure is interpreted in north in terms of the dynamics that 
will further entrench the division between the north and the south.  
The struggle for authority between state and customary institutions significantly impacts on 
tenure security and land dispute resolution as discussed under the Kigwe case (Chapter 5). 
Legal pluralism is a reality and a situation which will not go away soon, therefore there is need 
to understand the different ways in which customary tenure may be acknowledged. There is 
also need to explore further how both state and customary systems can work together in 
order to improve tenure security and land dispute resolution. We have seen that communities 
vehemently oppose land reforms when the government tries to impose statutory tenure on 
communities. I therefore conclude that customary tenure should be left to gradually evolve 
as a result of interactions with other institutional frameworks for example instead of 
registering customary land, people should be first helped to demarcate land by planting trees 
along their boundaries. When abrupt changes are made in the ways in which customary land 
is governed, then more land disputes are likely to ensue and competition between customary 
and statutory institutions over authority for customary land governance will escalate. 
However it is important to note that customary institutions can only operate the way they do 
within the boundaries set by statutory institutions. The state significantly impacts on the way 
customary land institutions operate either by legitimizing their authority over land governance 
or by coercing them to forcefully evolve and become more like statutory institutions.  
Land governance as a means of state formation 
The different case studies in this thesis demonstrate that - irrespective of their official aims - 
land governance reform tends to result in a further imposition of the state. The findings show 
a government that uses state power to advance the interests of a group of elites and 
(re)establish a system of patronage rather than represent the interests of its people.  
During colonialism, states displaced people through appropriating property, especially land. 
Similar means were used by post-independence states. While the state appropriates and uses 
land to impose its rule, simultaneously powerful actors take advantage of the state to get their 
interests realized: they cannot do this without the state. Vice versa, states may mobilize 
political support through clientelism (Robinson and Parsons 2006) and by providing powerful 
actors with resources of the state. Thus, a state becomes strong by rewarding the interests of 
the powerful elites. Allocating land to regime supporters by the state works to increase the 
state’s grip over power and territory.  
Therefore land reforms in Uganda basically work as a project to promote the interests (in this 
case access to land) of the elites. In post-conflict settings politicians (both national and local) 
use the state to advance their own agendas. In this, they do not refrain from using violence 
and so contribute to the further erosion of legitimacy of the state. In all the four cases, 
politicians have influenced land disputes. In Apaa (chapter three) the battle between 
prominent politicians has contributed to drawing in more actors into the conflict, all taking 
sides and contributing to the use of violence in the conflict. In the Amuru sugar plantation 
conflict (chapter 4) politicians mobilized the youth to resist the land allocation but they also 
attracted attention of other external actors in land governance to this particular land dispute. 
In the case of Kigwe (chapter 5), politicians took sides with the conflicting families and this has 
partly contributed to the failure to arrive at solutions during the mediations. And lastly in the 
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case of the youth (chapter 6), politicians are at the forefront of influencing how the youth 
relate with land. When politicians are dissatisfied with the way statutory land institution 
govern or the way a particular land conflict is resolved they organize the youth to show their 
grievances. But also the politicians use the youth to achieve their individual interests such as 
self-realization, popularity and to gain votes for the next elections. The politicians have the 
power to implant ideologies into the youth because the youth perceive the politicians as their 
role models and fighting for their plight. 
Patterns of state formation depend on the interests of the ruling government and the state’s 
ability to promote those interests (Eriksen 2011: 261). The interests and ability of the state 
are the driving force behind what path state formation takes. For example, a strong army helps 
to control territory that is considered to oppose the state. The interests of the NRM 
government include incorporating the northern region into the mainstream governance of the 
Ugandan state and controlling northern Uganda in order to check the activities of Joseph Kony 
in neighbouring countries of South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African 
Republic where the LRA is currently based (Mwenda, 2010). In order to achieve these motives, 
the NRM government must be able to implant itself locally among the communities of 
northern Uganda. For these reasons, the Uganda state is interested in manifesting itself at the 
local level. Post-conflict land governance reform and decentralization may create an entrance 
for this. And while this may also benefit the citizens, in northern Uganda local imaginations of 
the state and of state penetration are highly negative. People of the north perceive the state 
as land grabber and one that is out to exploit their resources. This is due to the overwhelming 
interference of the state in local land governance and unwillingness to devolve real power to 
local governments and the way in which the land conflicts discussed above are handled. 
Ultimately land governance contributes to state formation or penetration. In northern Uganda 
decentralized land governance led to the creation of new rules of land access, ownership, 
utilization and dispute resolution. Statutory land institutions like the District Land Board were 
put in place to enforce these new rules of land governance and the new rules and institutions 
undermined the customary institutions that previously governed land in Acholi region. All the 
above resonate with what Agrawal (2001:12-13) identifies as activities that contribute to state 
formation. The state of Uganda is trying to use integration in the process of state formation. 
By interfering in land governance the state feels it attempts to integrate the region of northern 
Uganda into the Ugandan state because northern Uganda has for long since independence 
seemed to be a region of its own, not wholly integrated into the Ugandan State.  
On the one hand the state wants to assert its power and control over territory through land 
governance yet on the other hand the local communities (the Acholi) want to control their 
land or natural resource through customary institutions or arrangements. The imposition of 
new land institutions like the District Land Board in areas that were previously governed by 
customary institutions properly fits into a definition of a successful state that has to destroy 
institutions or customs that stand in the way of development (Huntington 1968). As the 
Uganda Developmental State under the NRM government seeks to foster development 
through modernizing agriculture, it has to do away with customary land institutions and 
replace them with decentralized statutory land structures so that they make land available for 
large scale investments like Amuru sugar works for growing sugar cane and developing a sugar 
industry in Acholi sub-region. Through bypassing customary institutions in land governance, 
the government of Uganda weakens the institutions and incorporates them in the state 
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administration as it was the case in Botswana according to Eriksen (2011). Decentralization in 
Uganda seems to be more about state expansion and implantation (establishing the state 
physically and legally) than about creating legitimacy/authority. This might be an explanation 
also for the limited interest of the state in strengthening customary tenure. However, focusing 
on strengthening state institutions without bringing on board other institutions like customary 
could in the long run pose risks and be detrimental to building a strong state. States require 
local legitimacy in order to become sustainable, and if this is not considered by states then 
local communities may start perceiving statutory institutions as foreign and also see 
themselves as oppressed, disadvantaged and resist. 
States use land governance to increase their grip over certain territories and to show or 
reinstate their power over post-conflict areas. By interfering in land governance in northern 
Uganda, the state is trying to manifest itself as the highest political authority within the 
territory with the capacity to effectively enforce its rule (Cf. Eriksen 2011). In the Apaa and 
Amuru Sugar project cases (chapter three and chapter four respectively) the state uses the 
state machinery (violence) to impose what happens to land and who gets access to land. In 
this way, local people are reminded who has power and who is in control of land governance 
– the state. However, this cannot be done without using other state institutions to influence 
the way land is governed. For example in the Amuru Sugar project case (chapter four) 
government ministries directed the district land board to allocate land to Amuru sugar works 
limited. Therefore even though decentralized land governance structures are put in place, 
decisions on land are still determined by the central government. All these factors interrelate 
and have a negative impact on post-conflict tenure security.  
The violent imposition of a new land governance regime  
Literature shows that state formation is inherently a violent process as it was in the history of 
formation of western states and about early state formation where chiefdoms came into being 
through military imposition (See Flannery 1999; Boege et al. 2008). Current states are still 
imposing themselves through coercive means. Institutionalized violence carried out by state 
institutions especially security organs help states or governments to maintain order over its 
territories (See Fjelde and De Soysa 2009).  
Violence contributes to the constitution of the state and what we see in this study is a retake 
of power and territory in northern Uganda. Violence is a cross-cutting theme in all the cases 
that were followed during the study. Violence has become a means through which land 
governance is reformed, and through which the rules of access and ownership of land are 
reorganized. The case of Apaa (chapter 3) and the case of Amuru sugar project (chapter 4) 
demonstrate that the state is willing to use violence to enforce land governance rules and to 
reinstate its power over northern Uganda.  
Whether these cases are part of a deliberate strategy to control land in northern Uganda or  
are an accidental byproduct (circumstantial consequences) of the way in which the 
government wants to secure its power is an open question. The police and army have been 
implicated in numerous land disputes in northern Uganda. Although strong state institutions 
that serve the interests of all citizens are seen as a condition for achieving sustainable 
development (Boege et al. 2008), this is different in the Ugandan setting: instead, strong 
institutions are those that are able to exert force or violence to serve the interests of the state 
and elites.  
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The use of violence should be understood in connection to wider politics and antagonisms in 
society, notably efforts by the state to re-establish itself after the LRA war. The erratic way in 
which land is governed and state violence is used, promotes the use of violence by local 
people. The case of Kigwe in chapter five and the youth case in chapter six show the use of 
violence by local people in land matters. The use of violence by local people is a response to 
decentralized land governance structures’ failure to deal with land disputes and provide 
tenure security. The Kigwe and youth cases confirm what Olowu, 2003 and Peluso, 2007 noted 
that local people use violence when they perceive local governments as unjust. The youth in 
Lakang in Amuru district have resorted to the use of violence, including flogging and throwing 
stones at people from central and local government, because they feel land governance 
structures have overlooked local land rights in favor of land investors from outside (Amuru 
Sugar Works Limited in chapter four). If land disputes are intertwined with issues of identity 
and ethnicity they may become more violent. Similarly Unruh 2003 noted that identity plays 
an important role in land issues. This is because land gives people a sense of belonging, it is 
used a form of identity therefore denial of land rights (access and ownership) to some groups 
of people tantamount to denial of people’s identity and this results into the use of violence.  
Implications for policy  
Post-conflict land governance plays an important role in the peace process in post-conflict 
north Uganda and any land reforms like decentralized land governance ought to be 
implemented cautiously. This section presents the implications of this study to government 
and other actors in land governance. 
There should be clear division of power and responsibility among statutory and customary 
land institutions. Government and other actors in land governance should work to create 
some order among land governance institutions, the kinds of power that these institutions 
have should be clear. Institutional competition plays a big role in decreasing tenure security. 
Power relations and elite agendas play a critical role in how land reforms take shape. Unless 
the issues of power distribution among different levels of authority and political power plays 
among all actors in relation to land governance are sorted out, decentralized land governance 
will not be an effective instrument to protect local rights vis-à-vis powerful external actors. 
The real impediment to local governance lies in the distribution of power between levels of 
authority and not only lack of resources as most scholars and researchers emphasize. Without 
relinquishing power from central government to local government, decentralized land 
governance reforms are not going to work because decentralized land structures will not 
independently perform their roles in land governance. 
Most policies and legislation in African have their basis in the colonial state. Governments 
should not continue with policies that were put in place by colonialism for the sake of it but 
revisit them and make land policies that reflect people’s needs in land and changing situations. 
Colonialist (the British) started the policies of creating reserves (game and forest reserves) but 
the post-independence governments are continuing with the same through the politics of 
gazettement and degazettement. From the Apaa evictions (chapter three) we see that past 
policies on land governance significantly contributed to current land conflicts. The Apaa case 
shows that the government is building on colonial policies that continue to create uncertainty 
over land ownership and laws that are supposed to apply to that land.  
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Despite the fact that majority of land in northern Uganda is held under customary tenure, the 
formal procedure for land allocation has neglected customary institutions. For instance in the 
process of area land committees inspecting land for issuance of CCOs customary institutions 
are not consulted, only neighbors bordering the land which is the subject of application are 
involved. Large land allocation orders come from national authorities to local level authorities 
for implementation and in the process customary authorities are ignored. This could be a 
source of land disputes in future as communities will contest the authority of formal 
institutions in allocating customary land. The state should realize that to get more legitimacy 
in the north the state should check how it relates with customary institutions of the north. 
The objective of social sciences is the study of dynamic societal change (Lund, 2010) therefore 
the output from this research can be used as a baseline for improvement and positive change 
in decentralized land governance. Probably avenues of improving tenure security and dealing 
with land disputes through decentralized land governance may be improved basing on the 
findings of the study. 
Final remarks 
The overall aim of this study was to understand how post-conflict land governance takes 
shape, that is how decentralization influences land governance, how it impacts the legitimacy 
and authority of local institutions, the resolution of land disputes and how those land 
governance reforms would end tenure insecurity caused by contested claims resulting from 
the violent LRA conflict in post-conflict northern Uganda. But also through the land reforms 
prevent a relapse into further violence and enhance local stability. All these in the long run 
might contribute to the re-establishment of a legitimate state especially in northern Uganda. 
This thesis demonstrates that we should sober our high expectations of land governance 
reforms in post-conflict settings. Theorizing about land governance reform considers it as a 
smooth, technical problem solving exercise, and the failures of land governance reform are 
often interpreted in terms of policy failures and misunderstanding. This thesis highlights how 
land governance reform is a critical arena in which power relations and access to the state are 
fought out. Not surprisingly, violence plays a critical role in that, enforcing new land 
governance practices rather than renegotiating them.   
The way land is governed in post-conflict settings is very crucial for the restoration of peace 
or the continuation of conflict. Most literature on land in post-conflict areas concentrates on 
reaffirming how land is important in post-conflict reconstruction (Unruh, 2003; Rugadya, 
2009) without clearly explaining the relation between land and conflict. If the linkages 
between land and conflict in post-conflict settings are not well understood by researchers and 
policy makers then post-conflict stability will continue to be merely a fantasy. The Apaa case 
and the Amuru sugar cane project (chapter 3 and 4) show that the way decisions are made 
about access, utilization, and ownership may be a source of contestation and resistance, while 
ambiguity about who is in charge and what rules apply might also lead to land conflict. 
Ethnicity and identity issues drive land conflicts and land being the only source of livelihood 
makes it a conflictive resource.  
Well as the youth in post-conflict settings gain a prominent place in land governance and this 
probably will restructure intergenerational relations. From the case of northern Uganda some 
youth are misusing the opportunities that the war has opened for them (youth case chapter 
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six). If land institutions both customary and statutory are not capable to manage the way 
youth relate with land then serious conflicts are likely to arise between the youth and the 
elders over land governance. The new role attained by the youth in land governance in post-
conflict settings has irreversible effects on customary tenure where authority to govern land 
is embedded in elders and will increase intra-family land disputes. 
Areas for Future Research /Limitations of the study 
This study focused on land governance which included studying the issues of land access, 
ownership, utilization and land dispute resolution in post-conflict settings. However the study 
did not investigate the notion of land utilization. The case studies of Apaa and Amuru in a way 
showed conflict between different ways of land utilization for example between wild game 
conservation and human settlement in Apaa case (chapter three) and in Amuru Sugar project 
case (chapter four) a conflict between large scale agriculture and peasant farming (small scale 
agriculture). Therefore further research can be conducted to understand how effective land 
use and the desire to change land utilization contribute to how the rules of land access and 
ownership are renegotiated. In Uganda there is an ongoing political debate on ‘effective land 
use’, this debate can further be explored to understand its political consequences, and its 
implications for development and protection of livelihoods of the poor.  
Over the course of the research I became more and more aware of the importance of youth 
in post-conflict land governance yet the focus of my research was on land disputes and the 
increasing role of youth in land governance. Further research should be conducted on the 
successful cases of youth’s role in post-conflict land governance in order to understand how 
transformations in power relation between the generations affect land governance. 
Currently, the NRM government is championing a move to amend the constitution in Uganda 
in order for government to acquire people’s land for development or public interest without 
compensating them first. There is also a motion to lift the presidential age limit from 75 years, 
after the limits on presidential terms were already removed in 2005. All these developments 
work to benefit the current government. With the NRM government clinging to power (31 
years since 1986) and being over authoritarian through undermining the proper devolution of 
power to local governments, this does not to help improve natural resource governance in 
Uganda. The situation of land conflicts in Acholi could fuel into another civil conflict because 
strong perceptions about the current land reform process feed into the north-south divide 
that could effectively decrease stability. The cases also show what could happen if more land 
evictions were to take place for the development of large-scale agriculture. Therefore, the 
problem of poor natural resource governance is not limited to northern Uganda. Presently, 
there are cases in the central part of the country over the Buganda land question, in Bulisa 
over the oil resources and in Karamoja over the presence of valuable mineral resources like 
gold. In all these situations the government is trying to get control over natural resources 
territory.  By doing so government is seen as an imposition on communities and as an organ 
that serves the interests of certain elites and contributes to appropriation of local people’s 
properties which is a recipe for conflict. This study recommends that the state should let 
decentralized land governance structures to operate independently if tenure security is to be 
achieved and reconsider its role as guardian of public interests. 
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Summary 
After more than two decades of a civil war between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) government of Uganda, which resulted in the 
displacement of over two million people, life in Northern Uganda is returning to normalcy. 
Following the inconclusive 2006 Juba peace talks between the LRA rebels and the NRM 
government, former refugees and internally displaced people started returning home and re-
accessing their land in northern Uganda. However, people in the Acholi region are confronted 
with contestations and competition over ownership and access to land: among relatives, 
between those who returned first and those that returned later, between clans, between the 
Acholi and other tribes like the Madi, and between local communities and institutions like the 
Uganda Wildlife Authority and foreign companies. In the difficult transition from war to peace, 
land disputes are considered a serious threat to the stability of Northern Uganda. To deal with 
tenure insecurity and land disputes, the NRM government initiated a series of policy reforms, 
in which decentralization features prominently. This justifies an exploration of how 
decentralized land governance actually works out in Uganda.  
The situation in northern Uganda is similar to other conflict-affected settings, where tenure 
insecurity is a common phenomenon. This situation is characterized by huge numbers of 
people re-accessing land within a short period of time, a large number of contested land 
claims, involving IDPs who find their land occupied by others or have settled on land belonging 
to others (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2008; Van Leeuwen, 2008). This makes post-conflict land 
governance an enormous challenge. Violent conflicts might undermine the functioning of 
formal property rights institutions in a situation where people might question the capability 
and legitimacy of such institutions to enforce rights to property or natural resources (See 
Daudelin, 2003; Unruh, 2003). Nowadays, land governance reforms are seen as a necessary 
measure after conflict to solve land disputes, which might also deal with other general 
tensions in societies (See Cotula et al, 2004; Wiley, 2006; Anseeuw and Alden, 2010). Yet, land 
governance and its reform are very sensitive affairs in post-conflict setting, as they touch not 
only on the possibilities for people to rebuild their livelihoods after conflict, but also on the 
issues that the peace process is all about.   
The starting point of this thesis was to analyze how post-conflict land governance and its 
reform take shape in post-conflict northern Uganda. It explored how the LRA war transformed 
land governance; how post-conflict land reform and notably decentralization works out, how 
it impacts the legitimacy and authority of local institutions, and contributes to the resolution 
of land disputes. In particular, the research investigated the question of how such reforms 
contribute to the process of state formation.108 
The findings of the study demonstrate how the LRA war not only reshuffled land ownership 
but also distorted and transformed prevailing land governance practices. In particular, the 
analysis brings out how war transformed the roles of youths and women in land governance. 
Decentralization turned out to have mixed results, as it contributed to institutional 
                                                          
108 Research for this thesis was conducted as part of the programme ‘Grounding Land Governance’ which was 
funded by NWO-WOTRO Science for Global Development grant number W 01.65.332.00. This programme was a 
collaboration between African Studies Centre at Leiden University, Wageningen University, the Centre for 
International Conflict Analysis & Management at Radboud University, Nijmegen and Mbarara University of 
Science and Technology in Ugandan. The programme investigated how land governance evolves in conflict-
affected Uganda, Burundi and South Sudan, as the outcome of interaction between multiple stakeholders.  
 
 130 
 
proliferation, and competition between state and customary institutions. Despite 
decentralization, state actors continue to determine decision-making on land at the local level. 
All case studies illustrate how local changes in land governing authority do not necessarily 
result in more tenure security, yet, are often understood as efforts by outsiders to acquire 
local land. An overarching finding is that land governance reform in northern Uganda in fact 
amounts to a contested political programme of re-establishing the state.  
The study paid particular attention to gender issues in post-conflict land governance. Women 
are often affected differently than men in war-time situations, and fieldwork explored how 
the war impacted women’s ownership and access to land, and their vulnerabilities in post-
conflict settings. A specific chapter on gender issues in land governance in North Uganda is in 
preparation, but forms no part of this thesis. Some of the findings appear in a documentary 
entitled ‘Governance off the Ground’ which was a product of the Grounding Land Governance 
programme in general and my research project in particular. 
Fieldwork for this thesis was conducted in Acholi sub-region, Northern Uganda. Fieldwork was 
of an ethnographic nature and diverse qualitative methods were utilized, including participant 
observation, a review of secondary literature, 25 focus group discussions, and 133 interviews 
with local people, men and women, youth (female and male), local council members, elders, 
representatives of area land committees and district land boards, civil servants at sub-county 
and district level, policemen and game rangers, , NGO staff, cultural leaders, lawyers, officials 
from the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, and politicians. 
Chapter three shows that violent conflict and war prominently impact on land governance and 
significantly contribute to land conflicts in post-conflict settings. The case of Apaa evictions in 
Amuru district discusses the intricate causal connection between the 20 year civil war in 
northern Uganda and current land disputes in Acholi region. While literature tends to explain 
land conflicts in terms of either environmental security or political ecology, the analysis 
illustrates that political ecology approaches may be further strengthened by acknowledging 
that land governance is not only a cause of conflict, but that violent conflict in turn also has 
an important influence on land governance. Political, historical and social dynamics 
interconnect and contribute to the conflictiveness of land or natural resources. Violent 
conflicts are fueled by tensions between local groups about social issues such as ethnicity, 
grievances about those in power, limited or unequal access to land and the institutions that 
govern natural resources. This chapter highlights that how those issues are dealt with by policy 
makers is critical for successful post-conflict recovery and stability.  
The case study of Amuru Sugar Project in chapter four reflects on decentralized land 
governance and its role in large scale land allocation. Most analysts attribute the 
unsuccessfulness of decentralization to unclearness in state legislation and resource 
inadequacies. This study instead points out that decisions about land attribution at lower 
levels of government reflect the interests of those at higher levels of governance, and are the 
outcome of manipulation and intermingling in local affairs by politicians from higher levels. 
The chapter concludes that without devolution of real power to decentralized structures, 
decentralization will continue to be ineffective as a channel of incorporating popular 
participation in decision making.  
Chapter five, which is based on a land dispute case in Pader district, reflects on the notion of 
institutional pluralism and how it impacts on land dispute resolution. The analysis highlights 
how decentralization further contributes to institutional multiplicity by creating new 
institutions that add on to the already existing authorities and regulations about land, rather 
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than devolving power to existing local institutions. This results in confusion among people 
having land disputes about which institutions to approach, and fuels into institutional 
competition at local level, thereby contributing to a situation where land dispute resolution 
never reaches a final solution. This intensifies land disputes and thus deviates from the 
essence of improved service delivery propelled by decentralization.  
Chapter six elucidates the pivotal role of the youth in post-conflict land governance. It 
demonstrates that although intergenerational conflicts are part and parcel of society, war 
significantly accelerates social and political change which results in placing land governance in 
the custody of the male youths in post-conflict settings. The shift in power relations fuels into 
struggles for authority over land governance between the youth and the elders. Yet, while 
some youth gain power and prominence in land governance, other youths especially the 
female and orphaned youth become powerless in land governance. The chapter shows how 
the dynamics of staying in IDP camps, participation in the war, assuming positions in 
decentralized structures and inability to find jobs outside agriculture significantly influence 
the role of youth in land governance in post-conflict settings. It concludes that the new roles 
attained by the youth in land governance may have irreversible effects on customary tenure 
where authority to govern land is embedded in elders.  
On the basis of these different case studies, the thesis arrives at the overall conclusion that 
land governance reform in Uganda in fact amounts to the contested re-establishing of the 
state. States use post-conflict land governance as a tool for regaining control over and 
asserting authority in post-conflict areas that were previously under some other form of 
control. This argument is elaborated in chapter 7, which also brings together the main findings 
on the initial research questions. 
▪ The 20 year civil war in northern Uganda did not just reshuffle access and occupation 
of land, but transformed practices of land governance in Acholi region. Land and its 
governance are a critical element in dealing with the LRA legacy: not so much in that 
contestation around land and its governance generated the LRA conflict, but rather 
that any current intervention, court judgement, or government action on land is 
assessed in light of earlier episodes of exclusion that contributed to the LRA war. Land 
turns out to be a very critical issue around which the struggle between the North and 
South plays out, or seen to take place.  
▪ Decentralization was a key strategy of the government to deal with land disputes and 
tenure insecurity. However, decentralization has turned out to be largely ineffective 
because no real devolution of power took place. The actual involvement of state actors 
in local decision taking around land suggests that the central government tries to 
maintain or strengthen its control over local governments, especially in the areas of 
Uganda where authority is weak. 
▪ At a local level, reform programmes effectively disqualify customary institutions and 
contribute to institutional multiplicity and competition. This puts customary 
authorities on a side track at the benefit of the state, and fails to protect tenure 
security of small scale farmers, who mostly access land through customary 
arrangements. 
▪ These practices in Uganda show that land governance reform may serve as an avenue 
for state formation, and a means to increase its grip over territory and to show or 
reinstate power over post-conflict areas. By interfering in land governance in northern 
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Uganda, the state is trying to establish itself as the highest political authority within 
the territory with the capacity to effectively enforce its rule. 
▪ Moreover, land reform is often considered as a smooth, technical procedure to better 
organize the ways in which land is governed. However, this thesis demonstrates that 
actually land reform is a very contested and violent process. In Uganda, violence, both 
by the state and by local people, has become an important means through which land 
governance is reformed, and through which access and ownership of land are 
reordered.  
Implications for policy-makers 
Post-conflict land governance plays an important role in the peace process in post-conflict 
settings. Considering its contested nature, any land reforms like decentralized land 
governance ought to be implemented cautiously. To be effective, there should be clear 
division of power and responsibilities among statutory and customary land institutions. This 
can help reduce the number of land disputes that crisscross among institutions. In a post-
conflict situation land policies should prioritize local people’s needs in terms of tenure 
insecurity and land disputes. Only in such a way, the Uganda state may gain more legitimacy 
in the North.  
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Samenvatting 
Na meer dan twee decennia burgeroorlog tussen het Verzetsleger van de Heer (Lord’s 
Resistance Army, LRA) en regering van Oeganda geleid door de Nationale 
Weerstandsbeweging (National Resistance Movement, NRM), die resulteerde in meer dan 
twee miljoen mensen ontheemdem, wordt het leven in Noord Oeganda weer rustig. Na 
onvoltooide vredesonderhandelingen in Juba in 2006 tussen LRA rebellen en de NRM regering, 
begonnen voormalige vluchtelingen en ontheemden terug te keren naar hun huizen en namen 
ze hun land in Noord Uganda weer in. Echter, mensen in de Acholi regio worden 
geconfronteerd met conflicten over eigendom en toegang tot het land: tussen familieleden, 
tussen degenen die eerst terugkeerden en degenen die pas later kwamen, tussen clans, tussen 
de Acholi en andere etnische groepen als de Madi, en tussen plaatselijke gemeenschappen en 
organisaties zoals de Uganda Wildlife Authority en buitenlandse bedrijven. In de moeilijke 
overgang van oorlog naar vrede, worden geschillen over land beschouwd als een ernstige 
bedreiging voor de stabiliteit van Noord-Oeganda. In reactie op deze onzekerheid over land 
eigendom en land conflicten heeft de regering van de NRM de aanzet gegeven tot een reeks 
hervormingen, waarin decentralisatie een prominente plek inneemt. Dit rechtvaardigt een 
verkenning van hoe gedecentraliseerd land bestuur eigenlijk werkt in Oeganda.  
De situatie in Noord-Oeganda is vergelijkbaar met andere door conflict getroffen gebieden, 
waar onzekerheid over land eigendom een veel voorkomend verschijnsel is. Deze situatie 
wordt gekenmerkt door grote aantallen mensen die opnieuw hun land innemen binnen een 
kort tijdsbestek, en veel geschillen over eigendomsrechten, waarbij ontheemden hun land 
bezet vinden door anderen, of zich juist zelf gevestigd hebben op het land van anderen 
(Meinzen-Dick et al. 2008; Van Leeuwen, 2008). Daardoor wordt het ontwikkelen van post-
conflict bestuur en beleid van land een enorme uitdaging. Gewelddadige conflicten kunnen 
het functioneren van de verantwoordelijke overheidsinstanties ondermijnen, in een situatie 
mensen vaak twijfels hebben over de capaciteiten en de legitimiteit van die instanties om 
eigendomsrechten over land en natuurlijke hulpbronnen af te dwingen (zie Daudelin, 2003; 
Unruh, 2003). Tegenwoordig worden hervormingen van bestuur en beleid ten aanzien van 
land gezien als een noodzakelijke maatregel na een conflict, om geschillen over land te 
beslechten, aangezien deze vaak gerelateerd zijn aan andere spanningen in de samenleving 
(zie Cotula et al., 2004; Wiley, 2006; Anseeuw en Alden, 2010). Dit zijn echter zeer gevoelige 
zaken in post-conflict samenlevingen, aangezien verdeling van land niet alleen invloed heeft 
op de mogelijkheden voor mensen om na conflict weer in hun dagelijkse levensonderhoud te 
voorzien, maar ook omdat het ook de kern raakt waar het in het vredesproces om gaat. 
Het startpunt van deze thesis was om te analyseren hoe beleid en bestuur van en 
landhervorming vorm krijgen in post-conflict Noord-Oeganda. De thesis onderzocht hoe de 
LRA oorlog land bestuur veranderde; hoe landhervorming na conflict uitpakt, met name 
decentralisatie; hoe dit van invloed is op de legitimiteit en het gezag van lokale autoriteiten 
en bijdraagt aan de beslechting van land conflicten. Het onderzoek keek met name naar de 
vraag hoe dergelijke hervormingen bijdroegen aan het proces van staatsvorming.109 
                                                          
109 Het onderzoek voor dit proefschrift was onderdeel van het programma "Grounding Land Governance", dat 
gefinancierd werd door NWO-WOTRO Science for Global Development, onder nummer W 01.65.332.00. Dit 
programma was een samenwerking tussen het Afrika-Studiecentrum van Leiden Universiteit, Wageningen 
Universiteit, het Centrum voor Internationaal Conflict Analyse & Management van de Radboud Universiteit te 
Nijmegen en Mbarara University of Science and Technology in Oeganda. Dit programma onderzocht hoe land 
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De bevindingen van de studie tonen aan hoe de LRA-oorlog niet alleen grondeigendom door 
elkaar schudde, maar ook bestaande praktijken van land management verstoorde en 
veranderde. De analyse laat met name zien hoe de oorlog de rol van jongeren en vrouwen in 
het bestuur van land transformeerde. Decentralisatie bleek gemengde resultaten te hebben, 
in de zin dat het bijdroeg aan een toename van het aantal instituties en concurrentie tussen 
statelijk en op gewoonterecht gebaseerd gezag. Ondanks decentralisatie blijven vertegen-
woordigers van de centrale overheid het voor het zeggen hebben in besluitvorming over land 
op lokaal niveau. Alle case studies illustreren hoe lokale wijzigingen in landbestuur niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs resulteren in meer zekerheid van land eigendom, maar vaak worden 
opgevat als pogingen door buitenstaanders om lokaal land te verwerven. Een algemene 
bevinding is dat hervorming van land bestuur in Noord-Oeganda deel uitmaakt van een 
omstreden politiek programma om de staat weer op te bouwen. 
Het onderzoek besteedde bijzondere aandacht aan man-vrouw verhoudingen in land bestuur 
na conflict. Vrouwen worden vaak op andere manieren getroffen dan mannen in 
oorlogssituaties, en veldwerk onderzocht hoe de oorlog invloed had op eigendom van en 
toegang tot land van vrouwen en hun specifieke kwetsbaarheden in postconflict situaties. Een 
specifiek hoofdstuk over gender-problematiek in land bestuur in Noord-Oeganda is in 
voorbereiding, maar maakt geen deel uit van dit proefschrift.  Enkele van de bevindingen zijn 
terug te zien in een documentaire getiteld "Governance off the Ground " die een van de 
resultaten was van het grotere programma ‘Grounding Land Governance’ en van mijn 
onderzoeksproject in het bijzonder. 
Veldwerk voor dit proefschrift werd uitgevoerd in Acholi sub-regio, Noord-Oeganda. Veldwerk 
was etnografische van karakter en maakte gebruik van diverse kwalitatieve methoden, onder 
andere participatieve observatie, een analyse van secundaire literatuur, 25 focus-groep 
discussies, en 133 interviews met lokale mensen, mannen en vrouwen, jeugd (zowel 
vrouwelijk als mannelijk), leden van ‘local councils’, ouderen, vertegenwoordigers van ‘area 
land committees’ en ‘district land boards’, ambtenaren op sub-county en districtsniveau, 
politieagenten en parkwachters, medewerkers van NGOs, culturele leiders, advocaten, 
ambtenaren van het ministerie van Land, Huisvesting en Stedelijke ontwikkeling, en politici. 
Hoofdstuk drie laat zien dat gewelddadige conflicten en oorlog belangrijke gevolgen hebben 
voor land bestuur en geschillen over land na conflict. De casestudie van de uitzetting van 
lokale bewoners van hun land in Apaa, in Amuru district, bespreekt de ingewikkelde causale 
relaties tussen de 20-jarige burgeroorlog in Noord-Oeganda en huidige geschillen over land in 
de Acholi regio. Terwijl wetenschappelijke literatuur land conflicten meestal uitlegt in termen 
van schaarste dan wel politieke ecologie blijkt uit de analyse dat politiek ecologische 
benaderingen verder versterkt kunnen worden door erkenning dat beleid ten aanzien van land 
niet alleen een oorzaak is van conflict, maar dat gewelddadige conflicten op hun beurt ook 
een belangrijke invloed op beleid hebben. Politieke, historische en sociale ontwikkelingen 
raken met elkaar verweven en dragen bij aan de conflictiviteit van land of natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen. Gewelddadige conflicten worden aangewakkerd door spanningen tussen lokale 
groepen over sociale kwesties zoals etniciteit, grieven over machthebbers, beperkte of 
ongelijke toegang tot land en de instanties die natuurlijke hulpbronnen beheren. Dit 
                                                          
bestuur zich ontwikkeld in door conflict getroffen Oeganda, Burundi en Zuid-Soedan, en resulteert uit de 
interactie tussen meerdere belanghebbenden. 
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hoofdstuk laat zien dat hoe deze kwesties worden aangepakt door beleidsmakers van cruciaal 
belang is voor succesvolle wederopbouw en stabiliteit na conflict. 
De casestudie van Amuru Sugar Project in hoofdstuk vier reflecteert op decentralisatie van 
land bestuur en de rol daarvan in grootschalige toewijzingen van land. De meeste experts 
wijten het gebrek aan succes van decentralisatie aan onduidelijkheden in regelgeving en 
beperkte beschikbaarheid van financiële middelen. Dit onderzoek wijst er echter op dat 
besluiten over toewijzingen van land op lagere overheidsniveaus vaak de belangen van 
degenen op hogere overheidsniveaus weerspiegelen, en het resultaat zijn van manipulatie en 
inmenging in lokale kwesties door politici van hogere niveaus. Het hoofdstuk concludeert dat 
zonder werkelijke overdracht van macht aan gedecentraliseerde structuren, decentralisatie 
ineffectief zal blijven als een middel om participatie in lokale besluitvorming te realiseren 
Hoofdstuk vijf, dat is gebaseerd op een conflict over land in Pader district, reflecteert op de 
notie van institutioneel pluralisme, en welke invloed dit heeft op het oplossen van geschillen 
over land. De analyse laat met name zien hoe decentralisatie bijdraagt aan een toename van 
lokale instituties door het oprichten van nieuwe instituties naast de reeds bestaande 
autoriteiten en regelgeving over land, in plaats van dat het resulteert in de overdracht van 
macht aan bestaande lokale instellingen. Dit leidt tot onduidelijkheid onder mensen die 
conflicten hebben over land over welke instituties ze zouden moeten benaderen, en draagt 
bij aan concurrentie tussen instituties op lokaal niveau, wat bijdraagt aan een situatie waarin 
land conflicten nooit tot een definitieve oplossing komen. Dit zorgt ervoor dat land conflicten 
toenemen en wijkt daarmee af van de ambitie om door decentralisatie tot betere 
dienstverlening te komen. 
Hoofdstuk zes belicht de centrale rol van de jeugd in post-conflict land bestuur. Dit hoofdstuk 
laat zien dat hoewel intergenerationele conflicten onlosmakelijk deel van de samenleving 
uitmaken, oorlog sociale en politieke verandering aanzienlijk versnelt, wat resulteert in een 
verschuiving van rollen in land bestuur richting jonge mannen. Deze verschuiving van de 
macht resulteert in strijd over zeggenschap over land bestuur tussen de jeugd en de oudere 
generatie. Echter, terwijl sommige jongeren aan zeggenschap en dominantie in het bestuur 
van het land winnen, verliezen andere jongeren juist aan zeggenschap, vooral vrouwen en 
wezen. Het hoofdstuk laat zien hoe de dynamiek van het verblijf in kampen voor ontheemden, 
deelname aan de oorlog, het verwerven van posities in de gedecentraliseerde overheid, en 
het onvermogen om werkgelegenheid buiten de landbouw te vinden een aanzienlijke invloed 
hebben op de rol van de jeugd in land bestuur na conflict. Het hoofdstuk concludeert dat de 
nieuw verkregen rollen van de jeugd in land bestuur onherstelbare consequenties hebben 
voor land beheer op basis van gewoonterecht, waarbij zeggenschap over land juist berust bij 
de oudere generatie. 
Op basis van deze verschillende casestudies komt dit proefschrift tot de algemene conclusie 
dat hervorming van landbestuur in Oeganda in feite neerkomt op een omstreden project van 
wederopbouw van de staat. Staten gebruiken post-conflict land bestuur als een middel om 
weer controle te krijgen en autoriteit te claimen in gebieden waar tijdens het conflict andere 
vormen van gezag de dienst uitmaakten. Dit argument wordt uitgewerkt in hoofdstuk 7, 
waarin ook de belangrijkste bevindingen met betrekking tot de onderzoeksvragen besproken 
worden. 
▪ 20 jaar burgeroorlog in Noord-Oeganda reorganiseerde niet alleen toegang tot land en 
land bezit, maar veranderde praktijken van land bestuur in de Acholi regio. Land en 
land bestuur zijn een cruciaal onderdeel in hoe om te gaan met de erfenis van de LRA: 
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niet zozeer in dat onenigheid over land en land bestuur het LRA conflict veroorzaakten, 
maar in dat elke huidige interventie, gerechtelijke uitspraak, of elk overheidsoptreden 
rondom land beoordeeld wordt in het licht van eerdere ervaringen van uitsluiting die 
ten grondslag lagen aan de LRA-oorlog. Land blijkt een zeer kritieke kwestie in de 
werkelijke dan wel veronderstelde competitie tussen het noorden en het zuiden van 
Oeganda. 
▪ Decentralisatie is een belangrijke strategie van de regering om om te gaan met land 
conflicten en onzekerheid over landeigendom. Echter, decentralisatie blijkt 
grotendeels ineffectief, omdat geen werkelijke overdracht van macht naar lagere 
niveaus plaatsgevonden heeft. De hoge mate van betrokkenheid van 
vertegenwoordigers van de staat in lokale besluitvorming over land suggereert dat de 
centrale regering probeert om haar controle over lokaal bestuur te handhaven of te 
versterken, met name in die regio’s van Oeganda waar haar autoriteit zwak is. 
▪ Op lokaal niveau diskwalificeren hervormingsprogramma’s in feite op gewoonterecht 
gebaseerde instituties en dragen ze bij aan de toename van en concurrentie tussen 
instituties. Dit zet op gewoonterecht gebaseerde autoriteiten op een zijspoor, ten 
voordele van de staat, en resulteert niet in meer zekerheid over landeigendom van 
kleinschalige landbouwers, die meestal toegang hebben tot land gebaseerd op 
gewoonterecht. 
▪ Deze praktijken in Oeganda laten zien hoe hervorming van landbestuur kan dienen als 
een gelegenheid voor staatsvorming, en een middel voor de staat om zijn greep over 
zijn grondgebied te versterken en zijn macht te laten zien of te herstellen in post-
conflict gebieden. Door inmenging in land bestuur in Noord-Oeganda probeert de staat 
om zich te vestigen als de hoogste politieke autoriteit met de capaciteit om effectief 
zijn wil op te leggen. 
▪ Bovendien, landhervorming wordt vaak beschouwd als een gemakkelijke, technische 
procedure om de manieren waarop land bestuurd en beheerd wordt beter te 
organiseren. Dit proefschrift toont echter aan dat landhervorming een zeer omstreden 
en gewelddadige proces is. In Oeganda is geweld door zowel de staat als de lokale 
bevolking verworden tot een belangrijk middel om land bestuur te hervormen, en 
toegang tot en eigendom van land te bewerkstelligen. 
Implicaties voor beleidsmakers 
Land bestuur na conflict speelt een belangrijke rol in het vredesproces in post-conflict 
gebieden. Gezien het feit dat het vaak omstreden is, dienen land hervormingen zoals 
decentralisaties van land bestuur voorzichtig te worden uitgevoerd. Om doeltreffend te zijn 
moet er een duidelijke toewijzing van beslisbevoegdheden en verantwoordelijkheden 
plaatsvinden tussen statelijke en niet statelijke autoriteiten rondom land. Dit kan helpen het 
aantal land-conflicten te verminderen die steeds heen en weer geschoven worden tussen 
verschillende instituties. In een post-conflict situatie moet beleid rondom land prioriteit geven 
aan de behoeften van lokale mensen met betrekking tot zekerheid van land eigendom en land 
conflicten. Alleen op een dergelijke manier zou de Ugandese staat meer legitimiteit kunnen 
verwerven in het noorden van het land. 
 137 
 
Other Outputs from the research 
Documentary - Governance Off the Ground. August 2013. The documentary presents post-
conflict land governance issues in Northern Uganda and South Sudan. Can be accessed at; 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=mkG_g3h_50g 
Mathijs Van Leeuwen, Ilso Zeemejer, Doreen Kobusingye, Charles Muchunguzi, Linda Haartsen 
and Claudia Piacenza (2014). “The Continuities in Contested Land Acquisitions in Uganda”, in 
An Ansom and Thea Hilhorst eds., Losing your Land: Dispossession in the Great Lakes. James 
Curry, African Series. Can be accessed at; www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt6wp9mv 
Kobusingye, N. D.  (forthcoming). “Gender and Socio-economic Development: The Role of LRA 
War in the Current Gender Relations and Development in Northern Uganda”, in The Political 
Economy of Post-Conflict Development in Northern Uganda. International Alert; Kampala. 
  
 138 
 
 
 139 
 
About the Author  
Doreen Nancy Kobusingye was born in 1982 in Bushenyi district in Uganda. In 2001 she 
completed secondary school and in 2002 joined Makerere University Kampala, where she 
graduated with a second class upper Bachelor of Arts degree in development studies in 2005. 
Her BA dissertation is entitled: An Assessment of the Challenges of Rural Electrification in 
Enhancing Development: A case study of Mafubira Sub-county, Jinja District, Uganda. In 2008 
Doreen attained a NUFFIC scholarship and joined the faculty of development studies at 
Mbarara University of Science and Technology. In 2011 she graduated with a Master of Arts 
degree in development studies specializing in decentralization and local governance. Her MA 
thesis is entitled: The Efficacy of Creating New Districts as a Channel of Service Delivery in 
Uganda: A case study of Kayunga District.  
From 2008 to 2010 Doreen was a teaching assistant at Mbarara University of Science and 
Technology teaching a course unit called NGOs and Development. She also worked as a 
research assistant at KIN Development and Management Associates, Kampala. In 2011 she 
received a NWO-WOTRO scholarship and became a PhD candidate under Grounding Land 
Governance program which was funded by NWO-WOTRO Science for Global Development 
grant number W 01.65.332.00. The program was designed to investigate how land governance 
evolves in post-conflict situations. Uganda, Burundi and South Sudan were the study areas. 
The project in Uganda aimed to study how decentralization influences relations of land 
governance, the impacts the legitimacy and authority of local institutions and the resolution 
of land conflicts in post-conflict northern Uganda. 
She conducted ethnographic research on post-conflict land governance in Northern Uganda 
for 2 years (2011-2013). She organized and moderated 5 workshops in Amuru, Gulu, Kampala 
and Entebbe to disseminate research findings to stakeholders including policy makers, NGOs, 
academia, researchers, central and local government and the local people. In 2013 Doreen 
conducted research on women’s land rights in northern Uganda and traversed West Nile, 
Acholi, Lango, Teso and Karamoja regions, the research was commissioned by Oxfam. In 
March 2013 Doreen conducted research on various aspects of land governance in Yei, South 
Sudan, and was part of the team that shot a documentary entitled Governance off the ground, 
it depicts women stranded in former Pabbo IDP camp because of land conflicts. 
Doreen prepared and presented papers at the 2014 World Bank Conference on Land and 
Poverty at the World Bank Washington DC and the 2014 Conference on Land Policy in Africa 
at African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In 2014 Doreen and other authors wrote a book 
chapter entitled; The Continuities in Contested Land Acquisitions in Uganda. In eds. An Ansom 
and Thea Hilhorst. Losing your Land: Dispossession in the Great Lakes. Still in 2014 she 
conducted a research on governing commercial pressure on land: what is the role of local 
government? A case study of Amuru local government, northern Uganda that was 
commissioned by Landac. In 2016 Doreen and other authors published an article entitled; 
“Where Do I Report My Land Dispute? The Impact of Institutional Proliferation on Land 
Governance in Post-conflict Northern Uganda.” Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 
DOI: 10.1080/07329113.2016.1195673. In 2017 Doreen and other authors published an 
article entitled; “The Multifaceted Relationship between Land and Violent Conflict: The case 
of Apaa Evictions in Amuru district, Northern Uganda.” Journal of Modern African Studies. 
Currently Doreen works in Kampala, Uganda as a consultant on land governance, 
decentralization, gender and development and as a part time lecturer. 
 140 
 
Completed Training and Learning Activities 
 
Learning Activities 
Learning Activity Institution Time ECTS 
Courses 
Ceres Basic Training Course Ceres 2011 10 
A practical course on the methodology of 
fieldwork 
Ceres 2011 2 
Qualitative Data Analysis for Development 
Research 
Ceres 2011 1.5 
Quantitative Methodology and Economics 
Quantitative 
Ceres 2011 2 
Ceres Summer School Ceres 2011 1 
Workshops and Conferences 
Presentation and Organization of Research 
Findings To Stakeholders About Apaa 
Evictions at Pabbo Sub-County, Amuru 
District 
ASC 27th-09-2012 3 
Where Do I Report My Land Dispute? The 
Impact of Institutional Proliferation on 
Land Governance in Northern Uganda. 
“2014 World Bank 
Conference On Land 
And Poverty” 
The World Bank - 
Washington DC,  
March 24-27, 
2014 
1 
Decentralization And Power Complexities 
In Large-scale Land Allocations: 
The Case Of Amuru Sugar Project In 
Uganda 
Inaugural Conference 
On Land Policy In 
Africa, Addis Ababa  
11-14 
November 
2014 
 
1 
Land In Post-Conflict Situations: The Role 
Of Decentralization, War And Youth In Land 
Governance In Northern Uganda. 
Presentation and organization of Research 
Findings to Stakeholders in Gulu (northern 
Uganda) 
ASC 7th 
November 
2014 
3 
 141 
 
Land In Post-Conflict Situations: The Role 
Of Decentralization, War And Youth In Land 
Governance In Northern Uganda. National 
Workshop Uganda at Imperial Royale Hotel 
Kampala. 
ASC 19th May 
2015 
1 
Policy note: Post-conflict land governance 
reform in the Great Lakes region - Insights 
and challenges. Regional Seminar at 
Imperial Botanical Beach Hotel, Entebbe. 
ASC 20th -21st 
May 2015 
2 
Decentralization And Power Complexities 
In Large-scale Land Allocations:  
The Case Of Amuru Sugar Project In 
Uganda. Workshop on Land Governance in 
Juba, South Sudan.  
ASC 25th May 
2015 
1 
African Youths; The Forgotten Category in 
land governance. A Case study of Post-
conflict Acholi Region, Northern Uganda. 
Inaugural Conference 
of the Young African 
Researchers in 
Agriculture, Cape 
Town  
06-08 
February 
2017 
1 
 
 142 
 
Funding 
The research for this thesis was funded by the Dutch government through WOTRO Science for 
Global Development grant number W 01.65.332.00. 
